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Abstract 
Dynamic capabilities explain how firms adapt to environmental dynamism by modifying 
their underlying resources and capabilities.  However, despite a robust understanding of how 
dynamic capabilities are influenced by different dimensions of environmental dynamism (eg. 
velocity), scholars have not explained how dynamic capabilities develop in the presence of 
different configurations of environmental dynamism.  Common configurations of environmental 
dynamism include environmental shifts, which pertain to discontinuous environmental change, 
and ongoing environmental change, which depicts hypercompetitive environments.  In this 
thesis, I explore how dynamic capabilities develop in the context of a configuration of 
environmental dynamism that I call persistent disturbances, defined as repeated temporary 
events confronting firms.  My research investigates how firms build and further develop dynamic 
capabilities in the presence of persistent disturbances.  
In my research, I engaged in an inductive historical case study to build new and to 
elaborate on existing dynamic capability theory.  I chose the North American automotive 
industry for my context, focusing on the time period between 1965 and 2010, during which the 
industry was confronted with persistent disturbances in the form of labour difficulties, economic 
cycles, competitive pressures, energy challenges, and government regulations.  I focused my 
analysis on three firms: General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford.  I created a longitudinal dataset 
consisting of both qualitative and quantitative data obtained from archival sources including 
annual reports and the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks.  I analyzed these data in three iterative 
stages.  First, I focused on identifying the persistent disturbances that had impacts on automotive 
firms.  Second, I explored how the firms in my study responded to those persistent disturbances.  
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Third, I built new theory and elaborated existing theory pertaining to how dynamic capabilities 
develop over time in the presence of persistent disturbances.   
My analysis yielded important findings.  First, I found that, in response to persistent 
disturbances, dynamic capabilities developed through a process of capability layering.  The 
result was a dynamic capability architecture that comprised layers of capabilities that functioned 
to facilitate change.  Dynamic capability development proceeds from early periods of coping 
towards increasing technical fitness as firms build new dynamic capability layers by adding and 
modifying the capabilities that functioned as building blocks supporting the dynamic capability.  
My research also distinguished persistent disturbances from other configurations of 
environmental dynamism and offer insights regarding how different configurations of 
environmental dynamism influence dynamic capability development.   
Overall, this thesis makes important contributions to dynamic capability theory and to 
understanding the role of environmental dynamism in strategic management scholarship.  My 
thesis also has important implications for practice.   
Keywords: Dynamic Capabilities; Resilience; Environmental Dynamism; Automotive 
Industry 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.0 Introduction 
The automotive industry has experienced significant disturbances over its long history.  
In the 1930s the industry was the site of violent and prolonged battles with labour movement and 
union organizers.  Through depressions and recessions the automotive industry has been subject 
to the whims of economic cycles—booms and busts.  Then in the 1970s the automotive industry 
was hit hard with oil crises and concerns over national security and fuel economy, followed 
closely by a national furor and government regulations regarding safety and smog-producing 
emissions.  Throughout, North American automotive firms faced increasing threats from 
Japanese and other foreign competitors.  What is most striking about these disturbances is that 
while automotive firms responded to them with new management practices and technologies, not 
only did the disturbances persist, but the North American automotive firms continued to be 
challenged by these disturbances.  This research asks how firms build and further develop 
capabilities that permit adaptation to such persistent disturbances. 
The literature on dynamic capabilities offers a strong starting point.  Dynamic capabilities 
research addresses how firms respond to environmental change (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Helfat, et al 2007).  Dynamic capabilities have been 
defined as a firm’s “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies” to address changing environments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997: 516).  
However, despite a robust understanding of how dynamic capabilities are influenced by different 
dimensions of environmental dynamism (eg. velocity), scholars have not explained how dynamic 
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capabilities develop in the presence of different configurations or patterns of environmental 
dynamism, such as persistent disturbances.   
To address this theoretical gap, I conducted a longitudinal, historical case study, 
analyzing Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors (GM) within the North American automotive 
industry between 1965 and 2010.  I supported my study with a unique archival dataset 
comprising automotive firm annual reports, firm and industry analysis, Compustat data, and 
other data in order to construct rich case histories pertaining to how firms responded to the 
persistent disturbances in their environment.  This longitudinal view permitted me to study how 
firms developed dynamic capabilities over time in response to persistent disturbances. 
Guided by my data analysis, I focused on five persistent disturbances in the North 
American automotive context: economic cycles, labour disruptions, energy challenges, 
competitive pressures, and government regulations.  I further focused on how firms built 
dynamic capabilities to adapt their manufacturing operations in response to three persistent 
manufacturing implications which resulted from the five persistent disturbances I found.  The 
persistent manufacturing implications facing North American automotive firms were fluctuating 
consumer demand for vehicles, fluctuating consumer model preferences, and profit margin 
pressures.  I found that firms addressed these persistent manufacturing implications over time by 
developing distinct dynamic capabilities in manufacturing flexibility.  Figure 1 offers an 
organizing framework graphically depicting how persistent disturbances, persistent 
manufacturing implications, and dynamic capabilities relate to one another. 
3 
 
Figure 1 From Persistent Disturbances to Dynamic Capabilities 
 
Three main findings emerged from my research.  First, my research stressed the 
importance of incorporating not only dimensions of environmental dynamism such as velocity, 
but configurations of environmental dynamism.  By configurations I am referring to patterns of 
environmental dynamism such as environmental shifts, which involve dramatic or discontinuous 
change to a firm’s environment, and ongoing environmental change, which describes 
environments in a constant state of flux or churn.  I focused my research, however, on an 
important third configuration of environmental dynamism called persistent disturbances, which I 
defined as repeated temporary events confronting firms.   
Second, my research highlighted the importance of dynamic capability architecture, 
which refers to how capabilities relate to one another.  By examining in detail the dynamic 
capabilities associated with manufacturing flexibility that developed over 45 years, I discerned 
that the dynamic capability architecture of manufacturing flexibility comprised a family of 
dynamic capabilities, which in turn comprised layers of capabilities that changed over time.  This 
highly layered capability architecture serves a critical function in explaining how similar 
dynamic capabilities can function so differently.   
Finally, building on my insights into dynamic capability architecture, my research shed 
light on how dynamic capabilities develop over time.  I found that in environments characterized 
by persistent disturbances, instead of building dynamic capabilities in response to uncertainties 
and unknowns, firms built dynamic capabilities in response to repeated and predictable 
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disturbances.  Firms develop their dynamic capabilities by building entirely new dynamic 
capability layers and by adding or modifying the capabilities that functioned as building blocks 
supporting a dynamic capability.  Development proceeds from early periods of coping, as firms 
struggle with deploying dynamic capabilities that exhibit poor technical fitness with respect to 
the type of change required, to periods in which the dynamic capabilities exhibit high technical 
fitness and are well adapted to the demands of the persistent disturbances.   
This thesis is presented in six chapters.  In the next chapter I review literature on dynamic 
capabilities and environmental dynamism, clearly articulating the gaps with respect to how 
dynamic capabilities research addresses environmental dynamism.  In subsequent chapters, I 
review my case-based methodology, describing my research context, data sources, and data 
analysis, and present my findings.  I organize the presentation of my findings by describing the 
history of the five persistent disturbances I found in the North American automotive context, 
three persistent manufacturing implications, and subsequently how the automotive firms 
developed dynamic capabilities in response.  Following this I analyze these findings, building 
theory and formal propositions pertaining to how firms originate, develop, and deploy dynamic 
capabilities.  Finally, I discuss my findings, clarify my contributions, and close by offering 
opportunities for future research into dynamic capabilities.   
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Dynamic Capabilities 
Formal definitions of dynamic capabilities are plentiful.  The earliest was proffered by 
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997: 516), who described dynamic capabilities as the “ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
environments.”  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1107) extended the definition to incorporate the 
ability of firms to initiate change, defining dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s processes that use 
resources…to match and even create market change.”  These “firm processes” refer to routines 
that permit the integration, reconfiguration, acquisition, and release of resources in response to 
changing markets (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  Further, in a recent book taking stock of 
dynamic capabilities research to date, dynamic capabilities were defined as “the capacity of an 
organization to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base, and consists of patterned 
and somewhat practiced activity”  (Helfat et al 2007: 121).   
While differing in some details, these definitions collectively highlight critical features of 
dynamic capabilities.  First, prior literature has situated dynamic capabilities within a hierarchy 
of capabilities.  Dynamic capabilities modify lower-order ordinary capabilities and resources 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Collis, 1994; Winter, 2003; Salvato 
and Rerup, 2011).  Ordinary capabilities are those that firms use in their day-to-day operations 
(Winter, 2003).  They constitute a firm’s ability to execute day-to-day tasks (Pavlou and El 
Sawy, 2011) and produce outputs of a particular type (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  Dynamic 
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capabilities permit firms to create new combinations of these ordinary capabilities (Pavlou and 
El Sawy, 2011).  For example, product development processes or routines are higher-order 
dynamic capabilities that are employed to reconfigure the types of products a firm manufactures 
or the services the firm offers (Danneels, 2008).  This reconfiguration involves creating, 
modifying, repurposing, and releasing a firm’s internal (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Danneels, 
2010; Danneels, 2008) and external resources (Lichtenthaler, Ernst, and Hoegel, 2010; Capron 
and Mitchell, 2009).   
Second, dynamic capabilities aim to achieve and maintain fit with a firm’s changing 
external environment (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Helfat et al, 2007).  Thus, dynamic 
capabilities address how firms deal with the environmental dynamism that threatens to make 
their existing capabilities obsolete (Winter, 2003; Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  In this respect 
dynamic capabilities draw heavily on early contingency theory arguments that emphasize the 
importance of firms developing capabilities that are appropriate for a given environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978).  Environmental dynamism is at the core of dynamic capabilities, driving the 
very need to develop dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007).   
Third, dynamic capabilities are practised, patterned, and purposeful responses to 
environmental change.  Similar to ordinary capabilities, dynamic capabilities imply that an 
organization can perform an activity in a reliable and satisfactory way (Helfat and Winter, 2011).  
Helfat and co-authors (2007) describe dynamic capability as a capacity, stressing that the 
performance of the capability must exceed some minimum threshold of proficiency.  The 
dynamic capabilities literature argues that change due to dynamic capabilities should be 
distinguished from “ad hoc problem solving” (Winter, 2003:992).  The latter refers to change 
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that is not routine or patterned and that is often undertaken in response to unpredictable events 
(Winter, 2003: 992).  In short, not all change to a firm’s ordinary capabilities is a result of 
dynamic capabilities.  Capabilities can change in an ad hoc manner as discussed above, but 
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) also stress that a firm’s ordinary capabilities can also change in non-
routine ways through what they articulate as a capability life cycle.   
Dynamic capabilities draw from both the resource-based view of the firm and 
evolutionary economics (Di Stefano, Peteraf, and Verona, 2010; Barney, 1991; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  From a resource-based perspective, dynamic capabilities were originally 
conceptualized to redress a gap in the ability of the resource-based view to explain sustainable 
competitive advantage in dynamic, Schumpeterian environments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 
1997).  These are environments in which existing competences are destroyed, requiring the 
development and elaboration of new competences.  Scholars adopting the resource-based view 
emphasize that dynamic capabilities are a critical component of a firm’s ability to renew its 
competitive advantage over rivals, often through wholesale change and dramatic transformations 
(Rosenbloom, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).   
From an evolutionary economics perspective, dynamic capabilities are hierarchically 
nested routines.  In this view, a firm’s zero-level routines are the ordinary capabilities that permit 
firms to make a living in the here and now.  Dynamic capabilities are higher-order routines or 
capabilities that extend, modify, or create lower-order capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002; 
Winter, 2003; Danneels, 2008).  This routine-based perspective clarifies that dynamic 
capabilities are built deliberately in areas where the need for regular change is strong and the 
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benefits of building such a capacity outweigh its maintenance costs (Winter, 2003).  This 
conceptualization of dynamic capabilities often emphasizes continuous, routine change.   
There is much debate as to whether dynamic capabilities directly provide competitive 
advantage for organizations.  Whether dynamic capabilities simply permit firms to reconfigure 
their resources, or whether they are also tied intimately to firm performance and sustainable 
competitive advantage, remains a matter of debate (Easterby-Smith, Lyles and Peteraf, 2009).  
Research by Teece and colleagues claims that dynamic capabilities contribute to competitive 
advantage (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007), while Shamsie, Martin, and Miller 
(2009) found no relationship between dynamic capabilities and firm performance in a sample of 
project-based firms.  Research that makes performance claims has been accused of committing a 
tautology—defining dynamic capabilities in terms of the desired performance outcomes (Priem 
and Butler, 2001; Arend and Bromiley, 2009).  The emerging consensus is that dynamic 
capabilities do not directly contribute to a firm’s performance or its competitive advantage; 
instead dynamic capabilities permit a firm to manipulate its resources (Helfat et al 2007).  
Dynamic capabilities are a source of competitive advantage when "applied sooner, more astutely, 
and more fortuitously than competitors” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1117; Wang and Ahmed, 
2007). 
While there is substantial theory pertaining to dynamic capabilities (eg. Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007; Helfat et al, 2007), part of the challenge for scholars is that 
empirical research into dynamic capabilities remains nascent (Newbert, 2007; Barreto, 2010; 
Danneels, 2010; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009).  Recently, research has begun to fill the void and 
provide the field with more substance.  I provide empirical examples of different types of 
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dynamic capabilities in Table 1 (an extended review of empirical dynamic capabilities research 
can be found in table A2 in the Appendix).  These dynamic capabilities can be loosely grouped 
into dynamic capabilities that address relationship management, organizational structure, product 
and service development, and general management. 
Table 1 Examples of Dynamic Capabilities  
Topic     Examples 
Relationship 
Management 
• Alliance management (Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010; 
Kale and Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010) 
Organizational Structure • Architectural innovation (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001)  
• Resource divestment (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007) 
• Resource allocation (Coen and Maritan, 2011) 
• Diversification (Doving and Gooderham, 2008; Dixon, 
Meyer, and Day, 2010)  
• Foreign expansion (Luo, 2002) 
Product and Service 
Development 
• Research and development (Danneels, 2008; Helfat, 1997)   
• New product development capabilities (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995) 
General Management • Dynamic managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003) 
Given the breadth of possible dynamic capabilities, Helfat et al (2007) encourage 
scholars to clearly and precisely specify the nature of a dynamic capability under analysis.  
Discussing dynamic capabilities with greater precision provides managers and academics with a 
stronger understanding of what dynamic capabilities are and, more important, what can be done 
to further develop them.  Even still, much research into dynamic capabilities pertains to what are 
clearly very general dynamic capabilities, such as learning, knowledge transfer (Galunic and 
Rodan, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Zander and Kogut, 1995), integrative capabilities (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), and absorptive capacity (Zahra and 
George, 2002).  Marcus and Anderson (2006: 19) argue that general dynamic capabilities involve 
“searching for new ideas and methods, comparing company practices to the best in the industry, 
evaluating practices in other industries, and experimenting.”  Critics of this approach argue that 
these dynamic capabilities are described much too generally.  They suggest that attempting to 
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hedge against all contingencies by building general dynamic capabilities generates costs and 
complexity that may exceed the benefits provided by dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003; 
Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). Winter (2003) goes further, stating that there is no such thing 
as a general-purpose routine for dynamic change.   
Scholars have also sought to understand the mechanisms that undergird dynamic 
capabilities.  This work is still in its infancy (Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007).  However, 
consensus has emerged that two broad mechanisms are at play: one for sensing, search, and 
selection and another for reconfiguration and deployment (Teece, 2007; Helfat et al, 2007).  
Sensing, search, and selection refer to the capabilities of firms to identify and take advantage of 
threats and opportunities in the environment (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  For example, 
firms need to identify what new products and services they should produce for a given set of 
environmental changes before they can reconfigure their resources in response. An accurate 
understanding of a firm’s resources, including their fungibility (Danneels, 2010; Dixon et al, 
2010), is also important to the development of dynamic capabilities.  Schreyogg and Kliesch-
Eberl (2007) argue that firms must be capable of monitoring their own capabilities.  Thus 
dynamic capabilities involve a significant decision-making component (Helfat et al, 2007).  The 
second mechanism, reconfiguration and deployment, refers to the various ways in which firms 
create, extend, and modify their resource base.  In the next section I discuss how firms build and 
develop dynamic capabilities. 
2.2 The Origins and Development of Dynamic Capabilities  
Dynamic capabilities are not readily purchased; they must be built, maintained, and 
developed by the firms that possess them.  This is not a trivial challenge.  It requires that firms 
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make long-term commitments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  It follows that there is no 
single development path for dynamic capabilities.  Instead, different paths are effective for 
different types of dynamic capabilities and in different contexts.  In a study of Indian and 
Pakistani firms, Malik and Kotabe (2009) found that three capabilities formed the foundation for 
the dynamic capabilities they were studying.  These included organizational learning through 
experience, reverse engineering in order to gain valuable product knowledge, and manufacturing 
flexibility in order to improve integration and coordination processes.  Similarly, scholars have 
identified that a firm’s idiosyncratic incumbent capabilities or “positions” directly influence the 
development of dynamic capabilities.  These positions include technological, complementary, 
reputational, and structural resource endowments (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  For 
instance, studies have found that prior experience (King and Tucci, 2002) and capability 
strengths (Wernerfelt, 1984) play significant roles in how a firm develops its capabilities.  Firms 
are found to diversify and develop along firm strengths.  Lavie (2006) extends this logic, arguing 
that large gaps between a firm’s desired and existing capabilities lead the firm to acquire or 
substitute new capabilities in lieu of evolving or developing existing capabilities.   
Sensing capabilities, a critical component of the processes or routines that undergird 
dynamic capabilities, also play an important role in the initial and ongoing development of 
dynamic capabilities.  Sensing capabilities permit a firm to identify new development paths 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) as well as provide an accurate understanding of the firm’s 
existing capabilities, which can inform further development (Lavie, 2006; Capron and Mitchell, 
2009).  Danneels (2008) found that many organizational antecedents of dynamic capabilities are 
within managerial control.  He cited slack resources, environmental scanning, willingness to 
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cannibalize, and constructive conflict as factors that positively influence the development of 
dynamic capabilities.   
Recent research has begun to discuss capability development in terms of life cycles (Keil, 
McGrath, and Tukiainen, 2009).  This body of work argues that capabilities, like products or 
organizations, move through life cycles from founding through development and maturity 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  As the capability proceeds through the life cycle, events can arise 
that are strong enough to alter the development trajectory of that capability.  Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003) call these events selection events.  Selection events are external to the capability but not 
necessarily the firm.  Selection events can be as simple as a change of managerial priorities or a 
difficulty in obtaining critical raw materials.  Following a selection event, a capability branches, 
developing in different ways.  Helfat and Peteraf (2003) discuss six such development paths, 
encompassing retirement, retrenchment, renewal, replication, redeployment, and recombination.  
Dynamic capabilities, in that they are capabilities themselves, are also theorized to follow a life 
cycle (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).   
Underlying much of the development of dynamic capabilities are models of how 
organizations learn.  While some learning can occur through passive experience accumulation, 
most of the learning associated with dynamic capability development is conceptualized as being 
intentional and deliberate (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Romme, Zollo, and Berends, 2010).  
Learning occurs through processes of knowledge articulation whereby knowledge is shared and 
communicated as well as knowledge codification which involves deliberate actions to develop 
useful repositories for knowledge such as manuals and reports (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
Dynamic capability development must balance this knowledge articulation and knowledge 
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codification must strike a balance between permitting firms to exploit this knowledge and 
allowing firms to explore new knowledge (March, 1991).  Beyond what is highlighted in the 
above discussion, there is sparse treatment in the literature regarding how dynamic capabilities 
are built, developed, and maintained.  However, some research effort has examined capability 
development more generally.  Since dynamic capabilities are themselves capabilities, the insights 
from this more general research can be productively applied to dynamic capabilities.  There are 
two broad views on capability development.  The first conceptualizes capability development as 
emergent and gradual (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001).  Firms 
build on prior successes and strengths, as well as close gaps or improve underperforming 
capabilities (Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009).  In this way, capabilities are built up from 
repeated interactions over time (Ethiraj et al, 2005).  Capabilities are also developed deliberately 
and strategically through investments in critical infrastructure, systems, and processes (Ethiraj et 
al, 2005; Winter, 2003).  Lavie (2006) views capability development as occurring at multiple 
levels of analysis: at the level of the portfolio of capabilities through substitution, at the level of 
capabilities through transformation, and at the level of routines through evolution.   
2.3 Dynamic Capabilities and Environmental Dynamism 
While differing in some details, definitions of dynamic capabilities highlight that their 
central purpose is to achieve and maintain fit with a dynamic environment (Helfat et al, 2007).  
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997: 516) describe dynamic capabilities as the “ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
environments.”  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1107) extended the definition to incorporate the 
ability of firms to initiate change, defining dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s processes that use 
resources…to match and even create market change.”  These arguments flow from a long 
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tradition of literature on fit and contingency between a firm and its environment (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982).   
Despite the centrality of environmental dynamism to dynamic capabilities, a significant 
amount of research in dynamic capabilities is agnostic to the role of environmental dynamism.  A 
review of the literature highlights that when researchers do incorporate environmental 
dynamism, it is most frequently viewed as a precursor to dynamic capabilities.  What has been 
discussed as important is the degree of dynamism (Barreto, 2010).  Highly dynamic 
environments drive the development of firms’ dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007) 
and justify the expense of developing dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003).  Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) further argue that the degree of dynamism influences the nature of the dynamic 
capabilities that firms build.  In moderately dynamic environments, dynamic capabilities take the 
form of routines, while in highly dynamic environments, dynamic capabilities resemble simple 
rules or heuristics.  In the next section I discuss environmental dynamism in more detail, 
highlighting three configurations of environmental dynamism that I argue are critical to studying 
dynamic capabilities.   
2.3.1 Environmental Dynamism 
Environmental dynamism, in the simplest of terms, pertains to change in a firm’s external 
environment.  Environmental dynamism destabilizes a firm’s competitive environment and is 
associated with heightened uncertainty that makes accurately understanding external 
environments challenging (Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007; Milliken, 1987; Duncan, 1972).  As a 
construct, environmental dynamism is often loosely defined and conceptualized along a uni-
dimensional continuum from stability to ever greater dynamism.  Despite this uni-
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dimensionality, scholars have attributed a wide variety of different characteristics to 
environmental dynamism, such that environments can be dynamic in many different ways 
(Duncan, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984).  
A recent study has summarized the body of research on environmental dynamism into a 
four-dimensional construct comprising unpredictability, ambiguity, complexity, and velocity 
(Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009).  Unpredictability describes environments with little to 
no perceivable pattern.  Ambiguity refers to the clarity with which environments can be 
interpreted and understood.  Complex environments are characterized by interconnections among 
different facets of the firm’s environment, such as from regulatory, competitive, and economic 
sources.  Finally, velocity refers to the rate at which firms are presented with new opportunities 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) or face challenging disturbances.   
While environmental dynamism comprises multiple dimensions, organizational scholars 
commonly conceptualize dynamic environments in terms of configurations of these dimensions.  
By configurations I mean recognizable patterns of environmental dynamism.  Prior literature has 
emphasized two such configurations: environmental shifts and ongoing environmental change.  
Environmental shifts consist of a period of stability punctuated by dramatic, discontinuous, 
stepped change (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  In contrast, ongoing environmental change 
describes an environment undergoing continuous and unrelenting change (D’Aveni, 1994).  My 
study is particularly interested in a third configuration of environmental dynamism, which I call 
persistent disturbances.  Persistent disturbances constitute a pattern of repeated related 
disturbances that manifest over long periods of time.  Below I discuss each configuration in turn, 
distinguishing them from one another (see Table 2).   
16 
 
Table 2 Configurations of Environmental Dynamism 
Dimensions  Environmental Shifts  Ongoing Environmental Change  Persistent Disturbances  
Graphically  
      
General 
Description  
Dramatic, discontinuous 
environmental change 
Continual environmental change  Specific aspects of environmental 
change are repeated  
Example  Shift from mechanical to electronic 
typewriters  
Semi-conductor industry, constant 
churn  
Automotive industry, perennial 
problems  
Severity of 
Change  
Large, dramatic change Small changes; unstable industry 
structure  
Constrained change; aspects of 
change fixed or anchored  
Dynamism: 
Unpredictable  
Rarely predictable; no pattern in 
environmental dynamism  
No pattern in environmental 
dynamism 
Some pattern in environmental 
dynamism 
Dynamism: 
Ambiguity  
Highly ambiguous; difficult to 
understand shift early on  
Highly ambiguous; difficult to make 
sense of shifting landscape  
Diminishing ambiguity; repetition 
diminishes ambiguity surrounding 
disturbance  
Dynamism: 
Complexity  
Yes; multiple contingencies can 
create conditions for discontinuous 
change 
Yes  Yes; multiple persistent disturbances  
Dynamism: 
Velocity  
Two gears: generally slow pace of 
change prior to and following shift; 
relatively rapid during shift 
Fast; rapid pace of change  Slow or fast; velocity not especially 
relevant  
Representative 
Authors  
Punctuated Equilibrium (Gersick, 
1991; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986)  
Hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994; 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995) 
Jolts (Meyer, 1982) 
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Environmental Shifts   
Environmental shifts are dramatic or discontinuous environmental changes to a 
firm’s environment.  They occur infrequently and rarely repeat.  This configuration of 
environmental dynamism can be driven by a number of factors.  Scholars have studied 
environmental shifts due to disruptive technologies (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), new 
competitors (Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007), and major regulatory or political regime 
changes (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Dixon, Meyer, and Day, 2010; Pettus, 2001).  For 
example, an environmental shift in the transition from mechanical to electronic products 
threatened the long-term viability of a number of firms and industries, including those 
manufacturing mechanical typewriters (Danneels, 2010).  Similarly, Dixon, Meyer, and 
Day (2010) studied dramatic political and economic shifts in transition economies as they 
transformed from state-run to competitive-market economies.   
Driven largely by their discontinuous nature, environmental shifts are rarely 
predictable and they often take organizations by surprise. While it is common knowledge 
that environmental shifts are possible, the exact nature and timing of the shifts are 
difficult to reliably predict.  Further, because they are singular events with which firms 
will have had little experience, environmental shifts can be difficult to understand and 
interpret as they are emerging.  This ambiguity is heightened when one considers that 
environmental shifts are often caused by a complex interaction of seemingly unrelated 
events combining in new and novel ways (Anderson, 1999).  Environmental shifts often 
make more sense from a historical perspective once the shift is complete.  The velocity of 
an environmental shift has two paces: a slow, measured pace prior to and following the 
environmental shift that is itself, typically relatively rapid.  This two-pace pattern closely 
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resembles that of punctuated equilibrium models of change (Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Sastry, 1997; Gersick 1991).  In these models, 
environments change from equilibrium to equilibrium.  
Ongoing Environmental Change   
Ongoing environmental change describes an environment that is in a state of 
constant flux or churn.  The causes of this churn can include new competitors, 
technologies, or products.  Firms are required to continuously evolve their basis of 
competitive advantage (Burgelman, 1994).  Scholars have studied continuous and 
unrelenting pressures to reduce costs (Pablo, Reay, Dewald and Casebeer, 2007), and 
rapid innovation in products (Lee, Venkatraman, Tanriverdi, and Iyer, 2010) and product 
markets (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Rindova and Kotha, 2001).  Ongoing 
environmental change is akin to hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994; Wiggins and Ruefli, 
2005; Lee et al, 2010) or environmental turbulence (Easterby-Smith, Lyles, and Peteraf, 
2009).  The semi-conductor industry is often held up as an example of ongoing 
environmental change due to its high rate of technological and product innovation.   
Ongoing environmental change is difficult to predict because firms are confronted 
with a series of unique challenges.  Given the high state of flux, there are no readily 
identifiable patterns in the ongoing change.  Further, since the environment is always 
changing, the incremental changes are highly ambiguous, making them difficult to 
understand.  By the time a firm has made sense of its changed environment, the 
environment is changing again.  The pace of change is of central importance in ongoing 
environmental change and can be very rapid.   
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Persistent Disturbances  
Most studies conceptualize environmental dynamism either as environmental 
shifts or as ongoing environmental change.  However, I argue that neither of these 
configurations fully captures the nature of the environmental dynamism that many firms 
experience.  I argue that firms are often challenged not by a changed or changing 
environment, but by similar disturbances that repetitively affect the firm month after 
month and year after year.  Good examples include economic cycles, changing customer 
fads, and fluctuations in customer demand.  A third configuration of environmental 
dynamism that I call persistent disturbances, captures these repeated and patterned 
disturbances.   
I define persistent disturbances as repeated temporary events confronting firms.    
By temporary, I mean that the disturbances do not bring permanent change to the 
environment.  The impact of the disturbance is felt over a relatively short period of time 
and then dissipates.  However, while each individual disturbance is temporary, such 
disturbances cumulatively affect the organization over a long period of time by repeating 
at either regular or randomly irregular intervals.   
A small subset of prior literature has touched on concepts similar to persistent 
disturbances, albeit from different perspectives.  In a classic study, Meyer (1982) 
introduced the concept of a jolt.  Like disturbances, jolts are “transient perturbations 
whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organizations are 
disruptive.”  However, in his work on jolts, Meyer focused on a single discrete jolt or 
disturbance, and not a series of repeated disturbances.  Another related concept is that of 
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issues.  Issues are events or developments that organization members identify as having 
some important consequences to their firm (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991).  While 
repeating over time, issues, unlike disturbances, are heavily influenced by the way in 
which organizational members make sense of them.  Finally, the organizational resilience 
literature employs the concept of adversity or threats that challenge firms (Sutcliffe and 
Vogus, 2003).  While these ideas form a foundation to better understand persistent 
disturbances, they have not been developed within the context of dynamic capabilities.  
In terms of the four dimensions of environmental dynamism, persistent 
disturbances are distinct from the other two forms of change.  First, they exhibit relatively 
predictable patterns of environmental change.  Unlike studies of rare events (eg. Lampel, 
Shamsie, and Shapira, 2009; Rerup, 2009), studies of persistent disturbances focus on 
common disturbances.  Disturbances repeat and that repetition means that the subsequent 
changes are easier to anticipate or predict.  That same repetition means that persistent 
disturbances are less ambiguous.  The repetition of relatively similar disturbances 
provides firms with greater opportunity to learn about and to better understand the 
disturbances.  Persistent disturbances exhibit significant complexity when multiple such 
disturbances manifest concurrently.  The greater the number of persistent disturbances 
facing a firm, the greater the complexity as these persistent disturbances interact.   
2.4 Dynamic Capabilities and Configurations of Environmental 
Dynamism 
Research has not theorized explicitly regarding a relationship between different 
configurations of environmental dynamism and the nature of dynamic capabilities that 
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firms build.  I argue that this is because scholars have tended to focus their studies on 
only one configuration of environmental dynamism at a time—either environmental 
shifts or ongoing environmental change.  For instance, studies may examine 
environmental shifts, such as the transition from mechanical typewriters to electronic-
based office equipment (Danneels, 2010; Rosenbloom, 2000), or the impact of radical 
technological developments like microprocessors (Burgelman, 1991; 1994), radial tire 
technology (Sull, 1999), and digital photography (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Still other 
studies investigate how firms renew capabilities (Capron and Mitchell, 2009), enter new 
markets (King and Tucci, 2002), and make effective investment decisions (Shamsie, 
Martin, and Miller, 2009) in the face of rapid and ongoing change.   
However, looking across studies, I found that how scholars describe dynamic 
capabilities differs according to the configurations of the environmental dynamism found 
in the study’s context (see Table 2).  Scholars studying environmental shifts describe 
dynamic capabilities that reflect the need for firms to prepare for a variety of scenarios to 
effectively respond to an environment that has become dramatically different following 
an environmental shift.  These dynamic capabilities are also more oriented towards 
sensing, geared at identifying future possibilities.  They are developed in anticipation of 
and deployed during and following an environmental shift.  In contrast, scholars studying 
ongoing environmental change describe dynamic capabilities as being associated with 
highly routinized change processes.  These processes continuously evolve a firm’s 
underlying capabilities, matching ongoing environmental dynamism with ongoing 
organizational change.  They are built in advance of, or in conjunction with, the 
emergence of a dynamic environment.  The development of these types of dynamic 
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capabilities is ongoing and continuous, such that higher-order dynamic capabilities 
modify lower-order dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994; Winter, 2003).  While scholars 
describe dynamic capabilities in different configurations of environmental dynamism, 
they have yet to incorporate those differences theoretically.   
This review identifies two avenues to further develop dynamic capability theory.  
First, the dynamic capabilities literature has focused on dimensions of environmental 
dynamism and has paid little attention to the role of configurations of environmental 
dynamism.  Second, there have been few empirical studies illuminating the development 
of dynamic capabilities (Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009; Ethiraj et al, 2005; 
Narayanan, Colwell, and Douglas 2009).  Thus, despite the central role of environmental 
dynamism to dynamic capabilities, we know surprisingly little about how environmental 
dynamism influences dynamic capability development.  The need for research in this 
regard is reinforced by calls for increased adoption of longitudinal methods when 
studying dynamic capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al, 2009; Danneels, 2008). This study 
takes aim at these gaps in the dynamic capabilities literature, asking how dynamic 
capabilities develop over time in the presence of a particular configuration of 
environmental dynamism—persistent disturbances. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology  
3.0 Methodology  
3.1 Case Study Approach 
I have adopted a case study methodology to address the research question above 
with the aim of inductively building new theory and elaborating existing theory regarding 
how firms respond to disturbances (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).  I situate my study 
within the North American automotive industry and focus on three key firms: The “Big 
Three” automotive manufacturers—GM, Chrysler, and Ford.  My case study adopts a 
historical focus, commencing in 1965 and extending through to 2010.  I compiled 
qualitative and quantitative data from archival sources including annual reports and firm 
and industry analysis.   
I have adopted a case study method because the case method lends itself well to 
building new theory and elaborating existing theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Lee, Mitchell, and Sablynski, 1999; Yin, 2009).  While dynamic 
capabilities have received attention in the field of strategic management, new, empirically 
derived theory is still needed to address how dynamic capabilities are built and 
developed.  At least one scholar has called for longitudinal studies to improve scholarly 
understanding of how dynamic capabilities develop (Danneels, 2008).  Case study 
analysis is highly amenable to addressing “how” type research questions because case 
analyses permit and even demand a focus on process and a strong contextual 
understanding (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 2009; Pratt, 2009).   
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My study focuses on the time period between 1965 and 2010.  I have focused on 
historical rather than contemporary events owing to a desire to understand the processes 
of dynamic capability development over long periods of time.  I chose this time period 
because it encompasses the major disruptions affecting the automotive industry that 
began in the 1970s, including oil crises, major regulatory invasions, and the emergence of 
environmental and safety concerns.  While contemporary case studies benefit from the 
ability to examine events as they unfold, historically focused cases benefit from hindsight 
and refined accounts of historical occurrences.   
In designing the study I identified my unit and level of analysis and incorporated 
these decisions into how I collected and analyzed my data.  My level of analysis is the 
firm; I aim to understand the firm’s responses to the disturbances they face.  However, 
my unit of analysis is a disturbance.  In this research, my variance comes from studying 
different persistent disturbances across a homogenous group of organizations.   
3.2 Research Context 
I chose my research context based on the principles of theoretical rather than 
random sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989).  I elected to study a single industry so as to control 
for extraneous variation that may exist among firms in multiple industries (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  However, this single-industry focus also strengthened my understanding of the 
automotive context.  A strong contextual understanding is critical when studying 
organizational change processes (Pettigrew, 1990) and capabilities, which can be context-
specific (Ethiraj et al, 2005).  Studying a single industry allowed me to devote sufficient 
time to understanding the complex social, ecological, political, cultural, and economic 
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processes of a particular industry more deeply and over a longer period of time (Yin, 
2009).  Finally, a single-industry focus also facilitates comparisons among multiple 
organizations (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt, 1998).   
I situated my study in the North American automotive industry.  This industry has 
been the site of a broad range of societal, economic, political, and environmental 
disturbances over its long history, including labour disputes, regulations pertaining to 
environmental and safety standards, and oil price fluctuations.  The presence of these 
disturbances makes it a suitable context in which to study how firms respond to 
disturbances. The automotive industry also has a long and well-documented history, 
which is an important consideration in selecting a context, and in particular when dealing 
with long historical time periods (Yin, 2009).  My case study of the automotive industry 
was made feasible by the attention the industry has attracted over its history.   
I chose to study three automotive manufacturers: GM, Ford, and Chrysler.  A 
critical reason for these choices is the depth of history each of these firms possess in 
North America.  The founding of each of these firms dates back to the turn of the 20th 
century. This temporal depth provided me with the ability to study these firms’ responses 
to disturbances over a long period of time.  Throughout their history, these three firms 
have formed an oligopoly that has dominated the North American market, collectively 
possessing greater than 90% market share right up until the 1980s, when their dominance 
began to be eroded by Japanese competition.  As a result, much about these firms is well 
documented.  They have readily accessible annual reports and are discussed by analysts 
in a majority of the reports pertaining to the North American automotive industry.  My 
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focus on this oligopoly meant the exclusion of the fourth and only other North American 
automotive firm in existence throughout my study period - American Motor Corporation 
(AMC).  However data on its operations were difficult to obtain first because such data 
were sparse and inconsistent but also because AMC was acquired by Chrysler in 1987.  I 
also excluded foreign firms such as Toyota and Volkswagen from my study because they 
appear 10 to 20 years into my story, and data pertaining to these firms were not as readily 
available.     
3.2.1 North American Automotive Firms 
Below I briefly discuss the long history of each of the automotive firms in my 
study.   
Ford was founded in 1903 by Henry Ford with a vision of providing mobility for 
the masses.  Ford’s early focus was on low-cost automobiles that were relatively simple 
to use and maintain.  To support this aim, Ford invented and elaborated early large-scale 
assembly lines that served as the foundation for today’s modern manufacturing firms.  A 
distinguishing feature of Ford is that the Ford family has maintained control of the firm 
for more than 100 years.  Ford’s revenues during the study period have always trailed 
those of GM, placing Ford a consistent but distant second place.  However, Ford’s 
profitability has regularly exceeded that of GM, particularly in the late 1990s and 
periodically into the 2000s.  Ford is an international company with operations across the 
globe.  Ford established their European presence early through Ford of Europe.  Ford 
offers vehicles through 3 brands: Ford, Mercury, and Lincoln.  
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General Motors was founded in 1908 by William Durant.  In stark contrast to 
Ford, GM based their success on providing differentiated products, producing “a car for 
every purse and purpose.”  GM operated more as a holding company of differentiated 
brands that Durant acquired and loosely integrated.  GM has dominated the North 
American automotive industry in terms of revenues over most of its history, and for the 
entire period of this study.  Historically GM has been a large firm with an employee base 
twice that of Ford and three times that of Chrysler.  Recently, however, GM’s labour 
force has been reduced to 243,000, close to the size of Ford’s at 213,000. GM established 
their international presence early with the acquisition of Germany’s Opel in 1929.  GM’s 
current North American brands include Buick, Cadillac, GMC, and Chevrolet, having 
recently divested of their Pontiac, Saturn, Saab, and Hummer brands.  In June of 2009, 
GM entered bankruptcy protection, and with the help of the US and Canadian 
governments, emerged one month later on more financially sound footing.  
Finally, Chrysler was founded in 1925 following a reorganization of the Maxwell 
Motor Company and was renamed in honour of Walter Chrysler, a significant figure in 
North American automotive history.  While Chrysler has consistently lagged behind GM 
and Ford in terms of revenues and profitability, Chrysler has often led the industry in 
innovative technologies and vehicles, such as the minivan.  However, Chrysler has had 
more than their share of financial difficulties, requiring government support in 1979 and 
again in June of 2009 owing to its bankruptcy.  Throughout this time foreign firms have 
played important roles for Chrysler.  Daimler merged with Chrysler in 1998 before 
divesting their interests between 2007 and 2009.  More recently, Fiat has acquired a 
53.5% stake in Chrysler following their 2009 bankruptcy.  Chrysler has less than half as 
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many employees as Ford and GM and sells brands through their Chrysler, Dodge, Ram, 
and Jeep divisions.  
Despite significant homogeneity among these firms, there are some differences as 
well.  As outlined in Table 3, Ford and GM were both founded at the turn of the century, 
and Chrysler followed a couple of decades later.  The table also highlights that, while 
each of the firms is publicly held, Ford has retained a strong family holding that sets it 
apart.  Each of the firms also has international alliances with Japanese firms.   
Table 3 Overview of Case Firms 
Firm Year 
Founded 
Ownership Key International 
Alliances  
GM 1908 Publicly held Isuzu, Suzuki 
Ford 1903 Publicly held;  
strong family holding 
Mazda 
Chrysler 1925 Publicly held Mitsubishi 
Differences among the firms are further highlighted by Figure 2, Figure 3, and 
Figure 4.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate how GM led the North American market both 
in terms of revenues and in production volume for the majority of the study period.  
GM’s revenues were consistently double those of Ford and many times more than those 
of Chrysler.  GM’s production share (Figure 4) was greater than the combined production 
share of Ford and Chrysler up until the 1990s, when GM’s production share suffered 
dramatic decreases.  However, profitability was another matter.  Ford frequently achieved 
greater profitability than GM, especially during tumultuous periods for the industry, such 
as the early 1990s, the late 1990s, and the late 2000s. 
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Figure 2 Inflation-Adjusted Net Income 
 
Figure 3 Inflation-Adjusted Revenues 
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Figure 4 "Big Three" North American Production Share 
 
3.3 Data Sources  
My study employed qualitative archival data regarding the North American 
automotive industry between 1965 and 2010 from four data sources.  These included the 
automotive firms’ annual reports, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, Compustat, and other 
data sources required on an ad hoc basis.  These are diverse data sources providing 
different information and describing events in the North American automotive industry 
from different perspectives.  The dataset included both qualitative and quantitative data.  
This diversity was designed to strengthen my theorizing by allowing me to triangulate my 
findings using multiple data points (Jick, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Specifically, I used 
quantitative data to validate qualitative findings through non-statistical methods.  After 
identifying codes and themes through analysis of qualitative data, I found supporting 
quantitative data that both offered a more concrete understanding and also permitted me 
to graph these data longitudinally.  Each data source is discussed below and summarized 
in Table 4.  
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Table 4 Summary of Data Sources 
Data Source Description Location Data Points Volume of Text 
Ward’s 
Automotive 
Yearbooks 
Expert firm and industry 
analysis regarding 
automotive firms 
• Library collections and inter-
library loans 
• Expert firm-specific analysis 
• Production volumes split by 
firm, product category, 
vehicle prices, registrations 
• 180 pages of editor 
summary; 157 pages of 
editorials on key 
disturbances; 337 pages of 
firm-specific analysis 
Corporate 
Annual 
Reports 
Security regulator 
mandated reports 
detailing a public firm’s 
financial performance 
and other important 
metrics 
• Edgar (1993-) at 
www.sec.gov 
• Proquest Historical Annual 
Reports (1844-) 
• Library collections and inter-
library loans 
• Text of the letters to 
shareholders 
 
• 540 pages of letters to 
shareholders 
Compustat Critical business metrics 
for each firm  
• WRDS – Compustat 
 
• Firm revenues, profitability, 
capital expenditures, current 
ratios, employment, and 
other firm metrics 
 
Other Data 
Sources 
Supplementing data 
from above with specific 
metrics that were 
identified as pertinent 
during the course of 
analysis  
• National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration 
• Environmental Protection 
Agency 
• The Federal Reserve 
• Department of Energy 
• Safety and fatality statistics 
• Historical gasoline prices 
• Interest rates 
• Recessionary periods 
• Dozens of spreadsheets 
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The use of archival data offered significant advantages for my study.  Archival 
data permitted me to study organizational processes over my study’s long 45-year 
historical time period; no other data source offers such a long reach into the past.  My 
archival data also offered consistent yearly snapshots.  Each of these yearly snapshots 
provided comparable data captured with consistent levels of detail; for the majority of the 
years in question, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook was managed by the same editor.  This 
permitted appropriate sequencing of events and improved the reliability of my data vis-à-
vis contemporary case analysis by avoiding issues of retrospective biases that often result 
from the difficulty respondents have in accurately remembering past events (Golden, 
1992).  Below I provide additional details pertaining to the data sources I employed in 
this study.  
3.3.1 Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks 
Ward’s has been covering the automotive industry since 1938 and is one of the 
pre-eminent sources of automotive industry knowledge and insight.  Each yearbook 
consists of hundreds of pages of textual analysis and data tables pertaining to the North 
American automotive industry.  While the nature of the reporting changed over time, 
each report covers general industry trends; firm-specific analysis pertaining to Chrysler, 
Ford, and GM; detailed tables on production, sales, and registrations; as well as editorials 
detailing key government interventions, technological breakthroughs, and major industry 
events.   
In order to make data collection and analysis of this large qualitative textual 
dataset manageable, I focused my attention on specific sections within the text.  First, I 
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read the 4-page editor’s summary.  This summary provided information pertaining to the 
key factors facing the automotive industry during a given year.  Second, I read key 
editorial pieces pertaining to topics that represented major disturbances to automotive 
firms, such as government regulations and world events related to emissions, safety, 
labour, and fuel economy challenges.  On average, pertinent editorial pieces constituted 3 
to 4 pages of text for a given year.  Third, I studied the firm-specific analysis for each of 
GM, Ford, and Chrysler.  These sections were typically 2 to 3 pages in length for each 
firm and contained detailed information about the challenges the automotive firm faced 
during the year, major strategic actions they took, production-related decisions, and 
financial highlights.  In summary, I read 180 pages of editor summary and 157 pages of 
editorials on key disturbances, and analyzed in more detail 337 pages of firm-specific 
analysis.   
To support my qualitative analysis, I collected quantitative data from the tables 
within the Ward’s reports.  My selection of quantitative data was driven by my 
qualitative analysis.  These data included production, registration, and sales figures split 
out by company and vehicle characteristics.  It also included details of government 
regulations such as corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards and the per 
vehicle costs of regulated equipment.  These quantitative data gave shape and structure to 
the qualitative data collected from the text, and they corroborated my findings (Jick, 
1976).   
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3.3.2 Annual Reports – Letters to Shareholders 
Annual reports are issued yearly by firms in order to communicate information to 
the public about the firms’ activities in the past year.  Annual reports have grown to 
include a great deal of information, including financial highlights, reports on products 
and operations, strategic initiatives, management discussion and analysis, and 
consolidated financial statements.  For North American automotive firms these reports 
are typically 100 pages in length.   
I focused my analysis of the annual reports on the letters to shareholders.  Every 
annual report is prefaced with a letter to shareholders from the CEO or Chairman and 
other senior management.  These letters are relatively short, consisting of approximately 
4 pages each.  These letters describe the major strategic initiatives, the difficulties and 
challenges the firm faced over the year, and how well the firm performed against 
stakeholder expectations.  In these letters, management frequently discusses the 
disturbances their firm faces, and how the firm is responding (Staw, McKechnie, and 
Puffer, 1983).  In my study, letters to shareholders provided an overview of the 
disturbances firms faced and of their responses to those disturbances.  
Using letters to shareholders presents some difficulties.  In recent years, these 
letters have often been prepared by public relations departments that tailor the entire 
annual report to convey specific messages (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992).  As a result, 
relevant information can be selectively reported or suppressed.  For instance, despite the 
publicity generated by the safety problems with Ford’s Pinto, it did not feature 
prominently in the letters to shareholders in Ford’s annual reports during the course of the 
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controversy.  Despite these potential biases, letters to shareholders are important vehicles 
for management to communicate with investors.  Management often lends their pictures 
and signatures to the letters; and informal discussions suggest that managers spend 
significant amounts of time preparing communications to investors (Barr, Stimpert, and 
Huff, 1992).  Further, there are few data sources that can provide such regular, consistent 
data pertaining to a firm’s operations.  Annual reports are written at annual intervals 
which alleviates retrospective biases that can hamper interviews.  I triangulated insights 
gained from letters to shareholders with other data sources such as Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbooks.  
3.3.3 Compustat 
Compustat is a database compiled by Standard & Poor’s containing historical 
financial information on corporations.  From this database I pulled basic historical 
financial data, including revenues, net incomes, return on sales, capital expenditure, 
number of employees, and current ratios, for GM, Ford, and Chrysler.   
3.3.4 Ad Hoc Data Sources 
During the course of data analysis I acquired additional data that had been 
identified as pertinent to my study.  For instance, as I read about oil embargoes and oil 
crises, I found it useful to collect and analyze historical gasoline prices.  Similarly, as the 
automotive industry is heavily dependent upon economic cycles, I found that data 
regarding recessionary periods and interest rates were useful when juxtaposed against 
financial and production data.   
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3.4 Data Analysis  
Following Yin (2009), I settled on a strategy for my data analysis prior to commencing 
my case analysis.  I approached my data analysis in three stages (see Table 5).  In the first stage, 
I analyzed the letters to shareholders from each of the firm’s annual reports and the firm-specific 
sections of Ward’s yearbooks from 1965 to 2010, looking for and seeking to understand 
disturbances identified as affecting the firms under study.  In the second stage, I focused on how 
firms responded to those disturbances, tying connections between the disturbances firms faced 
and the ways firms responded to those disturbances.  In the final stage, I extend these analyses 
and built new theory and elaborated existing theory pertaining to how firms responded to 
disturbances, and in particular to persistent disturbances.  While all stages were iterative in the 
sense that I returned again and again to the data for further analysis, the final stage also involved 
iteration between existing theory and my emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).   
Table 5 Data Analysis Stages 
 Stage 1 – Disturbances Stage 2 – Responses Stage 3 – Theory Building 
Stage 
Objectives 
Identify and describe 
disturbances affecting 
the organizations 
Describe firm responses 
to disturbances 
Build and elaborate 
theory with respect to 
how firms respond to 
disturbances 
Outputs • Disturbance codes 
• Memos 
• Data tables 
• Response codes 
• Memos 
• Data tables 
• New theoretical 
models 
Data 
Categories 
Employed 
• Annual Reports 
(Letters to 
Shareholders) 
• Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbooks 
• Compustat 
• Ad hoc data sources 
• Annual Reports 
(Letters to 
Shareholders) 
• Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbooks 
• Compustat 
• Annual Reports (Letters 
to Shareholders) 
• Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbooks 
• Compustat 
• Academic articles 
• Historical texts 
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Each stage was designed to accomplish distinct objectives, examine a clearly defined 
dataset, and culminate in outputs including qualitative codes, memos, and data tables (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, and Wicki, 2008).  Each stage also provided important context for subsequent analysis.   
I employed an NVivo database to catalog and code the qualitative data from my data 
sources so as to ensure transparency (Yin, 2009).  The NVivo database included raw text from 
the letters to shareholders in annual reports and key sections of the Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbooks.  I also graphed patterns of disturbances and responses over time.  Below I discuss 
each of these stages in turn. 
3.4.1 Stage 1 – Identify Disturbances Facing the Firm 
The objective of this first stage was to identify and understand the disturbances facing the 
automotive firms in my study.  I focused on those disturbances discussed by firm executives in 
the letters to shareholders from the annual reports and by the automotive experts who authored 
the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks.  These executives and industry experts were immersed in the 
North American automotive industry and possessed a strong understanding of the challenges 
facing the industry.  Focusing on the disturbances identified by these executives and experts 
improved the validity of my data analysis by increasing my confidence that I was focusing on 
disturbances that were truly important to and had material impact on firms.  Further, these 
executives and experts recorded their analyses on a yearly basis, grounding their insights 
temporally.  Employing this approach thus offered a reliable way to consistently identify 
disturbances at different points in time (Nunnally, 1978; Peter, 1979).   
It was through the process of analyzing my data that I discovered the importance of 
persistent disturbances.  I began my data analysis looking to identify discrete events, such as 
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specific regulations, swings in customer demand and tastes, strikes, and major incidents like 
those caused by safety recalls or energy crises.  However, as my analysis progressed, I found that 
the disturbances experts and executives described were often without readily delineated start and 
end points.  The disturbances I found were connected to other disturbances that occurred at 
different points in time.  For instance, in 1975 the US government enacted legislation to bring the 
CAFE standards into effect.  These standards mandated more stringent fuel economy for cars 
sold in the United States and required automobile manufacturers to engage in massive research 
and development programs and to make significant investments in new technologies.  Although 
this event itself was important, the CAFE standards were not enforced until 1978 and the 
standards increased in stringency over a period of 12 years, with mandated fleet fuel efficiency 
averages growing from 18 mpg in 1978 to 27.5 mpg in 1990.  Further, CAFE standards were part 
of a broader issue pertaining to concerns over fuel economy, which were accentuated by energy 
crises, changes in customer taste and demand, and other regulatory actions, that stretched from 
before 1975 and remained a significant issue at the end of my study period in 2010.  With this 
recognition, I shifted my analysis from identifying discrete disturbances to discerning patterns of 
persistent disturbances over time.   
I analyzed my data looking for persistent disturbances that had affected the automotive 
manufacturing firms over my study period.  I began by coding my qualitative data from Ward’s 
Automotive Yearbooks and the letters to shareholders from annual reports for specific instances 
of disturbances.  These disturbances included energy crises, high gasoline prices, strikes, wage 
increases, government regulations of various kinds, competitor cost structures, inflation, and 
recessionary periods.  I sorted and grouped these disturbances into different categories denoting 
 39 
 
persistent disturbances.  I sought persistent disturbances that were both distinct from one another 
and relevant to firms over the duration of my study period.   
Some disturbance codes were dropped because they represented isolated disturbances that 
were not identifiable as being part of a persistent disturbance.  Examples of dropped codes 
include trade fluctuations, traffic congestion, resource shortages, wars, and production 
overcapacity.  I took measures to ensure that the codes I dropped did not materially impact my 
findings and theorizing.  First, the five persistent disturbances I identified were those that 
manifested throughout my study period, whereas the codes there were dropped appeared over 
short temporal durations.  Second, the five persistent disturbances that I identified constituted the 
largest volume of identified disturbances.  They were referenced on average 49 times whereas 
codes there were dropped were referenced at most 9 times (resource shortages).  Finally, I 
checked to ensure that dropped codes were not discussed as having a material or extended impact 
they had on the firm.  As such, the most substantive disturbances in my study — for example oil 
crises or major regulatory initiatives — were always retained. 
Figure 5 below illustrates this mapping of disturbance codes to persistent disturbances.  
This mapping provides a detailed picture of how persistent disturbances were identified.  At the 
end of this process I arrived at a set of five persistent disturbances: economic cycles, labour 
disruptions, energy challenges, competitive pressures, and government regulations.  
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Figure 5 Mapping of Codes for Persistent Disturbances 
 
I used the coding process to sensitize me to which persistent disturbances were important, 
and then I built a longitudinal picture of these disturbances.  To do so, I drew on additional data 
from Compustat, Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, and ad hoc data sources to build visual 
displays to aid in making sense of my data.  For example, with respect to the energy challenges 
category of disturbances, fluctuating gasoline prices were clearly of critical importance to 
automobile manufacturers.  Higher gasoline prices put pressure on consumers to purchase more 
fuel efficient vehicles.  I graphed historical gasoline prices collected from the US Department of 
Energy and mapped onto this graph critical events pertaining to energy crises and fuel economy 
regulations that I pulled from Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks.  These longitudinal depictions of 
the data provided a more complete perspective on each disturbance and served to triangulate my 
findings (Jick, 1976).       
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3.4.2 Stage 2 – Identify Firm Responses  
The objective of stage two was to identify firms’ responses to the persistent disturbances 
they faced over the study period.  My first step in stage two was to focus my analysis on a 
specific set of firm responses.  My decision to focus my research in this way followed advice 
from prior dynamic capabilities research.  Winter (2003: 994) advises scholars to focus on a 
specific dynamic capability.  He stressed that there is “no general rule for riches” and that it is 
not possible to hedge against every contingency.  As a result, investments in dynamic capabilities 
are necessarily focused.   
I chose to focus on how automotive firms built and deployed manufacturing flexibility in 
response to the five persistent disturbances identified above.  This decision followed from my 
initial data analysis, in which I noted that industry experts placed a strong emphasis on how 
automotive firms adapted their underlying manufacturing resources and capabilities in response 
to environmental dynamism.  Manufacturing flexibility has been studied extensively in the field 
of operations (Slack, 2005; Sethi and Sethi, 1990; Gerwin, 1993).  It can be defined as a firm’s 
ability to adapt to environmental changes by varying products, product mix, and production 
volumes (Upton, 1994).  This definition highlights how manufacturing flexibility involves 
modifying the underlying manufacturing resources and capabilities with which firms produce 
products — a pattern of adaptation that is in keeping with that of dynamic capabilities.   
Persistent Manufacturing Implications 
In studying manufacturing flexibility, I found that the impact of persistent disturbances 
was felt more acutely within the automotive firms’ manufacturing operations.  While at the level 
of the firm, there were five distinct persistent disturbances, I found that these five persistent 
disturbances translated into three persistent manufacturing implications at the level of the firms’ 
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manufacturing operations.  In my study these persistent manufacturing implications were 
fluctuating consumer demand, profit margin pressures, and fluctuating consumer model 
preferences.  I treated these persistent manufacturing implications as external disturbances 
because they operated external to the dynamic capability in which I was interested.  Table 6 
highlights the translation process.  A similar table in the appendix (Table A3) also provides 
representative passages associated with each of these persistent disturbances and highlights the 
translation between persistent disturbance and persistent manufacturing implication.   
Table 6 Persistent Disturbances and Persistent Manufacturing Implications 
Persistent 
Disturbance Codes 
Description Persistent Manufacturing 
Implication Codes 
Economic Cycles Economic cycles referred to the booms 
and busts of recessionary cycles as 
well as other economic factors such as 
high inflation 
Fluctuating consumer demand  
Profit margin pressures 
Labour Disruptions Labour disruptions included strikes and 
labour negotiations 
Profit margin pressures 
Energy Challenges Energy challenges included energy 
crises as well as fluctuating fuel prices 
Fluctuating consumer model 
preferences  
Fluctuating consumer demand  
Competitive 
Pressures 
Competitive pressures included those 
from domestic competitors as well as 
international entrants from Japan, 
Europe, and Asia 
Fluctuating  consumer demand 
Profit margin pressures 
Government 
Regulations  
Government regulations covered a 
range of regulatory issues including 
fuel economy, safety, and emissions 
Profit margin pressures 
Fluctuating consumer model 
preferences 
Dynamic Capabilities 
In stage two I began by systematically analyzing the responses that the three automotive 
firms in my study had, to the three persistent manufacturing implications which I had identified.  
I focused on the responses that automotive executives and automotive industry experts wrote 
about in the letters to shareholders and firm-specific analysis sections of the Ward’s reports, 
respectively.  By focusing on the responses identified by these automotive executives and 
automotive industry experts, I increased my confidence that I was identifying appropriate 
responses, thereby improving the validity of my study.  Further, since responses were identified 
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consistently at regular yearly intervals, attending to the analysis of automotive executives and 
automotive industry experts increased the reliability of my data collection (Nunnally, 1978; 
Peter, 1979).   
This initial step yielded a substantial variety of responses (see Tables A4 through A12 in 
the appendix).  I subsequently analyzed these responses in order to make better sense of them. I 
began by creating first-order codes.  First-order codes are used to identify and group facts (Van 
Maanen, 1979).  I used first-order codes to identify and group specific types of responses to each 
of the three persistent manufacturing implications.  These first-order codes were given 
descriptive labels (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  For example, in 1983 when GM was described 
as building N-cars for Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and Buick on a single line, I applied the first-order 
code multiple divisions (platforms) to denote that vehicle platforms were being shared across 
multiple automotive divisions within GM.   
Next, I analyzed these data, grouping the first-order codes and applying second-order 
codes.  Second-order codes are theoretical in nature, helping to explain the patterning of the first-
order data (Van Maanen, 1979).  For example, I grouped first-order responses related to 
increasing or decreasing plant capacity and opening new or closing existing plants as alter 
sources of production.  A complete mapping of first-order and second-order codes is found in 
Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8.  These codes helped me subsequently, to build theory 
explaining how dynamic capabilities developed over time.  
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Figure 6 Mapping of Codes for Consumer Demand Fluctuation Responses 
 
Figure 7 Mapping of Codes for Consumer Model Preference Fluctuation Responses 
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Figure 8 Mapping of Codes for Profit Margin Pressure Responses 
 
3.4.3 Stage 3 – Theory Building  
I built theory from the case data iteratively, moving back and forth among data, theory 
from existing literature, and my emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999).  The main 
inputs to this theory building process were the data tables, coding, and figures I compiled during 
prior data analysis stages.  However, in addition I built new interim tables (Miles and Huberman, 
1984; Yin, 2009) and figures (Langley, 1999; Yin, 2009) to help me make sense of the data.   
During this final stage I spent weeks comparing my emerging theory with prior literature 
on dynamic capabilities.  I read this prior literature with specific intent, concentrating on two 
broad topics upon which my emerging theory was focused.  First, I re-read prior research 
pertaining to the process of dynamic capability development.  I focused in particular on 
processes of layering and the role of dynamic capability structure.  Second, I examined prior 
research in dynamic capabilities paying attention to the role ascribed to environmental dynamism 
and, in particular, to mentions of different configurations of environmental dynamism.  I also 
sought research that described environmental dynamism in terms that went beyond a description 
of speed or velocity (see Table A2 in the appendix).   
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This review of the literature offered two benefits.  First, a focused review of prior 
dynamic capabilities literature provided me with the language to better understand and explain 
what I had found through my data analysis.  A great example of this was identifying the term 
dynamic capability architecture (Jacobides, 2006).  This term assisted me in better explaining 
the layered composition of dynamic capabilities that I had found.  Second, the focused review 
identified connections to related concepts and allowed me to better position my emerging theory 
within the broader body of literature on dynamic capabilities.  But perhaps more important, it 
reinforced my research and gave me confidence that what I was finding was consistent in the 
broadest sense with prior research.  This served to build the internal and external validity of my 
emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
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Chapter 4 – Findings 
4.0 Findings  
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter I present my research findings, displaying and describing the data I 
collected and analyzed.  I group this data presentation into three sections.  The flow of these 
sections is depicted by Figure 9.  First, I build narratives illustrating the history of the North 
American automotive industry through the stories of five different persistent disturbances from 
1965 through to 2010.  These persistent disturbances are economic cycles, labour disruptions, 
energy challenges, competitive pressures, and government regulation.  In the second section I 
discuss the implications of these persistent disturbances with respect to the automotive firms’ 
manufacturing operations.  I identified three distinct implications: consumer demand 
fluctuations, consumer model preference fluctuations, and profit margin pressures.  I describe 
these implications in detail.  Finally I discuss the nature and development of three 
manufacturing-related dynamic capabilities: production volume flexibility, production mix 
flexibility, and partnering flexibility.  I describe the development of these dynamic capabilities 
over time.  
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Figure 9 From Persistent Disturbances to Dynamic Capabilities 
 
4.2 Persistent Disturbances in the Automotive Industry  
The North American automotive industry has experienced a great number of disturbances 
over its long history.  Below I describe these disturbances, organizing my telling of the history 
along the five different persistent disturbances I identified through my data analysis; economic 
cycles, labour disruptions, energy challenges, competitive pressures, and government 
regulations.  For each I draw on my archival data to provide detailed illustrations. 
4.2.1 Economic Cycles 
The North American automotive industry is an industry that rises and falls with the 
conditions of the economy.  During strong economic times vehicle sales tend to be strong.  
Conversely, when the economy is weak, consumers delay the purchase of large items or shift 
towards less expensive vehicles.  Figure 10 graphically depicts this turbulence.  This graph 
shows three things.  First, the graph uses a solid line to display gross domestic product (GDP) 
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growth as a percentage.  Second, the dashed line shows sales of vehicles over the same period of 
time in units.  Third, vertical gray stripes depict recessionary periods. The graph shows how 
during recessionary periods, and corresponding to low or negative GDP growth, sales volumes 
drop dramatically.  Since automotive manufacturing is heavily reliant on large capital 
investments, these dramatic drops create significant difficulties.  During down times, firms are 
often forced to operate these expensive plants substantially below capacity, putting strong 
downward pressure on profit margins.  These cycles were borne out over six recessionary 
periods occurring during my study period, in 1970, 1974 to 1975, 1980 to 1981, 1990 to 1991, 
2001, and 2008 to 2009.    
Figure 10 Economic Cycles 
 
4.2.2 Labour Disruptions 
Labour disruptions have been a central disturbance for automotive manufacturers since 
well before 1965.  What began as a fragmented labour movement in the 1930s developed into a 
highly organized and powerful union called the United Auto Workers, with membership 
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stretching across automotive firms and into other related and unrelated industries.  The current 
United Auto Workers organization is the result of years of hard-fought battles and increasing 
consolidation of local unions into a national presence.  It boasts a membership of close to 
400,000 active members and 600,000 retired employees.1
Figure 11 Employment and Labour Disruptions 
  
 
Figure 11 depicts the number of employees at each of the automotive firms under study 
and highlights labour disruptions over my study period.  The lines illustrate the number of 
employees in thousands at each of GM, Chrysler, and Ford.  This graph highlights how each of 
the automotive firms substantially reduced their employment levels over the duration of the 
                                               
1 http://www.uaw.org/page/who-we-are, Accessed December 9th, 2011 
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period under study.  Since the late 1970s Ford and Chrysler respectively reduced their North 
American employee base from highs of 506,531 employees in 1979 and 250,833 employees in 
1978.  In the case of Ford, they ended 2008 with only 213,000 employees—42% of their 
previous high.  More recently, GM’s employment levels dropped from a high of 876,800 in 1986  
down to 243,000 by 2008—28% of their 1986 high.  It is interesting to note that these 
employment decreases were undertaken despite increasing domestic production, speaking to the 
significant improvements in productivity made by these automotive firms.   
The markers in the graph indicate the severity of different labour disruptions experienced 
by the automotive firms over the study period.  I calculated the severity of labour disruption on a 
scale of 1 to 10, basing my analysis on the volume of automotive production loss and the 
duration of the strike.  Longer strikes and strikes that resulted in greater loss of automotive 
production received higher severity scores.  The graph shows how labour disruptions are 
cyclical.  Contracts bind parties to a given labour agreement for a period of between 3 to 4 years 
at which time the contract comes up for renewal or renegotiation.  It was very common for 
unions to aggressively renegotiate labour contracts upon expiration.  This set the industry up for 
regular confrontations every few years as unions pushed to negotiate increasingly favourable 
employment terms on behalf of their members.   
4.2.3 Energy Challenges 
Intertwined with the history of the North American automotive industry has been the 
ongoing struggle for energy independence in the face of fluctuating fuel prices and sporadic 
energy crises.  This struggle was first dramatized during the two oil crises of the 1970s.  The first 
crisis, the Oil Embargo lasting from October 1973 to March 1974, was the result of an embargo 
by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) that was undertaken in 
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response to US military and financial assistance to Israel.  This embargo caused challenges for 
motorists who were faced with standby gasoline rationing and driving restrictions (eg new speed 
limits).  In 1979, the Iranian Energy Crisis caused similar dramatic concerns, including gasoline 
shortages and much higher gasoline prices.   
Figure 12 Historical Gasoline Retail Price 
 
Beyond energy crises, fluctuations in the price and availability of gasoline have been a 
significant factor driving the demand for more fuel efficient vehicles; both from the perspective 
of changing consumer demand as well as changing government regulations.  Figure 12 shows the 
inflation-adjusted retail price of gasoline per gallon over the duration of the study period. 
Gasoline prices spiked during the Iranian Oil Embargo and, despite low prices during the 1990s, 
climbed rapidly through 2008 reaching a high of $3.31 per gallon before receding in 2009 and 
2010.   
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Figure 13 Total Miles Driven and Fuel Consumption (Light Vehicles) 
 
While much progress has been made in terms of improving the fuel efficiency of 
individual vehicles, fuel efficiency remains a perennial concern.  This is because fuel efficiency 
improvements have corresponded with increasing consumption that has led to higher total 
consumption of fuel (Alcott, 2005), as illustrated by Figure 13.  Americans are driving more 
miles every year, negating much of the fuel efficiency improvements, meaning that total fuel 
consumption has been rising steadily.  Fuel efficiency improvements have not been dramatic 
enough to offset increased consumption meaning that energy challenges remain an ongoing 
problem for automotive firms. 
4.2.4 Competitive Pressures  
Automotive firms faced increasing international competition throughout the study period.  
Strengthening international competition was a concern beginning as early as the late 1960s [Ford 
Annual Report, 1968].  However, international firms intensified pressures in the early 1980s, and 
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sales of imports briefly exceeded 25% of sales before backing off temporarily in the 1990s.2
4.2.5 Government Regulations 
  
Evidence of the significance of foreign competition is noticeable by viewing the production 
share the Big Three enjoyed over the duration of the study.  Their share dropped from a high of 
over 90% down to 70% in the late 1990s, as foreign firms began setting up production facilities 
in the US.  Foreign firms enjoyed a significant cost advantage over domestic firms.  Ford 
executives summed up the cost problem facing the Big Three in a 1984 annual report interview: 
“We require more hourly and salaried labour hours to make each car, and we pay more for each 
of those hours.”  In 1980, the productivity gap between North American and Japanese 
automotive firms meant that Japanese competitors, on average, were able to produce vehicles for 
$1513 less per vehicle.  Over the study period this productivity gap decreased to between $313 
and $355 in 2002.  However, the increasingly global economy continues to present competitive 
challenges for Ford, GM, and Chrysler. 
The 1960s marked the beginning of a period of increasing government involvement in 
regulating the North American automotive industry.  A quote from Ford’s 1966 annual report 
illustrates this new reality well.   
“In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the 
test of the marketplace.  In the future, we shall be severely tested by the 
need to respond at the same time to the requirements of the market and 
the requirements imposed by the Federal governments' safety and air 
pollution regulations.” 
                                               
2 Import figures are difficult to classify since Japanese firms set up production facilities in the United States 
effectively rendering the vehicles produced there domestic vehicles for the purposes of reporting.   
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The US government began regulating the automotive industry in a variety of areas, but most 
notably in safety, emissions, and fuel economy.   
Safety  
Safety-related concerns evolved over the study period beginning with public criticism 
and dissatisfaction, and evolving to encompass stringent and broad-sweeping regulations.  In 
1965, Ralph Nader released his book entitled Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of 
the American Automobile.  This book offered a strong critique of industry practices, arguing that 
automotive firms actively avoided the issue of safety.  At the time, this was surprisingly easy to 
do, as safety was not in the collective consciousness of automotive buyers (Gioa, 1992).  
However, shortly after Unsafe at Any Speed was released, concern over safety intensified.  In 
1966, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act became law and seatbelts were made 
mandatory.  This started a series of government-mandated safety improvements including head 
rests, shoulder harnesses, high-mounted stop lights, and passive restraints such as airbags.  In 
1979, the government launched the New Car Assessment program, and the first cars were tested 
in a 35-mph front crash test.  Crash testing has since evolved into a complicated set of 
procedures, the results of which are made publicly available to enable consumers to make 
informed safety-related decisions.  The National Highway Transportation Safety Association was 
given responsibility for investigating safety issues and either initiating recalls or pressuring firms 
to voluntarily recall vehicles for safety-related problems.  Government-initiated recalls for safety 
reasons became a common and costly problem for automotive firms.  For instance, in 1977, 12.9 
million vehicles were recalled for safety; in 1983, 6.1 million vehicles were recalled; and in 
1984, 7.22 million recalls were made.   
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Figure 14 Passenger Vehicle Occupant Deaths 
 
Despite government-mandated improvements to vehicles, safety concerns remained, and 
automotive firms were presented with safety-related challenges throughout the study period.  For 
the majority of the study period, the improvements in vehicle safety served only to hold traffic 
casualties at a relatively constant level.  This was still a meaningful accomplishment, given that 
Americans were driving their cars 33% more miles each year.  However, notwithstanding a 
recent dramatic reduction in deaths, the issue of safety remained a concern throughout the study 
period (Figure 14).  
Emissions  
A major challenge for automotive firms has been addressing smog-inducing air pollution 
and caustic acid rain.  Smog is a serious health concern in many cities, causing heart and lung 
problems, and acid rain can damage the health of water and soil systems as well as animal and 
human health.  Automotive firms managed to comply with government regulations to reduce 
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hydrocarbon emissions (by more than 80%) and carbon monoxide emissions (by almost 70%) 
[Ford Annual Report , 1969].  Despite these achievements, automotive firms continued to face 
stringent standards imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) resulting from 
successive Clean Air Acts in 1977 and 1990.  Automotive firms had repeated difficulties with 
these more stringent regulations and missed deadlines between 1975 and 1978, requiring delays, 
extensions, and interim standards.  Dramatic improvements were made through cross-industry 
collaboration with the oil and gas industry that collectively moved towards a combination of 
unleaded fuel and catalytic convertors, dramatically reducing harmful emissions.  Restrictions on 
sulphur dioxide content in gasoline and the adoption of alternative fuels such as ethanol helped 
to further reduce damaging emissions.   
Despite these improvements, vehicle emissions have remained a significant problem for 
the automotive industry through the end of my study period.  A report by the Ontario Medical 
Association issued in 2008 estimated that smog causes 9,500 premature deaths in the province 
yearly.3
Fuel Economy 
  More recently, the definition of emissions has been broadened in the United States to 
include carbon dioxide, raising further emissions-related challenges for automotive firms. 
A number of government regulatory initiatives followed the oil crises of the 1970s.  In 
1973, the EPA took initial steps to rank the fuel efficiency (in mpg) of all cars.  This marked a 
first effort to understand the scope of the problem.  Then, in 1975 the Energy Policy 
                                               
3 Ontario Medical Association, https://www.oma.org/Mediaroom/PressReleases/Pages/PrematureDeaths.aspx, 
Accessed September 14th, 2011 
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Conservation Act was passed, mandating that automotive car fleets average 27.5 mpg by 1985.  
These standards were regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), while the EPA was responsible for measuring vehicle fuel efficiency.  National 
sentiment continued to build against larger cars, which had been dubbed “gas guzzlers”—a term 
that highlights the growing moral and social aspects of car buying [Ward’s, 1979].  In 1980, the 
government imposed a “Gas Guzzler Tax” on cars that exceeded a minimum threshold in order 
to help shift consumption patterns.  The tax started at $500 in 1980 and grew to $7700 in 1991.  
More recently in 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act was passed aiming at even 
higher CAFE standards of 35 mpg by 2020.   
All of these regulations have added substantially to the cost of individual vehicles.  Table 
7 illustrates the cumulative4
                                               
4 These numbers are cumulative in the sense that they include the costs as stated in prior years. 
 inflation-adjusted costs associated with vehicle production resulting 
from emissions and safety regulations.  While these numbers depict a dramatic increase in costs, 
their rise is even more dramatic when considered as a percentage of the cost of an average 
vehicle.  The average cost of emissions and safety regulatory requirements as a percentage of the 
average expenditure on a new vehicle rose quickly from only 0.34% in 1967 to 18% in 1981.  It 
has remained at approximately 19% since that time.   
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Table 7 Cumulative Costs per Vehicle (in US dollars) of Emissions and Safety Regulatory 
Requirements 
 
 
4.3 Persistent Manufacturing Implications 
While automotive firms were confronted with five persistent disturbances over the course 
of the study period, the implications of those persistent disturbances from the perspective of the 
firm’s manufacturing operations were more focused.  I found a translation process between the 
persistent disturbances at the level of the firm, and how those persistent disturbances impacted 
the firm’s manufacturing operations.  I called these more focused disturbances persistent 
manufacturing implications.  I define persistent manufacturing implications as the 
manufacturing-related implications of repeated temporary events confronting firms. 
My data analysis revealed three persistent manufacturing implications; fluctuating 
consumer demand, fluctuating consumer model preferences, and profit margin pressures.  In 
what follows I review each of these persistent manufacturing implications in turn.  I describe the 
Year Costs Year Costs
1967 11 1992 3174
1969 107 1993 3522
1971 176 1994 3904
1973 331 1995 3874
1975 586 1997 3970
1977 699 1999 4079
1979 861 2001 4286
1981 1611 2002 4199
1983 1871 2003 4127
1985 2056 2004 4166
1987 2257 2005 4605
1989 2457 2006 4661
1991 3097 2007 4638
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persistent manufacturing implication, showing how each was driven by persistent disturbances 
stemming from economic cycles, labour disruptions, energy challenges, competitive pressures, 
and/or government regulations.  This relationship between persistent manufacturing implication 
and persistent disturbance is depicted in Table 8.    
Table 8 Persistent Manufacturing Implications and Persistent Disturbances 
Persistent Manufacturing 
Implications 
Persistent Disturbances 
Fluctuating Consumer 
Demand 
Economic cycles 
Energy challenges 
Competitive pressures 
Fluctuating Consumer Model 
Preferences 
Energy challenges 
Government regulations 
Profit Margin Pressures Economic cycles 
Labour disruptions 
Competitive pressures 
Government regulations 
4.3.1 Fluctuating Consumer Demand  
Fluctuating consumer demand refers to changes in the volume of vehicles demanded by 
customers over time.  Below I review how consumer demand fluctuated over my study period.  
In doing so, I draw a connection between fluctuating consumer demand and the persistent 
disturbances the firms faced, in particular, economic cycles, energy challenges, and competitive 
pressures.  My analysis begins with total vehicle sales, and then breaks out both car and truck 
sales over the study period because cars and trucks have historically represented distinctly 
different markets and because doing so highlights consumer demand volatility more clearly.  
Consumer demand for vehicles was volatile over my study period.  In Figure 15 I 
illustrate this volatility, employing unit volume sales as a proxy for changing consumer demand.  
The spikes and valleys in vehicle sales highlight swings in vehicle demand.  There are substantial 
consumer demand fluctuations.  Vehicle demand grew through the early 1970s from just over 10 
million cars to 14.5 million vehicles in 1973—a 43% growth in just three short years.  Following 
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this rise, vehicle sales by unit volume fluctuated for several decades.  Between 1973 and 1975 
volumes tumbled to 11 million before rising again to 15.4 million in 1978.  Subsequently, sales 
volumes dropped again down to 10.5 million in 1982 before rising quickly to 16.3 million in 
1986.  Sales rose to historic highs of 17 to 18 million vehicles in the early 21st century before 
collapsing in 2009 to 8.1 million vehicles, the lowest in many decades. 
Figure 15 Industry Vehicle Sales 
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, US Domestic and Imports 
 
Figure 15 highlights how diverse events contributed to volatility in vehicle sales.  As 
depicted in the vertical bars at the bottom of Figure 15, recessionary periods depress demand as 
consumers scale back purchases of large-ticket items like vehicles.  Major world events such as 
the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973, the Iran Oil Crisis in 1979, as well as rising gasoline prices in the 
early 1980s, have significant impacts on consumer demand for vehicles.  Similarly, as the sales 
of imports rose over my study period, the demand for domestic vehicles declined.  These events 
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are depicted in Figure 15 with tall vertical bars and identified with text and arrows.  Sometimes 
these events span multiple years.  
Fluctuating consumer demand is even more pronounced when considering the swings in 
demand experienced by individual firms.  In Figure 16 each of GM, Ford, and Chrysler’s unit 
volume sales of cars are graphed over the duration of the study period.  GM unit volume sales of 
cars are particularly volatile throughout the study period, with volume sales fluctuations of over 
1 million units taking place within the span of only a few years and often in only a single year.  
For instance, sales dropped from 4.4 million to 3.3 million units between 1969 and 1970 before 
climbing again to 4.7 million in 1971.  Similarly, sales dropped from 5.1 million in 1973 to 3.8 
million in 1974.  Between 1975 and 1976 car sales rose over 1 million units from 3.8 million to 
4.8 million.  Volume sales dropped by almost 2 million units between 1978 and 1982 from 5.4 
million to 3.5 million.  From the graph it is clear that Ford and Chrysler experienced dramatic 
swings as well.  What is also noticeable is the dramatic and continuous decline from the mid-
1980s through until the end of the study period in 2009.  While this decline is most notable at 
GM, Ford and Chrysler mimic this decline as well.   
Figure 16 Big Three Car Sales (Units) – 
1965 to 2009 
 
Figure 17 Big Three Truck Sales (Units) – 
1985 to 2009 
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While less pronounced than with cars, trucks, SUVs, and vans also experienced 
fluctuating consumer demand (see Figure 17).  Sales were relatively flat through the 1980s until 
the demand for SUVs rose in the early 1990s, almost doubling from 3.5 million combined units 
of trucks in 1990 to 6.8 million units in 2000.  This trend crested at the mid-point of the first 
dcade of the 2000s and then dropped dramatically from a combined Big Three sales of 6.7 
million in 2005 to only 2.9 million unit sales of trucks in 2009, a decline more rapid than the rise 
of the class through the 1990s.   
4.3.2 Fluctuating Consumer Model Preferences 
The second persistent manufacturing implication is fluctuating consumer model 
preferences, involving swings in the demand for vehicles with different properties.  The most 
critical property that fluctuated was the class of vehicles demanded.  Below I discuss how 
demand for different classes of vehicles fluctuated over time—from big cars to small cars and 
from trucks to SUVs and then CUVs.  I discuss these fluctuations in the context of the persistent 
disturbances related to government regulations and energy challenges facing automotive firms 
over my study period.   
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Figure 18 Customer Demand for Cars by Vehicle Type as Share of Cars – 1971 to 1989 
 
The demand for different types or classes of vehicles fluctuated over the study period.  
Cars and trucks are both classified using criteria related to size and function.  Figure 18 and 
Figure 19 show swings in demand for different classes of cars as a share of total cars over two 
different time periods: between 1971 and 1989 and between 1990 and 2009.5 Figure 
20
 Similarly, 
 shows the swings in demand for different classes of trucks as a share of total trucks over the 
study period.  Taken together, these figures illustrate how firms faced fluctuating consumer 
model preferences from year to year.  To illustrate, the share of full-size cars dropped from 36% 
of automotive sales in 1971 to 16% of automotive sales in 1981.  Correspondingly, sales of 
                                               
5 Across different years in the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, different labels are used to describe different types of 
vehicles.  For instance, the terms subcompact, compact, intermediate, and full-size or regular were used between 
1971 and 1989.  From 1990 onwards, the labels became small, middle, and large.  Since some compact vehicles 
became classified as small and others as middle, I split my analysis into two time periods. 
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subcompact cars rose from 13% to 28%, and sales of compact cars rose from 21% to 26% in the 
same time period.  There were significant year-to-year increases as well.  Sales of subcompacts 
jumped 8% from 1971 to 1972 before dropping 5 points to 16% in the subsequent year.  Between 
1978 and 1979 subcompact sales rose 9 points from 14% to 23% of car sales.  During the 1990s 
and 2000s, sales of small and middle-sized vehicles traded off from one another, fluctuating 10 
percentage points over a decade.   
Figure 19 Customer Demand for Cars by Vehicle Type as Share of Cars – 1990 to 2009 
 
Trucks and SUVs experienced similar swings.  Demand for pickup trucks has been in 
decline since the early 1980s, with SUVs and vans growing in the share of truck sales.  SUVs 
grew from no share of trucks in 1982 to encompass 25% of vehicles a decade later.  During the 
mid-1990s, SUV sales as a percentage of total truck sales grew another 10 points.  Recently 
however, sales of SUVs have dropped off considerably from a high of 38% in 1998 to a current 
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low of 14%.  Much of this swing can be explained by the increased share taken by a new class of 
crossover utility vehicles (CUVs) that has grown to encompass half of the market of trucks in 10 
short years.  CUVs possess a smaller footprint than SUVs, pickup trucks, or vans while retaining 
some of the cargo and handling characteristics, meaning that they have developed into substitutes 
for larger, more expensive trucks.   
These three figures also display events associated with changing model preferences that 
occurred throughout the study period.  Energy-related issues such as the Arab Oil Embargo in 
1973 and the Iranian Energy Crisis in 1979 as well as spikes in retail gasoline prices appear to be 
associated with fluctuations in consumer model preferences from larger to smaller vehicles. 
Similarly, significant regulatory actions, including the launch and development of CAFE 
standards from 1978 through 1985 and the Gas Guzzler Tax launched in 1980, coincide with 
periods of increasing adoption of subcompact cars and abandonment of full-size vehicles.   
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Figure 20 Customer Demand for Trucks by Vehicle Type as a Proportion of Trucks – 1982 
to 2009 
 
Fluctuating consumer model preference also includes changes in other vehicle properties.  
For instance, the use of four-cylinder engines rose quickly in the 1970s from 0.03% of cars in 
1970 to comprise 39.85% of cars in 1981 before stabilizing at 50% from the mid-1980s onward 
[Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks].  In the same time period, the proportion of US cars produced 
that were smaller than 250 CID [cubic inch displacement] grew from 12.9% to 70.7% [Ward’s 
Automotive Yearbooks].  Similarly, shifts occurred in the move from rear-wheel drive to front-
wheel drive vehicles.  GM, Chrysler, and Ford produced few front-wheel drive vehicles prior to 
the CAFE standards being introduced in 1975.  However, a report by Arthur Anderson and Co in 
1980 predicted that the number of front-wheel drive cars sold in North America would grow to 
50% by 1985 [Ward’s, 1980].  By the mid-1990s and through to 2009, only a handful of high-
performance sports cars remained rear-wheel drive.   
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Fluctuating consumer model preferences were also pronounced when considering swings 
in the demand for individual vehicle models as compared with projections.  For example, sales of 
Chevrolet’s Citation dropped from 209,545 in 1982 to half of that in 1983 following a NHTSA 
safety investigation into alleged brake problems.  Over that year, Chevrolet sales increased by 
5.8%, meaning that production of other models was increased to compensate [Ward’s, 1984].  At 
Ford, sales of the Mercury Villager minivan never came close to capacity production, and the 
joint venture with Nissan to produce these vehicles was ultimately called off  in 2002 [Ward’s, 
1999; 2003].  Similarly, in 1982 Chevrolet’s Chevette widely missed projections of 350,000 
units, registering only 233,858 sales.  In short, demand for different vehicles varied widely from 
year to year and, perhaps more important, frequently deviated from manufacturers’ expectations. 
4.3.3 Profit Margin Pressures 
The third persistent manufacturing implication consists of persistent profit margin 
pressures on North American automotive firms to maintain and decrease vehicles costs while 
maintaining or increasing quality and other vehicle features.  Below I discuss these pressures in 
the context of the persistent disturbances from competitive pressures, labour disruptions, 
government regulations, and economic cycles. 
Japanese competitors, who were operating with significantly lower costs than GM, Ford, 
and Chrysler, were important drivers of these profit margin pressures.  Estimates produced by 
Harbour and Associates show that this cost differential was driven largely by differences in the 
number of hours it took North American firms to manufacture vehicles compared with their 
Japanese competitors.  In 1980, Japanese firms assembled smaller classes of vehicles in 17.4 
hours, and their total manufacturing time was 30.8 hours.  In contrast, North American firms 
took 33.2 hours to assemble and 59.9 hours for total manufacturing.  These differences in 
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assembly and total manufacturing time (15.8 and 29.1 hours, respectively) contributed to a cost 
advantage enjoyed by the Japanese of approximately $1513 per car [The Original Harbour 
Report, 1980/1981].  Significant differences persisted over the study period, although North 
American firms made considerable progress in reducing this spread.  By 1998, the cost 
differential per car as compared with Japanese firms was between $500 and $989; by 2002 it had 
fallen to between $313 and $355 [Harbour Reports, 1980/1981; 1999; 2003]. 
While profit margin pressures came from competitors as described above, the regulations 
imposed on North American automotive firms in terms of reduced emissions and improved 
safety and fuel economy added significant costs to the development and manufacturing of 
vehicles as well over the span of decades.  As Table 7 illustrated, the cumulative costs attributed 
to meeting emissions and safety requirements were considerable, constituting 19% of the total 
cost of a vehicle from the early 1980s on.  Since automotive firms were concerned about 
consumer price inelasticity, these costs were rarely passed onto consumers in their entirety.   
While cost pressures were an ongoing concern, owing largely to economic cycles of 
boom and bust, cost inefficiencies became most apparent during economic downturns.  I 
employed return on sales figures as a proxy for cost challenges experienced during the study 
period.  Return on sales is a measure that automotive executives themselves deployed in 
expressing concern about declining profit margins.  This concern is illustrated in the following 
excerpt from Ford’s 1970 annual report:  
“Throughout the world, the automobile industry is challenged by 
rapidly rising labor and material costs and by intense competition 
which precludes price increases sufficient to cover rising costs. These 
challenges are reflected in our after-tax return on sales, which declined 
last year to 3.5% from 3.8% in 1969 and 6.7% ten years ago.”  
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Return on sales is depressed when costs rise relative to revenues.  As Figure 21 illustrates, each 
of the automotive firms in my sample had regular difficulties in maintaining a healthy return on 
sales, reflecting the challenges that these firms were having in managing their costs.  Each of the 
major dips corresponds to economic recessions where higher costs led to depressed return on 
sales made worse when automotive firms dropped prices, as they often did, to maintain market 
share.  During economic booms cost advantages were less problematic as margins were retained.   
Figure 21 Big Three Return on Sales 
 
  
4.4 Dynamic Capabilities  
My research focused on the responses firms took to adapt their manufacturing operations 
to the persistent disturbances and associated persistent manufacturing implications they were 
facing from their environment—that is, how firms built and developed manufacturing flexibility.  
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Manufacturing flexibility has been studied extensively in the field of operations (Slack, 2005; 
Sethi and Sethi, 1990; Gerwin, 1993).  Manufacturing flexibility can be defined as a firm’s 
ability to adapt to environmental changes by varying products, product mix, and production 
volumes (Upton, 1994).  This definition highlights how manufacturing flexibility fits the 
description of a dynamic capability in that it is a capability through which firms adapt their 
underlying manufacturing operation to changing environmental conditions.    
Manufacturing flexibility comprises different types of flexibility that permit different 
forms of adaptation.  While the operations literature recognizes different types of flexibility, the 
dynamic capabilities literature has largely treated manufacturing flexibility as a unitary dynamic 
capability (see Malik and Kotabe, 2009).  In analyzing my data, I found three types of 
manufacturing flexibility pertinent in my study.  The first was production volume flexibility, 
which enabled firms to adjust the total volume of product produced.  The second was production 
mix flexibility, which enabled firms to switch among different classes of vehicles or vehicles 
with different properties or characteristics.  Finally, partnering flexibility enabled firms to 
modify how they relied on partners with respect to satisfying their manufacturing obligations.   
My data analysis revealed that each of these dynamic capabilities was aligned with a 
particular persistent manufacturing implication.  Figure 9 illustrated the relationships among 
persistent disturbances, persistent manufacturing implications, and dynamic capability 
development.  As the figure highlighted, while my data analysis found that multiple persistent 
disturbances translated into three persistent manufacturing implications, my data analysis also 
showed that a one-to-one relationship existed between a persistent manufacturing implication 
and a specific dynamic capability in manufacturing flexibility that firms built in response.  In my 
study, these dynamic capabilities developed over decades.  In this section I build narratives 
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describing how each of these dynamic capabilities developed over my study period.  The raw 
data for these narratives can be found in the appendix in Tables A4 through A12. 
4.4.1 Production Volume Flexibility 
Production volume flexibility refers to a firm’s capability to increase or decrease the 
volume of vehicles the firm produces over a given time period.  This was a dynamic capability in 
that it was through production volume flexibility that the firm’s underlying manufacturing 
capability was modified and adapted to meet changing environmental conditions.  I found that it 
was possible to discern the capabilities that comprised a firm’s dynamic capability in production 
volume flexibility.  These capabilities functioned as building blocks for the dynamic capability.  
Figure 22 illustrates these capabilities as they pertain to the dynamic capability of production 
volume flexibility.  Below I discuss how these capabilities comprise an automotive firm’s 
dynamic capability in production volume flexibility.  These capabilities are alter sources of 
production, utilize capacity, and adjust model timing.   
Figure 22 Development of Production Volume Flexibility 
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Alter Sources of Production 
The first capability, alter sources of production, pertains to the ability to increase or 
decrease plant capacity and to open or close entire plants.  For instance, in 1994 Ford increased 
the capacity of their St. Louis plant from 135,000 units to 445,000 units so as to build Ford 
Explorer SUVs alongside Aerostar vans.  This was accomplished through a 700,000-ft2 
expansion [Ward’s, 1995].  Alternatively, adding new sources of production can involve opening 
new plants, such as the Sterling Heights facility opened by Chrysler in 1984 to build the Chrysler 
LeBaron and the Dodge Lancer [Ward’s, 1985], or unshuttering idled plants like the St. Louis 
South plant in 1995, revived to produce Dodge Rams [Ward’s, 1996].   
To adjust production volume down, manufacturing plants may also be closed or idled for 
defined periods of time.  For instance, between March 1980 and March 1981, GM idled their 
South Gate plant [Ward’s, 1981], and in 1997 Ford shut down their Lorain plant for two years 
[Ward’s, 1998].  Plants may also be closed indefinitely.  In these cases, manufacturing firms 
retain ownership over the facility and are able to re-open the plant should conditions warrant.  
Finally, plants may be closed permanently, and the property sold and converted to other uses.   
Utilize Capacity 
The second capability, utilize capacity, involves increasing or decreasing the utilization 
of a firm’s manufacturing plants.  Capacity utilization can be increased through the use of 
overtime by requiring employees to work longer days and by extending weeks to include 
Saturdays.  Adding new shifts to an existing plant also improves capacity utilization since 
facilities are used for more hours of the day.  Manufacturing firms increased the number of shifts 
employed for a given facility from one or two shifts a day to two or three shifts a day.  This 
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requires hiring additional employees to work the new shifts.  Finally, capacity utilization can be 
increased by speeding up the production schedule at a facility, by increasing assembly line 
speeds which may or may not involve hiring additional employees.    
Reducing capacity utilization can be done in various ways.  First and very simply, it can 
involve temporary shutdowns to control inventory and reduce production volumes.  In 1990, 
Ford closed their plants for a total of 85 plant weeks to control inventory levels [Ward’s, 1991].  
In the same year Chrysler engaged in sporadic one- and two-week plant shutdowns [Ward’s, 
1991].  A second way to decrease capacity utilization is to reduce manufacturing line speeds so 
as to produce fewer vehicles.  This approach is typically associated with laying off employees.  
A third way is to shut down lines within a plant.  For example, in 2005 GM shut down a 
production line in Oshawa and idled one in Spring Hill [Ward’s, 2006].  Finally, manufacturing 
firms may reduce the number of shifts active at a given plant; for example, GM eliminated a 
second shift at their Buick City in 1987 [Ward’s, 1988]. 
Adjust Model Timing 
The final capability pertains to adjusting model timing.  The automotive business is 
seasonal, with new vehicle models released annually.  New models may constitute dramatic 
revisions of a vehicle including new specifications and features or they may involve small 
updates in styling.  Typically, new models are announced and displayed at annual automotive 
shows early in the calendar year and manufacturing begins during the latter part of the summer.  
At times when demand for the vehicles of a given model year is high, firms change models over 
later, extending the run of the existing model and delaying the launch of new models.  In 1984 
GM extended the production run of the Fiero and 2000 Sunbird into November to satisfy 
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sustained customer demand [Ward’s, 1985].  Similarly, a firm may delay plans to end the 
production of certain models when demand warrants.  In 1986, Ford delayed plans to drop the 
Grand Marquis in response to stronger than expected market demand [Ward’s, 1987].  
Conversely, when demand for vehicles is low, manufacturing firms cease production of a model 
earlier than originally planned.  This may involve an idle period for a plant, experienced as 
unscheduled downtime, or it may involve commencing production on new models earlier than 
originally anticipated.  
4.4.2 Production Mix Flexibility 
The repeated oil crises of the 1970s were catalyzing events for the automotive industry.  
However, these crises were just the beginning of significant turmoil in the industry and marked 
the start of fluctuations in consumer model preference.  Despite the difficulty in doing so, North 
American automotive firms were often required to make dramatic changes to the mix of vehicles 
they manufactured from one year to the next.  Customer demand swung between vehicles of 
different classes, properties, and models.  North American automotive firms initially responded 
to these swings by leveraging their existing capabilities; converting plants, sourcing external 
vehicles, and changeover models.  As the need to rapidly adjust production mix persisted, firms 
developed new and increasingly sophisticated capabilities in platform sharing and facility 
sharing.  Below I discuss how this dynamic capability developed over the course of my study 
period from 1965 to 2010.  I pull much of the data for this narrative from the annual analyses of 
Ford, GM, and Chrysler found in Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, supplementing the telling of 
the story with facts from a variety of additional sources.  Figure 23 depicts this development 
graphically.   
 76 
 
Figure 23 Development of Production Mix Flexibility  
 
The 1970s proved especially challenging for automotive firms.  The repeated oil crises in 
1973 and 1979 shocked the automotive industry, each causing large swings in demand from big 
to small cars.  Combined sales of compact and subcompact cars increased from 33% in 1970 to 
over 50% of automobiles sold through the 1980s.  Corresponding decreases in larger-automobile 
sales were also recorded.  Making matters worse, the swing towards small cars was not direct.  
Following each of the crises the sales of larger automobiles bounced back when gasoline prices 
temporarily declined, gasoline rationing was suspended, and national concern over energy 
security diminished.  The result was that firms were faced with swings in demand between large 
and small cars over a 10-year period.   
In response, firms were forced to change their production mix from one weighted with 
large cars, to one that favoured smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles.  Changing a firm’s 
production mix involved either introducing new vehicles to fill a gap in the firm’s product line-
up or shifting production among existing vehicles.  During the 1970s, GM, Ford, and Chrysler 
 77 
 
deployed capabilities that were poorly developed.  These firms relied on smaller, more fuel 
efficient captive imports from Japanese partners, engaged in production changeover, and 
dramatic and costly plant conversions.  I discuss each of these in turn.   
Captive Imports 
Captive importing is the practice of importing vehicles from third parties manufacturing 
in foreign countries and selling them under domestic brands.  The term “captive” refers to how 
the foreign cars are sold under the importer or domestic automaker’s own brand.  North 
American automotive manufacturers largely partnered with Japanese firms for their captive 
importing programs.  Ford partnered with Mazda, Chrysler with Mitsubishi, and GM with Suzuki 
and Isuzu.  GM and Ford also had extensive European subsidiaries (Opel and Ford of Europe) 
and thus relied on imports of small cars from these subsidiaries as well.   
Figure 24 Captive Import Cars as Proportion of Firm Car Sales 
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Chrysler was particularly reliant on captive imports.  Possessing no domestically 
produced subcompact car, Chrysler was left with few options when responding to the shifts in 
demand towards small cars that occurred during the 1970s [Ward’s, 1974].  Over this time, 
Chrysler imported an increasing volume and variety of vehicles from Mitsubishi, including the 
Dodge Colt, Plymouth Arrow, Dodge Challenger, and Plymouth Sapporo.  Chrysler relied on 
captive imports so much during the oil crises of the 1970s that units of captive imports more than 
doubled from 6% to 16% of car sales between 1975 and 1980 (Figure 24).  Ford and GM initially 
relied on captive imports from their European subsidiaries.  GM imported the Opel-
manufactured Kadett, Manta, and GT; Ford, the Capri and Fiesta.  Both firms subsequently 
contracted the manufacture of these small European cars to their Japanese partners. 
In all cases, North American automotive firms used captive imports to bolster their 
underdeveloped small-car programs that had been struggling to compete with low-cost Japanese 
competitors.  Many small-car programs run by North American automotive firms were still in the 
planning stages when the second oil crisis hit [Ward’s, 1981].  Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca 
said it plainly when describing the impact Japanese firms were having on North American 
automotive manufacturers: “they’re murdering us” [Ward’s, 1990: 15].  Making use of captive 
imports allowed firms to avoid the years of research and development and millions of dollars of 
investments to bring a new vehicle from concept through to production readiness.  A single 
engine plant alone can cost $600 million [Ward’s, 1982], and it was reported that Ford’s world 
car program, the basis for the Ford Contour and Mercury Mystique, cost $6 billion and took 
upwards of 10 years (from 1985 to 1995) to complete [Ward’s, 1995].  
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Convert Plants  
Each of the Big Three automotive firms struggled to adjust their production mix by 
increasing the production of small cars to meet demand and decreasing the production of large 
cars to slow the accumulation of inventories.  Firms shifted their production in two ways.  First, 
they converted plants on a massive scale to adjust their production mix in favour of small cars.  
Second, they adjusted model changeover times to permit the continued production of larger or 
smaller cars as necessary.  I discuss each approach below. 
Each of the Big Three underwent massive plant conversions to replace big-car capacity 
with small-car capacity.  They shut down and reduced the capacity of large-car plants, and then 
converted and opened new small-car plants or increased the capacity of existing small-car plants.  
At Ford this conversion was perhaps the most dramatic.  Ford increased production rates for their 
small car, the Pinto, at Ford’s Metuchen and San Jose plants.  Ford also converted Dearborn and 
San Jose to the production of the Mustang II, Chicago to the intermediate-sized Torino, and 
Wayne to the smaller Maverick.  For Ford, these conversions added 1 million units of small 
cars—a conversion of 40% of Ford’s annual sales [Ward’s, 1974].  This feat was referred to as 
the “fastest and most expensive production model-mix shift in history” [Ward’s, 1973].  It was a 
brute force approach to a dramatic problem.   These are signs that firms were attempting to find 
the right mix of vehicle and facility during this time.  GM engaged in a number of plant 
conversions as well, shifting the production of vehicles to different plants.  In 1971, they moved 
their Nova to their Van Nuys and Norwood plants and moved the Camaro from Van Nuys to 
Norwood [Ward’s, 1972].  In 1977, they added the LeMans to their Baltimore plant and dropped 
it at their Lakewood facility.  They added the Sunbird to their Lordstown plant and the Phoenix 
to both the Willow Run and North Tarrytown plants, while dropping the Ventura from their Van 
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Nuys plant [Ward’s, 1978].  During significant conversion from big to small cars in 1973, GM 
was forced to lay off workers while plant conversions occurred [Ward’s, 1974].   
Production Changeover 
New and updated vehicle models are introduced on a yearly schedule that starts in the 
late summer.  At this time, manufacturers may introduce entirely new vehicle models or make 
smaller cosmetic or incremental adjustments.  During the 1970s, automotive firms used these 
model changeover periods to adjust the volume of a given vehicle or class of vehicles that was 
produced.  For instance, in 1977, as large-car sales rebounded, Ford shut small-car plants earlier 
than scheduled so as to reduce the number of small cars produced.  Simultaneously, they delayed 
the changeover of full-sized cars until August of that year, thereby increasing the number of 
larger cars produced [Ward’s, 1978].  GM engaged in similar activities during 1978, ending 
production of their full-size vehicles several months early so as to convert the plant to new front-
drive E-body vehicles that were more fuel efficient [Ward’s, 1979].   
I contend that these activities deployed a set of dynamic capabilities that had been 
developed, and which were better suited to changing production volumes up or down than to 
shifting production mix.  Following the deployment of these poorly developed capabilities, the 
automotive firms built new capabilities that enabled them to more effectively adapt to changing 
consumer model preferences.  Below I discuss the development of platform sharing and facility 
sharing.   
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Platform Sharing 
Platform sharing refers to a practice whereby automotive firms design a vehicle platform 
that can be used to build multiple vehicle models.  A good example is the platform supporting 
Chrysler’s popular Plymouth Reliant, Dodge Aries, and Chrysler LeBaron cars.  These were 
known as K-cars because they were built on Chrysler’s K-platform.  As was the case with 
Chrysler’s K-cars, vehicles built from the same platform were often shared across different car 
divisions and, in time, different automotive partners.   
Platform sharing served a number of purposes.  One critical purpose was to spread the 
cost and effort of producing new vehicles across a larger production volume.  Engineering effort 
and manufacturing complexity were dramatically reduced when a single vehicle platform was 
customized and tailored to the needs of different car divisions, rather than having to build unique 
vehicles for each division.  Thus shared vehicle platforms served to reduce costs.  Shared 
platforms were first employed to manufacture two or three very similar vehicles branded with 
different nameplates in order to satisfy the demands of different customer groups.  This 
capability provided firms with the flexibility to shift production mix among brands based on 
varying demands and the changing tastes of customers.  GM employed this strategy with many 
of their new car launches, often building three vehicles from a single platform such as their N- 
and E/K-platforms, which each produced vehicles for Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and Buick [Ward’s, 
1984; 1987].  Similarly, Ford built the Mustang, Thunderbird, and Fairmont off the same 
platform [Ward’s, 1980], and, as discussed above, Chrysler’s sister K-cars, the Reliant, Aries, 
and LeBaron, were all built on the K-platform [Ward’s, 1982].   
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Vehicle platforms played a critical role in manufacturing flexibility as well.  Shared 
platforms permitted firms to fill critical gaps in product line-ups faster as new technology 
became available and to more readily shift production among platform vehicles owing to the 
strong overlap in parts and manufacturing knowledge required.  Sharing platforms meant that a 
firm’s limited technology offerings for vehicles in high demand could be spread more effectively 
across the firm’s brands.  For instance, automotive firms could take a fuel efficient subcompact 
vehicle model, or a fuel efficient front-wheel drive vehicle model such as GM’s X-car, and better 
leverage valuable engineering to satisfy fluctuations in consumer model preferences across 
multiple brands.   
Platform sharing also meant that automotive firms could focus engineering effort on a 
reduced set of platforms.  Ford was successful in reducing their platforms from 24 to 16 [Ward’s, 
1995].  At first this was done by taking existing vehicles and combining them onto the same 
platform.  For instance, in 1979 Ford built both the Mustang and the Thunderbird from the 
Fairmont platform, eliminating the body platform previously used by the older model of the 
Thunderbird [Ward’s, 1980].  Subsequently, further platform reduction was accomplished as new 
vehicles were designed and produced on existing platforms.  Engineering effort was concentrated 
in other ways as well.  Ford had reduced the number of engines they used from 30 to 14 by 1996 
[Ward’s, 1997].  GM began centralizing engine manufacturing to a greater extent, with divisions 
sharing their engines.  Chevrolet shared their V-8 engine with other divisions; Oldsmobile 
provided their diesel engines to other divisions; and Pontiac shared their fuel efficient 4-cylinder 
engines [Ward’s, 1979; 1980].  Further engine and transmission consolidation occurred when 
GM created a central Powertrain Division [Ward’s, 1992].  In this way, shared platforms made it 
easier to disseminate cutting-edge technology as it became available.   
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Over time, platform sharing became more sophisticated, permitting firms to achieve an 
increasing diversity of models from a single platform.  The Chevrolet Lumina platform is a great 
example of a single platform that permitted GM to produce a coupe, sedan, and minivan 
[Ward’s, 1990].  Similarly, Chrysler built the new Pacifica platform originally to manufacture a 
station wagon, but it also became the basis for Chrysler’s next generation of minivans [Ward’s, 
2003].  GM’s GMT800 program enabled GM to produce 40 different models of SUVs and 
pickups from a single modularized vehicle platform [Ward’s, 1999].      
In addition to sharing platforms across brands, firms began to share platforms across 
partner firms.  Chrysler engaged in joint platform development with Mitsubishi for their C- and 
D-segment vehicles that included the Dodge Neon [Ward’s, 2003], and Ford’s Probe was based 
on Mazda’s 626-platform [Ward’s, 1986].  In other instances, Ford and Nissan teamed up to 
share a platform to build small vans, including the Mercury Villager and the Nissan Quest 
[Ward’s, 1992].  GM’s joint venture with Toyota at their NUMMI manufacturing plant produced 
a variety of vehicles, including the Toyota Matrix and the Pontiac Vibe.   
Platform sharing was not without its challenges.  A critical challenge arose as consumers 
had difficulty differentiating among vehicles that looked increasingly similar to one another.  
Figure 25 shows three different vehicle models, the 1986 Oldsmobile Toronado, the 1986 
Cadillac Eldorado, and the 1986 Buick Riviera.  Each of these vehicles is based on the same 
underlying platform—what GM refers to as their E/K-platform.  The pictures in Figure 25 show 
how the vehicles look very similar.  Since each of an automotive firm’s brands is carefully 
cultivated to appeal to specific market segments, this was a very real challenge.  This was 
particularly challenging when platforms were shared across firms or across distinctive divisions 
within a firm, such as GM’s Chevrolet, Opel, and Saturn [Ward’s, 1998].  By this point shared 
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platforms were not only heavily ingrained into the automotive firms, they were a financial 
necessity keeping costs lower.  Chrysler responded to these criticisms by separating Chrysler and 
Plymouth into distinct brands, although the brands continued to share platforms.  GM’s SUV and 
pickup truck program, the GMT800, tried to get around some of the problems of undifferentiated 
platform vehicles by using a variety of modules that could be mixed and matched to produce 
greater variety of output from a still greatly reduced set of parts [Ward’s, 1999]. 
Figure 25 GM E/K Model Vehicles 
 
This practice of sharing platforms became so pervasive that it would be difficult to find a 
vehicle manufactured by GM, Chrysler, or Ford that is not built on a platform shared with 
another vehicle within the firm or with one of its subsidiaries or partners.   
Facility Sharing 
 In addition to sharing vehicle platforms, North American automotive firms developed the 
capability to share facilities among automotive divisions and across subsidiaries and partners.  
Automotive firms frequently shared plants among their varied brands.  This gave these firms the 
ability to more quickly adjust production based on which brands and vehicles were selling well.  
For instance, GM’s N-cars were built for Buick, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac on a single production 
line [Ward’s, 1984], and Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Oldsmobile split output for all-purpose vehicles 
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(APV) being produced at the North Tarrytown facility [Ward’s, 1990].  At Chrysler, the Laser 
was built on the same line as the Reliant and LeBaron [Ward’s, 1984].  Similarly, the New 
Yorker and the LHS shared output, and the Ram and Dakota trucks both shared a production line 
at Warren [Ward’s, 1993].  Thus automotive firms could adjust their production output based on 
changes in market demand by shifting among their various brands.   
Facility sharing developed further such that automotive manufacturing facilities were 
able to produce very different vehicles in the same plant and even on the same line.  For instance, 
during the move from rear-wheel drive to front-wheel drive vehicles, Ford developed the ability 
to manufacture both rear- and front-wheel drive vehicles at the same plant—a feat that had not 
previously been accomplished.  Since front-wheel drive provided superior fuel economy 
performance, this permitted Ford to make adjustments to production output based on market 
demand for fuel efficient vehicles [Ward’s, 1984].  Similarly, Ford and Chrysler, at their St. 
Thomas and Sterling Heights facilities respectively, developed the ability to produce both big 
and small vehicles [Ward’s, 1984; 1987].   
Subsequently, automotive firms built capabilities in flexible manufacturing, permitting 
them to manufacture models from multiple platforms on the same assembly lines.  Such flexible 
plants became more commonplace.  Ford’s Chicago plant comprised a multi-supplier park and 
assembly line that could produce eight models from two platforms by 2003 [Ward’s, 2004]; 
Ford’s Rouge plant was redone to accommodate three distinct platforms up from two [Ward’s, 
2003]; and Ford’s Dearborn plant was capable of producing nine models from three platforms 
[Ward’s, 2005].  Ford prepared for their CUV production by creating a flexible truck campus in 
Oakville [Ward’s, 2008].  Chrysler developed similar capabilities, with 60% of their assembly 
plants featuring advanced flexible manufacturing capabilities that permitted production of  
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multiple models from various platforms on the same assembly line [Ward’s, 2006].  GM 
bulldozed inefficient plants to build state-of-the-art facilities, such as new flexible manufacturing 
facilities in Oshawa [Ward’s, 2005], and a 500-acre, state-of-the art facility named Buick City 
[Ward’s, 1984]. 
Finally, firms began sharing facilities across partner organizations.  One of the most well-
known facility-sharing arrangements occurred between GM and Toyota, which invested jointly 
in a production facility called NUMMI in California.  GM and Toyota split the output of this 
facility, co-producing one vehicle, the Pontiac Vibe and Toyota Matrix, while using additional 
capacity at the facility for other vehicles.  Similarly, in 1986 Chrysler announced a joint venture 
with Mitsubishi to assemble cars in Illinois under the banner of Diamond Star Motors, despite 
selling their stake 2 years later [Ward’s, 1987].  Ford shared facilities with partners as well, 
including an arrangement with Nissan to jointly manufacture minivans [Ward’s, 1992] and a 
joint production facility with Mazda at their Flat Rock plant, Auto Alliance International 
[Ward’s, 1993].  
As demonstrated above, firms developed and then elaborated increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities, which enabled GM, Ford, and Chrysler to exhibit a dynamic capability in flexibly 
adjusting production mix.  Figure 23 illustrated and summarized these capabilities, depicting 
how they developed over time.  Early capabilities included plant conversion, whereby firms 
converted plants from producing one vehicle to producing another vehicle; external vehicle 
sourcing, in which vehicles were acquired from external sources through captive importing; and 
model changeover, with running changes and adjusted changeover times to take advantage of a 
changing production mix.  Subsequently, firms developed capabilities in platform sharing, which 
evolved from an ability to share across multiple divisions to one where firms were sharing 
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platforms across disparate vehicles and partner firms.  Finally, firms developed facility sharing 
that permitted firms to allow multiple divisions to share a single facility and, ultimately, to share 
facilities across disparate vehicle types and partner firms.  
Figure 26 Production Mix Flexibility Capability Deployment – Big Three 
 
Despite the development of new capabilities in shared platforms and shared facilities, 
firms continued to deploy prior capabilities in converting plants, importing, and model 
changeover.  Figure 26 shows how the use of plant conversion, facility sharing, and platform 
sharing continued over the study period.  What is striking about the graph is the continued 
reliance on older capabilities.  For instance, Ford continued to sell captive imports through 1997, 
and both GM and Chrysler sold captive imports to the end of the study period.   
In broad strokes, a firm’s ability to respond to production mix fluctuations developed 
substantially over the study period.  This development was characterized by a move from being 
concerned with building production capacity for a specific vehicle, such as the Ford Mustang or 
the Chrysler Intrepid, to building production capacity for classes of vehicles, such as small cars, 
large cars, SUVs, or CUVs [Ward’s, 1998; 2005].  Firms regularly discussed exchanging car 
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class capacity among brands.  As an example, Oldsmobile exchanged some if their H-body car 
capacity for additional X-car allocations [Ward’s, 1980]. 
4.4.3 Partnering Flexibility 
The third persistent disturbance, profit margin pressures, led firms to develop dynamic 
capabilities that allowed them to build and adapt partnerships with third parties in new and 
innovative ways.  Firms developed and then elaborated increasingly sophisticated capabilities 
over the course of my study period.  This development enabled GM, Ford, and Chrysler to 
exhibit a dynamic capability in partnering flexibility.  Figure 27 illustrates and summarizes the 
capabilities which comprise partnering flexibility, depicting how these capabilities developed 
over time.  Firms began by incorporating partner-manufactured components into their vehicles, 
subsequently developing this capability to facilitate sharing technology among partners.  
Similarly, firms began leveraging partner capacity through captive imports and subsequently 
developed this capability to support joint manufacturing and purchasing output capacity.  I pull 
much of the data for this narrative from the annual analysis of Ford, GM, and Chrysler found in 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, supplementing the narrative with data from additional sources.   
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Figure 27 Development of Partnering Flexibility 
 
Leverage Partner Capacity 
North American automotive manufacturers became increasingly reliant on partners to fill 
gaps in their vehicle line-ups.  This reliance began as firms leveraged captive importing partners.  
Both GM and Ford began by using captive imports from their European division: Opel and Ford 
Europe, respectively.  GM received 669,626 units from Opel between the mid-1960s and the 
mid-1970s.  GM was particularly reliant on imports of subcompact vehicles from Opel [Ward’s 
1974], owing to their poorly developed domestic small-car program.  Similarly, Ford imported 
495,695 units from Ford Europe over the same period.   
Both GM and Ford subsequently moved the manufacturing of their small-car models 
from their European subsidiaries to their Japanese partners, Isuzu (in 1976) and Mazda, 
respectively.  GM sourced the Sprint and Spectrum vehicles from Suzuki and Isuzu, respectively, 
which helped GM bolster their small-car program starting in the mid-1980s.  While Ford had 
their strongest captive import relationship with Mazda, purchasing vehicles such as the Lynx 
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[Ward’s, 1987], they did source vehicles from Korean manufacturer Kia, such as the mini-
compact Ford Festiva [Ward’s, 1987], and from Merkur in Germany [Ward’s, 1985;1988].    
Chrysler, possessing no European subsidiary, partnered with Mitsubishi early and began 
importing multiple Mitsubishi models in 1970, including the Challenger, Colt, Sapporo, and 
Arrow, to fill out their smaller-car line-ups for the Dodge and Plymouth brands.  Between 1970 
and 1996, Chrysler imported over 2,130,000 vehicles from Mitsubishi.  Captive importing was 
an early effort by automotive firms to access the capacity of partners skilled at producing small 
cars and trucks.   
However, GM, Ford, and Chrysler’s Japanese partners became increasingly eager to get a 
manufacturing foothold in North America in order to circumvent the voluntary import quotas 
imposed on Japanese automobiles.  The relationship GM, Ford, and Chrysler enjoyed with their 
partners developed from one of captive importing to one of joint manufacturing.  Each of the 
North American automotive firms developed joint manufacturing operations with Japanese 
partners on North American soil.  Chrysler partnered with Mitsubishi in 1984 to form Diamond 
Motors, which produced vehicles out of Illinois.  Through this partnership, Chrysler purchased 
vehicle output from this plant, including the Eagle Talon, Dodge Avenger, Chrysler Sebring, and 
Dodge Stealth over the duration of its existence.  Ford agreed to purchase a share of output from 
Mazda’s new manufacturing facility at Flat Rock in 1985 [Ward’s, 1986], and subsequently in 
1992 purchased a 50% equity stake [Ward’s, 1993].  Finally, a well-documented joint 
manufacturing initiative called NUMMI Motors began between GM and Toyota in the 1980s 
(Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1999; Adler, 1993).  GM and Toyota reached an agreement to 
deploy Toyota’s production system in an idled GM plant in Fremont California [Ward’s, 1984], 
in which they built a variety of vehicles to be sold under both brands.  GM’s share of the vehicles 
 91 
 
was initially the Chevrolet Nova, and then the Prizm and Geo Storm.  These joint manufacturing 
moves benefited the Big Three as well as their Japanese partners, since their own captive imports 
had been capped by voluntary government quotas and they were having difficulty acquiring 
captive import vehicles.    
The North American automotive manufacturers developed additional joint manufacturing 
arrangements as well.  Ford partnered with Nissan in the late 1980s to build small vans—the 
Mercury Villager and the Nissan Quest—with Ford adopting the role of assembler and Nissan 
taking on the design and engineering [Ward’s, 1988; 1992].  This joint venture lasted until 1998 
[Ward’s, 1999].  Further, Ford’s Hermosillo plant in Mexico was originally a joint venture 
between Ford and Mazda. GM increased their integration with supplier partners, who took on a 
more integral role in the assembly of GM’s automobiles.  In 2001 GM named “lead interior 
integrators” to manage the development of passenger compartments in every North American 
vehicle, and these partners assumed overseeing and benchmarking roles.  These deals were often 
international in nature.  A deal between Daimler Chrysler, Mitsubishi, and Kia was struck in 
2000 to manufacture high-quality, low-cost cars for multiple world markets—vehicles like the 
Dodge Neon [Ward’s, 2001]. A further relationship between Chrysler and Volkswagen was 
struck to build minivans at Chrysler’s St. Louis plant [Ward’s, 2006].   
These joint manufacturing relationships often involved substantial equity investments.  
Ford held equity stake in Mazda that reached 35% in 1996 [Ward’s, 1996] before being reduced 
to 13% in 2008 [Ward’s, 2009].  Similarly, GM held equity stakes in Isuzu (49%), Fuji (20%), 
Suzuki (20%), and Fiat (20%) over the study period.  GM ended the Fiat and Fuji relationship in 
2005 [Ward’s, 2006] and the Suzuki and Isuzu relationships in 2006 [Ward’s, 2007].  Chrysler 
purchased a 15% stake in Mitsubishi in 1971 [Ward’s 1972], and the then merged Daimler-
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Chrysler, increased that ownership to 37% before ending the relationship in 2005 [Ward’s, 
2006].  Joint ownership of facilities was also common.  Ford, for example, purchased 50% of 
Mazda’s facility in Flat Rock [Ward’s, 1993].   
North American automotive firms moved even more towards the use of third-party 
manufacturing plants, with North American automotive manufacturing firms purchasing output 
capacity from partners.  These partners included other automotive manufacturers.  Ford’s Probe 
was built at Mazda’s Flat Rock, based on Mazda’s 626-platform.  While its production included 
engineers from both companies, it was not a joint venture.  Similarly, Mazda produced the front-
wheel drive version of the Ford Mustang at the same plant.  A Suzuki plant in Canada produced 
GM’s Tracker [Ward’s, 1990]. Chrysler negotiated with American Motor Company (AMC) to 
produce Chrysler’s full-size rear-wheel drive cars at their AMC’s Kenosha plant starting in 1987 
[Ward’s, 1987].   
These partners also include major suppliers such as Magna International, which styles 
itself a Tier 0.5 supplier.  Magna has the ability to conduct much of the full manufacturing and 
assembly of vehicles for automotive firms.  They can leverage highly flexible facilities across 
multiple automotive clients.  Chrysler is one firm to have taken advantage of this capability, 
selling an assembly plant to Magna International in 2002, which then began assembling vehicles 
for Chrysler [Ward’s, 2003].  
In summary, relationships that began through captive importing with foreign partners, 
moved first towards joint manufacturing and subsequently towards an inter-related system of 
manufacturing capacity that was shared among partners.  Firms moved from assembling entire 
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vehicles themselves, to partnering with others, to outsourcing the full assembly of automobiles in 
some cases.   
Integrating Third-Party Components 
A similar trajectory of development occurred with respect to how automotive firms 
purchased and integrated partner-manufactured components.  This began with relatively 
straightforward relationships, as firms purchased manufactured components from suppliers.  
GM, Ford, and Chrysler each sought components to satisfy demand for smaller and more fuel 
efficient cars.  For instance, GM sourced a diesel engine from Isuzu for their vehicles [Ward’s, 
1980], and more recently GM’s Chevrolet Equinox featured a Chinese-built engine [Ward’s, 
2003].  Chrysler sourced small engines and manual transaxles from Volkswagens to support their 
efforts to build a domestic subcompact car [Ward’s, 1975], and regularly sourced parts and 
components from external companies [Ward’s, 1981]. Chrysler used Mitsubishi engines to 
power their New Yorker vehicles [Ward’s, 1988]; by 1995 they reversed the trend, looking to 
move all engines in-house [Ward’s, 1996].  Ford received small engines from Mazda [Ward’s, 
1985].  The liberalization of parts sourcing is well evidenced by Ford’s decision to source sliding 
doors for a new minivan from GM’s parts department, as opposed to Ford’s own Visteon parts 
arm [Ward’s, 1999].  
Automotive firms built on these initial relationships with suppliers to develop joint 
ventures with foreign and domestic partners to produce parts for shared projects.  Ford was 
involved in joint ventures with Alfa Romeo for aluminum engine components at their Windsor 
plant [Ward’s, 2001], with Peugeot for two power plants [Ward’s, 2006], and with Changan and 
Mazda in China for an engine plant [Ward’s, 2006].  Chrysler created a joint venture with 
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Mitsubishi to build engines in Germany for use in Smart and Mitsubishi cars [Ward’s, 2002].  
Chrysler also created a partnership with Hyundai and Mitsubishi to produce four-cylinder 
engines [Ward’s 2003], increasing the extent of this relationship in 2004 [Ward’s, 2005].  
Domestically, the Big Three also collaborated on projects, including one joint venture between 
GM and Chrysler on four-wheel drive transfer cases, manual transmissions, and various driveline 
products [Ward’s, 1998].   
Some automotive firms took partnering beyond component sourcing and joint ventures to 
the next level through technology sharing.  Ford, for instance, developed and maintained a 
relationship with Mazda that involved Ford using Mazda’s platforms to build vehicles, such as a 
B-segment car that was based on Mazda’s Mazda2 architecture [Ward’s, 2009].  However this 
collaboration went both ways, with Mazda designing their Mazda 626 in Ford’s Small Vehicle 
Center in Cologne, suggesting that the 626 would share a platform with Ford’s next world car 
[Ward’s, 1999].   
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Chapter 5 – Analysis  
5.0 Analysis 
5.1 Overview 
The purpose of this study was to examine how firms developed dynamic capabilities in 
response to a specific form of environmental dynamism: persistent disturbances.  In conducting 
my research, I undertook an inductive theory-building approach, analyzing a longitudinal 
archival dataset detailing the activities of Ford, Chrysler, and GM in the North American 
automotive industry between 1965 and 2010.  In what follows, I build on the findings presented 
in the section above, formalizing propositions that capture insights about dynamic capability 
development in the context of persistent disturbances.  The propositions are summarized in Table 
9 and are developed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.   
Table 9 Proposition Summary 
Proposition 1: The architecture of dynamic capabilities comprises capabilities.  These capabilities 
function to increase the speed, reduce the cost, or increase the flexibility of firms’ dynamic capabilities. 
Proposition 2: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that build dynamic capabilities 
develop them so as to adapt to the more predictable, rather than stochastic, elements of the 
environmental dynamism that the firms face. 
Proposition 3: When responding to newly emerging persistent disturbances, firms initially deploy 
existing capability endowments that have been developed for other persistent disturbances. This 
response has low technical fitness. 
Proposition 4a: When responding to newly emerging persistent disturbances in increasingly complex 
environments, firms that build dynamic capabilities develop their dynamic capabilities through a process 
of dynamic capability layering. 
Proposition 4b: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that develop dynamic capabilities do 
so by building new capabilities and refine existing capabilities, which increase the technical fitness of 
firms’ dynamic capabilities over time.  The resulting dynamic capabilities develop in a path-dependent 
manner along a trajectory that is reinforced by persistent disturbances. 
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5.2 Dynamic Capability Architecture  
My findings build on previous research that has stressed how dynamic capabilities 
comprise assemblages of heterogeneous elements (Salvato and Rerup, 2011; Helfat et al, 2007).  
In my study, I found that these heterogeneous elements consisted of a portfolio of capabilities 
that underpinned each firm’s dynamic capabilities.  For example, I found that five capabilities 
underpinned production mix flexibility: convert plants, source external vehicles, changeover 
models, platform sharing, and facility sharing.  Similarly, utilize capacity, adjust model timing, 
and alter sources of production were capabilities that comprised a dynamic capability in 
production volume flexibility.  These capabilities are akin to the building blocks of dynamic 
capabilities.  Other research has noted how dynamic capabilities comprise collections of routines 
and capabilities (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; Salvato and Rerup, 2011).   
More important than the composition of dynamic capabilities are the relationships among 
those heterogeneous elements.  The concept of dynamic capability architecture stresses the 
importance of these relationships.  Dynamic capability architecture refers to how different 
elements associated with a dynamic capability fit together or relate to one another (Jacobides, 
2006).  On this topic, there is existing research from which to draw.  Most well understood is the 
hierarchical relationship between dynamic capabilities and underlying ordinary capabilities. 
Dynamic capabilities modify lower-order ordinary capabilities, which in the case of my study 
were the manufacturing capabilities firms used to manufacture automobiles (Collis, 1994; 
Winter, 2003; Salvato and Rerup, 2011).  The microfoundations research by Teece (2007) 
proposes three generic capabilities that undergird dynamic capabilities: seizing, sensing, and 
transforming.  Other research describes different modes through which firms can alter their 
underlying resources and capabilities.  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) describe four ways in which 
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firms adapt their resource bases: leveraging existing resources, creating new resources, accessing 
external resources, and releasing resources.  This approach has received some preliminary 
empirical support (Danneels, 2010).   
The capabilities that I found stressed a supportive role for those capabilities comprising a 
dynamic capability architecture.  Figure 28 illustrates this architecture, distinguishing between 
the capabilities that comprise a dynamic capability, and the ordinary capabilities that dynamic 
capabilities are built to adapt.  This role draws support from prior research, which has stressed 
how capabilities can complement dynamic capabilities (Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010; 
Helfat, 1997), serving both operational and dynamic purposes to “make change possible” (Helfat 
and Winter, 2001: 1248).  What distinguished the capabilities that I found is that they were not 
necessarily geared towards change or adaptation themselves.  Instead, capabilities facilitated 
change processes, making change faster or less expensive or providing a range of alternatives.  
Below I use examples from my study to illustrate how capabilities supported dynamic 
capabilities in adapting underlying ordinary capabilities.  Table 10 summarizes the different 
ways in which the capabilities I found supported their respective dynamic capabilities. 
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Figure 28 Dynamic Capabilities Architecture 
 
Increase Speed 
The capabilities that comprised a dynamic capability can increase how quickly a firm can 
deploy a dynamic capability—in the case of my study, how quickly they could exhibit 
manufacturing flexibility.  Two examples of this from my study are platform sharing and facility 
sharing capabilities.  While these two capabilities did not directly modify lower-order 
manufacturing capabilities, they enabled firms to more flexibly and much more quickly shift 
between different vehicle models.  Recall that in the 1970s and early 1980s, Ford, Chrysler, and 
GM each engaged in months of effort to convert existing large-car plants to be able to produce 
smaller cars.  In the 2000s, with the development of platform sharing and facility sharing, this 
same scale of conversion is unnecessary.  Instead, the automotive firms are now able to adjust 
their production schedule by switching among vehicles on the same platform and among 
different platforms at a facility that is trained and capable of producing many different vehicles 
from many different platforms.   
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Decrease Costs 
Similarly, while they were initially costly to build, platform sharing and facility sharing 
capabilities dramatically reduced the costs associated with shifting production across different 
vehicle models.  Prior to the development of platform sharing and facility sharing, firms would 
convert a plant, substituting the capability to manufacture one type of vehicle with the capability 
to manufacture another type of vehicle (Lavie, 2006).  These conversions involved new tools and 
manufacturing equipment, as well as extensive training, all of which can be very expensive.  
However, after building these two capabilities, firms could switch production among different 
vehicles with minimal conversion costs.   
Table 10 Capabilities Comprising Dynamic Capabilities 
 Capability Description How it Supports 
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Utilize Capacity Adjusting plant utilization through 
overtime, number of shifts, line speed, 
and temporary shutdowns 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
 
Adjust Model Timing Adjust length of production runs; extend 
to increase volume and end to decrease 
volume 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Alter Sources of 
Production 
Change sources of production through 
plant opening or closing and capacity 
increases or decreases 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
M
ix
 F
le
xi
bi
lit
y 
Convert Plants Change which vehicles are produced in a 
given plant 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Source External 
Vehicles 
Source vehicles from foreign (or domestic) 
partners 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Changeover Models Selectively adjust length of production 
runs;  extend popular models and end 
undesired models  
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Platform Sharing Sharing multiple vehicle models across a 
single vehicle platform  
Increases adaptation speed 
Decreases costs of adaptation 
Facility Sharing Sharing multiple vehicles or platforms 
within a single facility 
Increases adaptation speed 
Decrease costs of adaptation 
Pa
rt
ne
rin
g 
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 
Integrate Third-Party 
Components 
Source components from third parties 
through purchase, joint ventures, and 
technology sharing 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Leverage Partner 
Capacity 
Source vehicles from third parties through 
captive importing, joint manufacturing, 
and purchasing output capacity 
Increases range of 
alternatives 
Diversity of Alternatives 
 100 
 
The different capabilities that comprise a dynamic capability reveal a broad diversity of 
response alternatives, each with different properties.  This diversity of response alternatives 
increases the flexibility with which a firm can respond to persistent disturbances.  I illustrate the 
importance of this diversity by considering production volume flexibility.  This dynamic 
capability comprised three distinct capabilities that permitted a firm to alter sources of 
production, adjust capacity utilization, and adjust model timing.  Two of these capabilities, 
utilize capacity and alter sources of production, could be deployed in a variety of ways.  These 
capabilities offered many different ways to respond to fluctuating consumer demand.  Firms 
could increase the capacity of existing facilities through overtime, new shifts, or changing line 
speeds.  With more time, or as disturbances became more severe, the firm could add or remove 
new plants or adjust the capacity of existing plants through investments.  As an additional 
illustration, consider the capability leveraging partner capacity, which is part of a dynamic 
capability in partnering flexibility.  This capability provided firms with a variety of partnering 
options, ranging from sourcing fully manufactured components from partners, to engaging in 
joint manufacturing of components, to technology sharing initiatives.  I argue that this diversity 
facilitates dynamism in the face of persistent disturbances because the firm is prepared to 
respond to a variety of contingencies.  
This preceding discussion is summarized in the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: The architecture of dynamic capabilities comprises 
capabilities.  These capabilities function to increase the speed, reduce 
the cost, or increase the flexibility of firms’ dynamic capabilities. 
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5.3 Persistent Disturbances and Dynamic Capability Development 
5.3.1 Environmental Dynamism – Unpredictability and Dynamic Capabilities 
The dynamic capabilities literature presents a bit of a paradox.  On the one hand, dynamic 
capabilities exist to deal with environmental dynamism (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  Firms 
are challenged to build dynamic capabilities today that help them respond to future challenges 
(Teece, 2007; Doving and Gooderham, 2008).  This dynamism, however, means that the 
dynamic capabilities firms build today may not be useful tomorrow.  The result is that, while 
highly dynamic environments create futures where dynamic capabilities are thought to be most 
valuable, the same dynamism simultaneously makes it difficult to anticipate whether a particular 
dynamic capability will be useful in the future.  Given that building and maintaining dynamic 
capabilities is expensive (Winter, 2003), building dynamic capabilities is most practical when 
firms are relatively confident that the dynamic capabilities in which they invest can be deployed 
in the future—in short, that investments in dynamic capabilities will be paid back (Pacheco-de-
Almeida, 2010).   
Unpredictability is a key dimension of environmental dynamism (Davis et al, 2009).  My 
research highlights the importance of unpredictability in a firm’s environment with respect to the 
development of dynamic capabilities.  Environments are unpredictable when future events 
cannot be anticipated based on past events (Farjoun and Levin, 2011).  Unpredictability is 
associated with higher levels of disorder that make identifying patterns in a firm’s environment 
difficult or impossible (Davis et al, 2009).  All configurations of environmental dynamism are 
unpredictable in some respect.  Environmental shifts are unpredictable because they are 
dramatic, one-time, discontinuous events that are difficult to predict and that can take 
organizations by surprise (Danneels, 2010).  Ongoing environmental change is unpredictable 
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owing to the rapid pace of change that makes the future difficult to anticipate (Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen, 1997).  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) picked up on the central role of unpredictability in 
environmental dynamism when they defined moderately dynamic markets as those exhibiting 
some predictability with respect to direction and frequency of future changes.   
I argue and find evidence to support that persistent disturbances exhibit lower levels of 
unpredictability than environmental shifts or ongoing environmental change do.  There are two 
reasons for this lower level of unpredictability.  The first is repetition.  Persistent disturbances 
often comprise relatively homogeneous disturbances that have been repeated over time, and 
which appear likely to continue repeating.  For instance, the socioeconomic and political 
dynamics underlying past oil and gasoline price fluctuations are harbingers of future gasoline 
price fluctuations in the same way that the increasing encroachment of government regulators in 
the 1960s and 1970s led firm executives and industry analysts to expect increasing regulation.  
Managers recognized that the increasing encroachment of government through regulations on 
emissions, safety, and fuel economy were becoming a part of the fabric of the industry:  
“In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the 
test of the marketplace.  In the future, we shall be severely tested by the 
need to respond at the same time to the requirements of the market and 
the requirements imposed by the Federal governments' safety and air 
pollution regulations.” [Ford Annual Report, 1966] 
Automotive firms demonstrated that they were concerned about and predicted future 
disturbances throughout the period of my study.  For instance, in 1983, Ford’s annual report 
contained the following excerpt predicting a cyclical economy: 
 “[W]e are in a cyclical industry and must be prepared to face 
economic recessions down the road. We must husband our resources 
and spur our progress during times of favorable business conditions so 
we will be prepared for future downturns.”[Ford Annual Report, 1983] 
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It is reasonable to assume that managers at automotive firms also viewed the occurrence 
of future labour difficulties and energy challenges as highly predictable given the nature of fixed-
duration labour contracts and the regular fluctuations in oil prices that occurred.  In each of these 
instances, the persistent disturbances in question were predictable owing both to past repetition 
and to a reasonable expectation that this repetition would continue.  
However, persistent disturbances also exhibit increased predictability when, through a 
process of translation, a diverse set of persistent disturbances affect particular firm functions, 
such as the firm’s manufacturing capability, in a more focused manner.  This translation process 
was highlighted in Figure 9.  Consider, for example, one set of translation processes from my 
study.  Fluctuations in consumer model preference were driven by different persistent 
disturbances: first, by energy-related challenges such as oil or energy crises and gas price 
increases that pushed consumers to purchase smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles; second, by 
regulations that tinkered with the incentives to purchase particular vehicles, including the Gas 
Guzzler Tax, and the crash testing program that changed public opinion regarding vehicle safety; 
third, by competitive activities, such as when firms launched new types of vehicles like 
minivans, SUVs, and CUVs.  Even fashion trends can drive fluctuations in consumer model 
preferences.  While these diverse disturbances at first glance appear disparate, the impact that 
they had on the firm’s manufacturing operations was surprisingly consistent.  Each forced the 
firm to adapt their production mix to changing preferences.  In the process, a diverse set of 
persistent disturbances was translated into a more predictable persistent manufacturing 
implication.   
I found that firms built dynamic capabilities specifically to address the predictable 
patterns that emerged from these persistent disturbances.  Prior theorizing supports this finding 
 104 
 
(Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009).  In the North American automotive industry, I found 
three persistent manufacturing implications: fluctuating consumer demand, fluctuating consumer 
model preferences, and profit margin pressures.  In my study I drew links among these three 
persistent manufacturing implications and three dynamic capabilities: production volume 
flexibility, production mix flexibility, and partnering flexibility.  I argue that in each case, 
automotive firms built dynamic capabilities that helped them respond to the predictability 
inherent in these persistent manufacturing implications.      
Persistent disturbances, owing to their homogeneity and repetition, attract the attention of 
managers and justify deliberate investments in dynamic capabilities.  I argue that what drove 
firms to develop new dynamic capabilities was not the dynamism of the firm’s environment, but 
instead its relative stability. The presence of persistent disturbances draws attention to those 
disturbances that are predicted to repeat in the future, and simultaneously justifies the 
investments in dynamic capability formation owing to greater certainty that the dynamic 
capability will be required in the future.  In short, I found that firms built dynamic capabilities 
not in preparation for unpredictable futures but, instead, for persistent disturbance that were, and 
which continue to be, prevalent in their environments—persistent disturbances that can be 
predicted.  This leads me to propose the following: 
Proposition 2: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that 
build dynamic capabilities develop them so as to adapt to the more 
predictable, rather than stochastic, elements of the environmental 
dynamism that the firms face. 
5.3.2 Coping with Newly Emerging Persistent Disturbances 
On occasion, firms are confronted with new disturbances that threaten to become 
persistent.  My analysis identified two such disturbances during the study period: the first when 
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consumer model preferences began fluctuating more substantially in the 1970s, coinciding with 
the two oil crises; the second when profit margin pressures intensified as Japanese firms brought 
and sustained strong competition at about the same time.  These newly emerging persistent 
disturbances presented challenging environments to which firms were required to adapt.  
My data analysis revealed that firms were poorly prepared for these new disturbances.  
The automotive firms redeployed pre-existing capabilities (Zollo and Reuer, 2010), or what 
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) would call endowments.  In the case of consumer model preference 
fluctuations, my study shows that GM, Chrysler, and Ford each redeployed plant conversion and 
model changeover capabilities that had been built to enable the firms to adapt to fluctuations in 
consumer demand.  Firms responded with massive plant conversions to remove large-car 
capacity and replace it with small-car capacity.  They shut down and reduced the capacity of 
large-car plants, and then opened up new (or converted) small-car plants or increased the 
capacity of existing small-car plants.  At Ford this conversion added 1 million units of small-car 
capacity—a conversion that amounted to 40% of Ford’s annual sales.  Similarly, as profit margin 
pressures threatened to affect sales, firms turned to captive imports and sourcing third-party 
components; both of these approaches that firms were already deploying to satisfy the increased 
demand for smaller cars due to consumer model preference fluctuations.  The above discussion 
highlights how the effectiveness of a firm’s dynamic capabilities is contingent on the 
environment in which the firm is operating (Helfat et al, 2007).  In my study, this contingency 
meant that the effectiveness of different dynamic capabilities was contingent upon the specific 
persistent disturbance being addressed.  A well-developed capability exhibiting strong technical 
fitness in response to one type of persistent disturbance may be poorly suited to other persistent 
disturbances and may perform ineffectively (Helfat et al, 2007).   
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These repurposed dynamic capabilities permitted adaptation, but at great cost.  These 
dynamic capabilities exhibited poor technical fitness (Helfat et al, 2007).  The concept of fitness 
addresses the concern that not all dynamic capabilities are created equal (Winter, 2000).  
Scholars use the concept of fitness to capture differences between dynamic capabilities of higher 
and lower effectiveness.  The literature on dynamic capabilities distinguishes between two 
different forms of fitness: evolutionary fitness and technical fitness (Helfat et al, 2007).  
Evolutionary fitness refers to how well a dynamic capability enables a firm to survive and even 
grow in changing environments.  It is akin to whether or not firms are performing the right set of 
activities (Mie and Teece, 2009).  Technical fitness pertains to how effective a dynamic 
capability is at performing its intended function (Teece, 2007; Martin, 2011).  Dynamic 
capabilities with greater technical fitness enable firms to respond to disturbances at less cost 
(Helfat et al, 2007).   
My data suggested that as new persistent disturbances emerged, firms deployed primitive 
dynamic capability endowments that exhibited low technical fitness.  They satisficed, deploying 
the first capability that provided an acceptable solution to the new challenge (Winter, 2000).  
Early periods of ineffectiveness or temporary underperformance are well documented in the 
research on dynamic capabilities.  Rosenbloom (2000), in his study of NCR Corporation’s efforts 
to adapt to the introduction of electronics in the field of business equipment, described how NCR 
experienced a painful crisis because NCR’s capabilities were poorly suited to adapt to these 
changes.  Salvato (2009), in his study of an Italian design firm, similarly identified an initial 
period of temporary underperformance when the firm was confronted with new challenges, 
followed by a permanent increase in performance.  These findings are consistent with the idea 
that firms may at first simply cope with new challenges.  This reinforces a view of dynamic 
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capabilities as emergent and evolving (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Danneels, 2008), and initially fragile (Narayanan, Colwell, and Douglas 2009).  Dynamic 
capabilities are not always built fully formed in advance of a disturbance.  Instead, they need to 
be developed and enabled (Pablo et al, 2007; Rosenbloom, 2000).   
This leads me to formalize my third proposition:  
Proposition 3: When responding to newly emerging persistent 
disturbances, firms initially deploy existing capability endowments that 
have been developed for other persistent disturbances. This response 
has low technical fitness. 
5.3.3 Dynamic Capability Development Through Layering 
Prior to the 1970s, firms in the North American automotive industry possessed a dynamic 
capability in manufacturing flexibility that consisted largely of production volume flexibility.  
Firms deployed this dynamic capability to adjust production volumes in different ways, such as 
by opening and closing plants, changing line speeds, adding or removing shifts, and adjusting 
overtime.  Initially, production volume flexibility was the extent of the North American firms’ 
dynamic capability in manufacturing flexibility.   
However, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the environment facing North American 
automotive firms became increasingly complex.  Environments are complex when they comprise 
multiple heterogeneous contingencies that need to be addressed (Davis, Eisenhardt, and 
Bingham, 2009; Dess and Beard, 1984).  Complexity manifested in my study as multiple 
concurrent persistent disturbances confronting the automotive firms.  In addition to facing 
significant fluctuations in consumer demand, the automotive firms faced new disturbances: 
fluctuations in consumer model preferences and profit margin pressures.   
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As discussed above, firms initially coped with these new disturbances.  However, as these 
disturbances persisted, firms responded to this complexity by building new layers of dynamic 
capabilities.  Initial coping gave way to deliberate investments in improving the technical fitness 
of the dynamic capabilities that the automotive firms were deploying (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; 
Keil, McGrath, and Tukiainen, 2009; Arikan and McGahan, 2010).  I refer to this process as 
layering because at the core of each new dynamic capability was the set of initial capabilities that 
the firms had deployed in coping with the new disturbance.  These existing capabilities served as 
the core around which new dynamic capabilities were elaborated.  In the case of production mix 
flexibility, this core set of capabilities consisted of plant conversion capabilities, upon which 
layers of platform-sharing and facility-sharing capabilities were added.  Similarly, a dynamic 
capability in partnering flexibility grew out of early captive importing and from sourcing partner 
manufactured components.  The new dynamic capabilities were layered on top of existing 
capabilities, accumulating over time (Dosi, Nelson, and Winter, 2000).  Thus the process of 
layering builds from a base capability, adding new layers to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the firm’s dynamic capabilities (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Lampel and Shamsie, 
2003).  Figure 29 depicts this process of dynamic capability layering. 
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Figure 29 Dynamic Capability Layering 
 
The foregoing discussions lead to my fourth proposition:    
Proposition 4a: When responding to newly emerging persistent 
disturbances in increasingly complex environments, firms that build 
dynamic capabilities develop their dynamic capabilities through a 
process of dynamic capability layering. 
5.3.4 Dynamic Capability Development: Nested Layering 
In addition to layering that occurred at the level of dynamic capabilities, I found that this 
layering process nested, extending down to the capabilities that comprised dynamic capabilities.  
For example, a capability in platform sharing began as a comparatively simple capability 
permitting firms to share vehicle platforms across different brands.  This capability enabled firms 
to share innovative technology, such as front-wheel drive or smaller-car designs, more broadly 
across the firm’s product line-up.  Over time this capability evolved further to also enable firms 
to share similar vehicles that were customized to different geographies through Ford and GM’s 
global car programs, and then to share platforms across disparate vehicle classes, such as 
Chevrolet’s versatile Lumina platform that supported both a sedan and a van.  Subsequent 
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refinements extended the platform-sharing capability beyond organizational boundaries to 
incorporate partner firms.  Ford and Mazda offer an excellent example of a platform-sharing 
partnership.  Similar patterns of capability refinement occurred in facility sharing, integrating 
third-party components, and leveraging partner capacity capabilities.  Refining existing 
capabilities, as opposed to acquiring new capabilities, permits firms to build on their strengths 
and have been found to provide greater payoffs with lower investments (Helfat et al, 2007; 
Lavie, 2006; Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009).   
In my context, what motivated this layering at the levels of both dynamic capabilities and 
the capabilities they comprised was the nature of the environmental dynamism firms were facing.  
Persistent disturbances repeated, exposing firms time and again to disturbances that had similar 
impacts.  The effects of this exposure were three-fold.  First, the continued repetition of 
persistent disturbances provided firms with ongoing opportunities to improve their ability to 
respond.  Repetition has been shown to be an effective learning mechanism (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000), and dynamic capabilities have been conceptualized as learned capabilities (Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  Firms get more proficient when dynamic capabilities are used more 
frequently.   
Second, persistence disturbances justified continued investment in dynamic capability 
development.  Each time firms were exposed to the persistent disturbance they had another 
opportunity to improve the performance of their response.  Managers thus more readily 
recognized and could more easily justify the need to build and refine dynamic capabilities to 
respond to persistent disturbances.      
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Third, the persistent disturbance reduced ambiguity by enhancing what the firm knew 
about the persistent disturbance.  Disturbances to which firms have not been exposed are more 
ambiguous because firms have a poor understanding of the disturbance.  Firms confronting a 
one-time environmental shift are unlikely to have developed a sophisticated understanding of this 
new disturbance.  Similarly, firms facing ongoing change are continuously being presented with 
disturbances, but the disturbances are different and thus affect the firm in a myriad of new and 
different ways.  In contrast, persistent disturbances repeat relatively homogeneously over time 
and thus with each repetition firms are able to improve their understanding of the persistent 
disturbance.  Understanding the disturbance a firm is facing is critical to developing an effective 
response (Zollo and Winter, 2002).    
This is consistent with current theorizing regarding how firms both accumulate new 
capabilities and deliberately improve their existing capabilities.  Zollo and Winter (2002) argue 
that firms learn what does and does not work by trial and error, and that these firms may then 
deliberately articulate and codify that knowledge to improve their ability to adapt.  High levels of 
complementary knowledge can positively moderate this effect (Helfat, 1997), and this is 
consistent with descriptions of dynamic capability development as path dependent (Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Vergne and Durand, 2011).  In this way, dynamic capability 
development displays a tendency towards continuous improvement, always striving for better fit. 
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This leads me to state my final proposition:  
Proposition 4b: When responding to persistent disturbances, firms that 
develop dynamic capabilities do so by building new capabilities and 
refine existing capabilities, which increase the technical fitness of 
firms’ dynamic capabilities over time.  The resulting dynamic 
capabilities develop in a path-dependent manner along a trajectory that 
is reinforced by persistent disturbances. 
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Chapter 6 – Discussion  
6.0 Discussion 
6.1 Overview 
In this study I sought to understand how firms developed dynamic capabilities in 
dynamic environments that were characterized by persistent disturbances such as government 
regulations, energy crises, labour disruptions, economic cycles, and competitive pressures.  I 
focused my analysis on the manufacturing flexibility of the North American automotive firms I 
was studying.  I identified and further analyzed the dynamic capabilities that these firms were 
building in response to persistent disturbances.   
To do this, I adopted a longitudinal, inductive case-based approach to studying the North 
American automotive industry between 1965 and 2010.  I focused on three key firms: GM, Ford, 
and Chrysler.  I built a qualitative archival dataset primarily from industry and firm analyses 
found in Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks and the letters to shareholders in firms’ annual reports.  
I complemented this dataset with firm-specific financial information from Compustat and 
industry data from a variety of sources.  I analyzed these data first by identifying the 
disturbances that were salient to the firms under study, and subsequently by examining the 
responses that the firms had to these salient disturbances.  My analysis was designed so as to 
better understand the patterns of disturbances and responses occurring in the North American 
automotive industry over my 45-year study period.   
In this section, I discuss the theory that I presented above, positioning it firmly within the 
dynamic capability and strategic management literatures.  My discussion proceeds in two 
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sections.  The first pertains to how dynamic capabilities develop over time.  To begin this 
discussion, I pay particular attention to dynamic capability architecture.  I show how the 
architecture that I found offers insights regarding how dynamic capabilities develop.  In the 
second section, I offer insights into the role played by different configurations of environmental 
dynamism in the formation and development of dynamic capabilities.  I discuss differences in the 
dynamic capabilities firms build in environments characterized by ongoing environmental 
change, environmental shifts, and persistent disturbances.  
6.2 Dynamic Capability Development 
I begin by discussing the importance of dynamic capability architecture (Jacobides, 
2006).  My research casts new light on what the architecture of dynamic capabilities looks like, 
particularly in the context of persistent disturbances.  In turn, I use this capability architecture to 
offer insights into how dynamic capabilities develop over time.   
6.2.1 Dynamic Capability Architecture 
Capability architecture pertains to how different capabilities relate to one another 
(Makadok, 2001; Jacobides, 2006).  Prior research into dynamic capabilities has addressed 
capability architecture in a variety of ways.  Most common is the expression of dynamic 
capabilities as comprising part of a hierarchy of capabilities, distinguishing between dynamic 
and ordinary capabilities.  Figure 30 highlights how dynamic capabilities are higher-order 
capabilities, the purpose of which is to modify underlying resources and lower-order ordinary 
capabilities (Danneels, 2008; Collis, 1994; Winter, 2000; Salvato and Rerup, 2009; Helfat et al, 
2007).  In my study, the firms’ ordinary capabilities were their abilities to manufacture particular 
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products, such as a model of a car (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), while dynamic capabilities referred 
to manufacturing flexibility (Malik and Kotabe, 2009).   
Figure 30 A Hierarchy of Dynamic Capabilities 
 
While there is broad agreement on this hierarchy and where dynamic capabilities fit with 
respect to ordinary capabilities, the architecture of dynamic capabilities themselves has been 
discussed with less consistency and in less detail (Salvato and Rerup, 2009). Some work has 
attempted to address this gap.  In their seminal article on dynamic capabilities, Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen (1997) discussed how dynamic capabilities comprise coordination, learning, and 
reconfiguration routines.  More recent research has refined this, arguing that three generic 
capabilities—seizing, sensing, and transforming—underpin dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007).  
Despite this, research into dynamic capability architecture remains nascent.  
My research highlights the importance of considering how dynamic capability 
architectures comprise capabilities.  These capabilities largely comprised the building blocks of a 
dynamic capability offering a greater variety of ways in which to respond to disturbances that the 
firm faced.  However, these capabilities do not necessarily engage in change to underlying 
resources and capabilities.  Instead, these capabilities  often enable a firm’s dynamic capabilities 
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to change underlying ordinary capabilities faster and at less cost.  Two examples include 
platform sharing and facility sharing which both made shifting production among different 
vehicle models much faster and less costly.   
Prior research has hinted at the capabilities that comprise dynamic capabilities but has 
offered little empirical elaboration.  Helfat and Winter (2011) very briefly discuss the concept of 
dual purpose capabilities—capabilities that serve both ordinary and dynamic purposes.  These 
dual purpose capabilities are described as those that “make change possible” (Helfat and Winter, 
2011: 1248).  However that research stream is at an early stage.  Dual purpose capabilities are 
mentioned at the conclusion of a more expansive article on dynamic capabilities, and few 
empirical details are offered.  Other research in this regard explores the microfoundations of 
dynamic capabilities.  Microfoundations are defined as those “skills, processes, procedures, 
organizational structures, decision rules and disciplines…which undergird” sensing, seizing, and 
reconfiguring (Teece, 2007: 1319). These microfoundations include governance, research and 
development, and building loyalty and commitment, and they are theorized to span all dynamic 
capabilities across different contexts. 
However, whereas the concept of microfoundations as put forth by Teece is independent 
of context, my findings strongly emphasize the importance of context.  Prior research is split in 
this regard, with some research encouraging the study of very general dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, 2007; Marcus and Anderson, 2006) and other research stressing the difficulties with 
separating dynamic capabilities from their context (Ethiraj et al, 2005; Winter, 2000).  This latter 
camp argues that dynamic capabilities have very specific purposes and support very specific 
activities, such as acquisitions, alliances, and new product development (Helfat and Winter, 
2011).  The arguments for context cast some doubt on whether it is even possible to identify a 
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common set of microfoundations that undergird all dynamic capabilities.  My own research 
pertained to a focused set of dynamic capabilities in manufacturing flexibility.   
One consequence of the search for a common underpinning of dynamic capabilities may 
have been a homogenization of how dynamic capabilities are viewed.  Salvato (2009) has 
lamented that capabilities are often discussed as though they are homogeneous across firms and 
time.  A case in point comes from well-cited research by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), who 
argue that dynamic capabilities are akin to best practices and possessed by many firms.  Picking 
up on this discussion, my research shows how dynamic capabilities that seem very similar can in 
fact be very different.  These differences are revealed by their capability architecture and the 
different capabilities each dynamic capability possesses.  Two firms possessing dynamic 
capabilities that appear similar but that possess different capability architectures respond to 
disturbances in heterogeneous ways.  For example, my study highlights how automotive firms 
responded to similar disturbances in different ways at different points in time throughout my 
study period.  In the 1970s the automotive firms shifted their production mix by converting big 
plants to small plants, completely retooling facilities (plant conversion).  Flash forward 20 years 
and these same firms responded to consumer model preference fluctuations by adjusting 
manufacturing schedules in flexible manufacturing facilities (facility sharing, platform sharing).  
Similarly, at different points in time the firms’ manufacturing flexibility included production 
volume flexibility, production mix flexibility, and then partnering flexibility.  Each of these 
modified the firms’ same underlying manufacturing capability, but in different ways.  They 
modified, respectively, how much product was produced, what product was produced, and with 
which partners.  In short, I found that similar dynamic capabilities adapted lower-order ordinary 
capabilities in different ways.  My research stresses the layered nature of dynamic capabilities, 
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offering a new granularity with which to understand differences in dynamic capabilities among 
firms and over time.   
These differences in dynamic capability architecture can help to explain differential 
abilities in similar dynamic capabilities.  For instance, firms may have a strong dynamic 
capability in partnering flexibility but possess weak production volume or production mix 
flexibility.  Further, firms may have strong platform sharing capabilities but inferior facility 
sharing capabilities, each of which can influence how well a firm responds to consumer model 
preference fluctuations.  Deeper still, firms may have mastered how to share platforms across 
similar vehicles sold under different brands within the same firm, but not yet figured out how to 
share platforms across very disparate vehicles or partner firms, a gap that would negatively effect 
the technical fitness of the firm’s production mix flexibility. 
In short, not all firms exhibit manufacturing flexibility in the same way or at the same 
point in time.  Malik and Kotabe (2009) illustrate this point, identifying how in an emerging 
market context, handling fluctuating consumer demand and reducing process inventories were 
challenges of critical importance while other challenges, such as handling consumer model 
preference fluctuations, were less critical.  By conceptualizing dynamic capabilities at finer-
grained levels of analysis, scholars will be in a better position to more clearly understand the 
dynamic capabilities that firms possess.  McKelvie and Davidsson (2009) have suggested that the 
difficulty in identifying supportable hypotheses (a concern also shared by Leiblein, 2011) may be 
due in part to pursuing an understanding of dynamic capabilities that is too general.  My research 
suggests that scholars should dig more deeply into the architecture of dynamic capabilities, 
attempting to achieve greater understanding through a more detailed view of the nature of a 
firm’s dynamic capability.  
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6.2.2 Changing Dynamic Capabilities 
In the analysis chapter above, I built theory pertaining to how dynamic capabilities 
developed over time.  I argued that dynamic capability development began with firms coping in 
response to newly emerging persistent disturbances by redeploying dynamic capabilities that 
were designed and better suited for addressing other persistent disturbances (Proposition 3).  
Subsequently, while developing dynamic capabilities, firms responded to the predictable aspects 
of persistent disturbances in their dynamic environment (Proposition 1).  Over time firms built 
additional capabilities that improved the technical fitness of the dynamic capability by making it 
increasingly better suited to addressing a particular persistent disturbance (Proposition 4a and 
4b).  In what follows, I place this theorizing within the context of prior research on dynamic 
capability development.  I draw on the above discussion pertaining to dynamic capability 
architecture to do so.  
Dynamic Capability Development: Initial Development 
A debate in the dynamic capabilities literature centers on whether dynamic capabilities 
are developed in anticipation of future environmental dynamism and then deployed, or 
developed in parallel as environmental dynamism unfolds.  Early definitions of dynamic 
capabilities seemed to suggest the former.  Dynamic capabilities “address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece et al, 1997: 516) and permit firms to “match…market change” (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000: 1107).  However, more recent research has found that dynamic capabilities 
develop substantially when firms encounter change in the nature of environmental dynamism 
facing the firm (Danneels, 2010; Helfat, 1997).  For instance, a study of firms that had recently 
undergone initial public offerings found that capabilities for conducting acquisition and alliance 
deals crystallized quickly, but then evolved substantially over time (Arikan and McGahan, 
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2010).  Promising research into the origins of dynamic capabilities has found that dynamic 
capabilities may at first be latent, requiring strong development from managers who identify and 
subsequently develop them (Pablo et al, 2007; Rosenbloom, 2000).   
My research lends support to the argument that dynamic capabilities are built in parallel 
as the environmental dynamism unfolds.  More specifically, I found that initially firms coped 
with new environmental dynamism.  That is, they responded to the new environmental 
dynamism but in a technically inefficient manner.  This finding is similar to prior research that 
found that as dynamic capabilities developed, firms experienced an initial period of poor 
performance (Rosenbloom, 2000; Salvato, 2009).  My research builds on this by showing that 
firms initially underperform because they redeploy existing capabilities that were developed for 
different environmental dynamism.  The strongest illustration from my study was the dramatic 
plant conversions in which the automotive firms engaged.  Ford converted 40% of their 
production capacity from large to small cars.  Similarly inefficient was the North American 
automotive firms’ reliance on captive imports from Japanese partners.  This reliance led North 
American firms to give up much of their autonomy and control over their small-car programs.  
Both examples illustrate how firms did not necessarily deploy poor capabilities to address new 
environmental dynamism, but rather inappropriate capabilities.   
In related research, scholars have found that firms are often required to maintain multiple 
capabilities simultaneously as environments change (Gilbert, 2006).  In environments 
characterized by environmental shifts or ongoing change, this is because firms need to operate in 
both the existing environment and the changed or changing environment.  The firm requires a 
capability for each environment.  When the change to a new environment is complete, the firm 
can presumably shed the prior capabilities.  For instance, Daneels (2008) studied how Smith 
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Corona responded to a shift from mechanical to electric typewriters.  As this shift progressed, 
capabilities in designing, manufacturing, selling, and servicing mechanical typewriters became 
less and less important.  However, in an environment characterized by persistent disturbances, I 
found that firms maintained multiple capabilities over longer periods of time.  This is because 
persistent disturbances persist and thus firms respond to these disturbances by redeploying 
familiar dynamic capabilities at a later point in time.    
A key insight from my research is that, in an environment characterized by persistent 
disturbances, a firm’s dynamic capability architecture reflects the past responses the firm took in 
response to the persistent disturbances they faced.  It follows then that firms that have been 
exposed to different persistent disturbances, or which have experienced persistent disturbances in 
different ways, are likely to develop different dynamic capabilities and thus have built 
capabilities that permit the firm to adapt their underlying ordinary capabilities in different ways.  
This finding reinforces research that has suggested that a firm’s ordinary capabilities are 
developed through different strategies—in short that dynamic capabilities develop their 
capabilities in nonlinear ways (Shamsie, Martin, and Miller, 2009).  This result can explain 
differences between firms that each possesses some variant of a dynamic capability; such as the 
different manufacturing flexibility dynamic capabilities the automotive firms possessed over the 
study period.  This insight may help to explain differences in technical fitness among similar 
dynamic capabilities by providing the language, dynamic capability architecture, with which to 
understand these idiosyncratic differences.   
Dynamic Capability Development: Change 
The literature on dynamic capabilities suggests that dynamic capabilities are changed by 
other dynamic capabilities (Helfat et al, 2007).  Just as dynamic capabilities act on ordinary 
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capabilities, higher-order dynamic capabilities (2nd, 3rd, 4th, and so on) modify lower-order 
dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994).  These higher-order capabilities are such that they allow 
firms to overcome the path dependence that led to the rigidity of lower-order capabilities.  While 
simple in concept, this approach suffers from the problem of infinite regress because firms are 
required to have an infinite number of higher-order dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994).  This can 
quickly become intractable.   
My study offers an alternative perspective on how dynamic capabilities are changed, 
articulating how dynamic capabilities are developed through a process of layering at both the 
level of dynamic capabilities, and the capabilities that comprise them.  I found that a firm’s 
manufacturing flexibility comprised layers of dynamic capabilities (production volume 
flexibility, production mix flexibility, and partnering flexibility).  In turn, I found that each of 
these dynamic capabilities was supported by layers of capabilities.  I argue that change to a 
dynamic capability was accomplished not by higher-order capabilities or managerial oversight, 
but as firms respond to persistent disturbances by building new or developing existing 
capabilities.   
This process shares some similarities with the concept of resilience capacity.  Lengnick-
Hall and Beck (2005) coined the term resilience capacity to refer to a firm’s ability to choose 
appropriate responses from a collection of possible responses that the firm already possesses.  
Similarly, Capron and Mitchell (2009) highlighted the importance of the firm’s ability to 
appropriately select between internal and external sourcing in the development of new 
capabilities.  I found that a firm’s portfolio of layered dynamic capability functioned in a similar 
manner, providing a memory of past responses from which firms can select when responding to 
persistent disturbances.  
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The layering process that I found helps to reconcile conflicting research on changing 
dynamic capabilities.  On the one hand, scholars question the very nature of dynamic 
capabilities.  Schreyogg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) argue that since capabilities are highly 
practised and purposeful, it does not make sense that they should be dynamically changeable.  
Even dynamic capabilities scholars acknowledge that when environments are changing too 
much, dynamic capabilities can become fragile and improvisational (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000).  Similarly, Rindova and Kotha (2001) have described dynamic capabilities as emergent 
and evolving (Rindova and Kotha, 2001).  It is a classic debate pertaining to the plasticity of 
organizations—how much of the organization is predetermined and how much is changeable 
(Levinthal and Marino, 2011)?   
The process of layering, and the resulting dynamic capability architecture, demonstrates 
how dynamic capabilities can both be practised and purposeful while simultaneously being 
emergent and evolving.  This is because dynamic capabilities consist of a relatively stable core, 
and are developed by adding new capabilities which elaborate the existing dynamic capability.  
For example, in my study, production mix flexibility began as a rudimentary dynamic capability 
in plant conversion and developed over time into a sophisticated dynamic capability that 
involved plant and facility sharing.  Similarly, partnering flexibility began with outsourcing 
arrangements, whereby firms purchased parts and entire vehicles from their Japanese partners.  
This developed into much more sophisticated dynamic capabilities in sharing technologies and 
facilities.  Thus, the dynamic capability architecture and layering process illustrate how the 
dynamic capability changed, often quite dramatically, but did so by modifying a relatively stable 
core.   
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6.3 Environmental Dynamism and Dynamic Capabilities 
While environmental dynamism is central to dynamic capabilities, the dynamic 
capabilities literature has overemphasized a firm’s internal abilities, at the expense of the 
external environment (Vergne and Durand, 2011).  A dynamic environment is always present 
when studying dynamic capabilities, yet it is rarely formally incorporated into dynamic 
capability theory.  When environmental dynamism is modeled, the focus has been on individual 
dimensions of environmental dynamism such as velocity or degree (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011).  Not surprisingly, research 
studying the impact of these dimensions of environmental dynamism has found significant 
effects.  Dynamic capabilities are less effective than ordinary capabilities in stable settings 
(Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011), but increase in value and effectiveness when the degree of 
environmental dynamism increases.   
My research extends the study of the impact of environmental dynamism on dynamic 
capabilities from its current focus on dimensions to incorporate configurations of environmental 
dynamism.  By configurations I am referring to patterns of environmental dynamism.  Two 
common configurations include environmental shifts and ongoing environmental change, each of 
which has attracted significant research attention in the field of strategic management (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986; D’Aveni, 1994).  Dynamic capabilities have been studied in both contexts: 
environmental shifts (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010; Danneels, 
2008; Gilbert, 2006; Danneels, 2010) and ongoing environmental change (Capron and Mitchell, 
2009; Drenevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; Lee et al, 2010).  A third configuration that I call 
persistent disturbances has been defined in this study.  Unlike environmental shifts and ongoing 
 125 
 
environmental change, persistent disturbances depict an environment that, while dynamic and 
challenging, presents firms with similar challenges repetitively.   
Dynamic capability theory has not formally incorporated the role of configurations of 
environmental dynamism.  Instead, configurations of environmental dynamism have remained 
research contexts.  This presents a difficulty.  Scholars may be inappropriately generalizing 
research that applies in a context characterized by one configuration of environmental 
dynamism, to a context characterized by another configuration of environmental dynamism.  
Prior research lends credence to this concern.  For instance, King and Tucci (2002) argue that in 
environments of rapid change, firms are unlikely to engage in dramatic transformation as such 
transformation is likely to take too long.  Conversely, in Danneels (2008) study of the shift 
between mechanical and electronic business equipment, a dramatic transformation at Smith 
Corona was required.  Thus, it follows that firms responding to different configurations of 
environmental dynamism would build very different dynamic capabilities.  I argue that dynamic 
capabilities research needs to explicitly incorporate the impact of different configurations of 
environmental dynamism on the characteristics of dynamic capabilities themselves.   
In what follows I discuss this theoretical gap, pulling from both my study and prior 
literature to distinguish from one another, dynamic capabilities built under different 
configurations of environmental dynamism.  I discuss the implications in terms of the nature of 
the dynamic capabilities developed, the origination of dynamic capabilities, the development of 
dynamic capabilities, and the deployment of dynamic capabilities.  I also offer some suggestions 
on appropriate research methods with which to study dynamic capabilities in each configuration 
of environment dynamism.  Table 11 highlights these insights and the following paragraphs 
expand on them in more detail. 
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Table 11 Configurations of Environmental Dynamism and Dynamic Capabilities 
Dynamic 
Capability 
Characteristics 
Environmental Shift Ongoing Environmental 
Change 
Persistent Disturbances 
Nature Sensing oriented – 
identify future 
possibilities and act 
quickly to prepare and 
respond; 
vertical capability 
architecture 
Highly routinized change 
processes that 
continuously evolve the 
firm’s underlying dynamic 
and ordinary capabilities; 
vertical capability 
architecture 
Highly specific, targeted, 
and multi-layered 
collection of capabilities 
that firms deploy during 
disturbances;  
horizontal capability 
architecture 
Origination  Originated well in 
advance of 
environmental shift; 
anticipation of 
unknowns 
Originated in advance of or 
in conjunction with 
emergence of dynamic 
environment; anticipation 
of unknowns 
Originated when 
disturbance becomes 
persistent; dealing with 
knowns; initial 
development involves 
period of expensive 
coping 
Development Developed in 
anticipation of future 
challenges 
Development is ongoing, 
modified by higher-order 
capabilities 
Development occurs as 
disturbances are 
repeated 
Deployment Deployed through a 
combination of sensing 
and adaptation 
Deployed continuously as 
processes of ongoing 
adjustment 
Firms select appropriate 
capabilities to deploy for 
given disturbance 
Literature 
Tradition 
Resource-based view; 
disruptive technologies 
Routines; learning Jolts 
Research Method Case based – 
interviews; 
retrospective  
Case based – ethnographic, 
interviews; real-time 
Case-based – archival; 
retrospective and real-
time 
6.3.1 Nature of Dynamic Capabilities 
Prior research has argued that the nature of dynamic capabilities differs based on 
different dimensions of environmental dynamism, such as velocity, that the firm is facing.  
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1105) theorize that in highly dynamic environments, dynamic 
capabilities take the form of “simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable 
outcomes,” while in moderately dynamic environments they are stable and predictable processes.  
Similarly, Lavie (2006) argues that under conditions of high uncertainty, akin to unpredictability, 
dynamic capabilities are evolutionary in nature such that they modify capabilities incrementally.   
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In this paper I argue that different configurations of environmental dynamism play an 
important role in shaping the nature of dynamic capabilities.  Above, my study highlights how 
dynamic capabilities built in response to persistent disturbances comprised a layered capability 
architecture.  Each dynamic capability in that architecture in turn comprised a set of capabilities.  
This nested architecture was built as firms responded to the persistent disturbances in their 
environment.  The resulting dynamic capabilities permitted firms to adapt to multiple, concurrent 
persistent disturbances that each affected firms in different ways.  In contrast, dynamic 
capabilities associated with environmental shifts emphasize the important role of sensing (Mie 
and Teece, 2009) or environmental scanning (Danneels, 2008) to identify and prepare for future 
possibilities.  Once an environmental shift occurs, firms activate latent dynamic capabilities to 
respond quickly (Danneels, 2010; Teece, 2007).  Dynamic capabilities built in the context of 
ongoing environmental change take the form of highly routinized processes that continuously 
evolve a firm’s underlying ordinary capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002).  These dynamic capabilities are routines that modify routines (Winter, 2003; 
Collis, 1994).   
6.3.2 Origination of Dynamic Capabilities 
I argue that different configurations of environmental dynamism influence how dynamic 
capabilities originate.  Environments that are characterized by persistent disturbances provide 
continuity and relative stability that facilitate dynamic capability origination.  I argue that in 
these environments, firms build new dynamic capabilities in response to those facets of the 
underlying environment that become predictable due to repetition.  Thus, the origination of 
dynamic capabilities in response to persistent disturbances is more about responding to 
disturbances that have become stable and commonplace, than to change and dynamism 
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(Levinthal and Marino, 2010).  In contrast, dynamic capabilities built in response to either 
environmental shifts or ongoing environmental change pertains to preparing for the unknown.  
With respect to environmental shifts, firms originate dynamic capabilities well in advance of, 
and in anticipation of environmental shifts.  Similarly, in contexts of ongoing environmental 
change, firms build dynamic capabilities so as to keep pace and stay ahead of environmental 
dynamism, building and then deploying dynamic capabilities “faster and more fortuitously” than 
competitors (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).   
One implication of this focus on unknowns which is associated with environmental shifts 
and ongoing environmental change, is that this research has been less concerned with the early 
development of dynamic capabilities.  Most literature on dynamic capabilities has emphasized 
how firms build dynamic capabilities that are fully formed and effective at responding to the 
shifts and the ongoing environmental change that the firms may face.  In contrast, my study 
captures this early dynamic capability development period, highlighting how nascent dynamic 
capabilities initially struggle and perform poorly.  Nascent dynamic capabilities exhibit poor 
technical fitness, permitting firms to cope with dynamic environments but in inefficient ways.  
The two oil crises of the 1970s and early 1980s illustrate this well.  In responding to these crises, 
firms reacted strongly by converting, slowly and at great expense, automotive capacity geared to 
producing big cars to small-car capacity.  Lacking well-developed dynamic capabilities which 
would have offered more sophisticated responses, the firms spent large sums of money and a 
great deal of time coping with the challenge of the oil crises.  This coping is similar to the 
responses described by other scholars.  Periods of coping were identified in studies of how NCR 
laboriously and painfully restructured and reorganized over decades as the industry moved from 
mechanical to electronic cash registers (Rosenbloom, 2000), how Smith Corona engaged in 
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extensive efforts over 20 years to adjust resources before ultimately failing in 2001 (Danneels, 
2010), and how firms experiment before finding appropriate investments (Ahuja and Katila, 
2004).   
Further, considering how configurations of environmental dynamism influence the 
origination of dynamic capabilities makes explicit how dynamic environments motivate dynamic 
capability development.  Prior research has argued that environmental dynamism motivates the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Wang and Ahmed, 2007; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) or 
that dynamic capabilities are more effective in dynamic environments (Drnevich and 
Kriauciunas, 2011).  However scholars have had difficulty articulating why or how.  Drawing 
distinctions among these different configurations of environmental dynamism takes a step 
towards more explicit attention to the role of environmental dynamism in dynamic capability 
origination.  My results suggest that dynamic capabilities built in anticipation of environmental 
shifts and ongoing environmental change follow a development pattern akin to path-deepening 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2004), characterized by inertia and momentum of capability development 
(Helfat, 1997; Miller and Friesen, 1980).  In contrast, dynamic capabilities developed in response 
to persistent disturbances involve significant new path creation (Ahuja and Katila, 2004), as 
firms build new capabilities and even expand the family of dynamic capabilities in response to 
dynamic environments. 
6.3.3 Development of Dynamic Capabilities  
I argue that how dynamic capabilities are developed, is influenced by the configuration of 
environmental dynamism in which the firm is operating.  In contexts characterized by persistent 
disturbances, dynamic capabilities are developed as repeated disturbances drive firms to respond 
in an increasingly efficiently manner to disturbances that remain persistent.  For example, in my 
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study firms built increasingly efficient dynamic capabilities in changing the mix of products they 
produced.  The dynamic capability developed as the firms layered on increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities in platform sharing and facility sharing.   
In contrast, dynamic capabilities built in the context of environmental shifts are 
developed in advance of and in anticipation of future challenges.  These capabilities tend to 
emphasize sensing capabilities that permit firms to identify shifts before or while they are 
occurring (Teece, 2007).  One difficulty is that in these contexts it is difficult to anticipate how 
effective a dynamic capability will be to an unknown and uncertain future environmental shift.  
If a firm is developing a dynamic capability to address an unknown environmental shift, it is 
difficult to know how effective a dynamic capability will be, until that occurs.  Finally, dynamic 
capabilities in the context of ongoing environmental change develop as higher-order dynamic 
capabilities modify lower-order dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003; Collis, 1994).  This form of 
change can be considered more routinized, and change can be considered to be occurring 
continuously across the multiple levels of the dynamic capability hierarchy. 
6.3.4 Deployment of Dynamic Capabilities 
Firms also deploy dynamic capabilities differently for given configurations of 
environmental dynamism.  In the case of persistent disturbances, firms in my study responded to 
disturbances by selecting appropriate dynamic capabilities from their dynamic capability 
architecture; dynamic capabilities which had been built in response to past disturbances.  I found 
that firms continued to deploy dynamic capabilities that were built decades earlier.  In contrast, 
dynamic capabilities built in environments of ongoing environmental change continuously 
deployed their dynamic capabilities across multiple levels of the capability hierarchy (Collis, 
1994; Winter, 2003).  Finally, dynamic capabilities built in anticipation of environmental shifts 
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were deployed through a combination of sensing an environmental shift and responding to that 
shift.   
6.3.5 Research Approaches for Dynamic Capabilities 
Finally, different configurations of environmental dynamism have a bearing on the 
methodological approaches and empirical measurements that scholars use to study different 
dynamic capabilities.  When studying persistent disturbances, scholars should focus on archival 
data incorporating interviews for context and interpretation.  Studying persistent disturbances 
mandates a longitudinal perspective encompassing many years.  However, when studying 
environmental shifts, researchers may wish instead to focus on the managerial cognition 
processes associated with sensing and interpreting environmental shifts.  The use of interviews 
and ethnographies to build contemporary case studies is highly suitable.  While identifying 
organizations in the middle of an environmental shift would be ideal (see Meyer’s 1982 study of 
jolts as an example of a study taking advantage of a unique opportunity in the environment), 
practically these studies would be designed as retrospective accounts of organizations that have 
successfully, and preferably recently, navigated dynamic capabilities in the context of an 
environmental shift.  Finally, in studying dynamic capabilities built in response to ongoing 
environmental change, scholars could employ detailed surveys, interviews, or even diaries to 
capture and interpret change processes in real-time.   
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
7.0 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
My research offers four contributions to the study of strategic management and, in 
particular, to dynamic capabilities.  First, it offers a stronger understanding of the role that 
configurations of environmental dynamism play in the development of dynamic capabilities.  
While prior research most commonly conceptualizes environmental dynamism in terms of 
different dimensions, such as velocity, my research focuses on configurations of environmental 
dynamism.  I examine an important but understudied configuration of environmental dynamism 
that I call persistent disturbances, defined as repeated temporary events confronting firms.  I 
argue that persistent disturbances are an important but understudied configuration of 
environmental dynamism. 
My research also highlights how dynamic capabilities develop differently in the presence 
of different configurations of environmental dynamism.  This finding highlights an important 
recursive relationship between a firm’s dynamic capabilities and its environment.  In this study I 
found that, while dynamic capabilities were built in response to dynamic environments, the 
nature of the dynamic environment in which a firm operated played a significant role by 
influencing the nature, origination, development, and deployment of the dynamic capabilities 
that the firm developed.   
Second, my research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the architecture of 
dynamic capabilities.  By examining in detail firm’s manufacturing flexibility related dynamic 
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capabilities that developed over 45 years, I discerned that the dynamic capability architecture of 
these firms manufacturing flexibility comprised a family of dynamic capabilities which in turn 
comprised layers of capabilities that changed over time.  I found that this family of dynamic 
capabilities, comprising production volume flexibility, production mix flexibility, and partnering 
flexibility, was built over time in response to specific persistent disturbances from the firm’s 
environment.  These dynamic capabilities in turn comprised capabilities which made adapting a 
firm’s underlying ordinary capabilities more effective by increasing speed, reducing costs, and 
providing a range of alternatives.  This highly layered dynamic capability architecture serves a 
critical function in explaining how dynamic capabilities that seem similar can behave differently.   
Third, building on my insights into dynamic capability architecture and the longitudinal 
nature of my data and analysis, my research sheds light on how dynamic capabilities develop 
over time.  I found that in environments characterized by persistent disturbances, instead of 
building dynamic capabilities in response to uncertainties and unknowns, firms built dynamic 
capabilities over time in response to repeated and predictable disturbances.  A firm develops its 
dynamic capabilities by building entirely new dynamic capability layers or by adding or 
modifying capabilities that support the firm’s dynamic capability.  Development proceeds from 
early periods of coping, as firms struggle with dynamic capabilities that have poor technical 
fitness with respect to the type of change required, to periods in which the dynamic capabilities 
exhibit high technical fitness and are well adapted to the demands of the persistent disturbances.   
Finally, my research offers a methodological contribution as well.  Critics of the dynamic 
capability literature have expressed concern that dynamic capabilities cannot be observed or 
measured and most work on dynamic capability stops short of showing dynamic capabilities in 
much detail (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011).  My approach which sought to understand different, 
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albeit related, responses to persistent disturbances facing them firm could be duplicated in other 
settings and with other dynamic capabilities to delve into the underlying architecture of a 
dynamic capability and understand that dynamic capability in greater detail.   
7.2 Implications for Managers and Policy Makers 
My research has implications for managers and policy makers.  The first implication is 
that managers should strive to understand the configuration(s) of environmental dynamism they 
are facing in their environments.  Some industries or environmental contexts are associated with 
particular configurations of environmental dynamism.  For instance, the semi-conductor industry 
due to its rapidly changing technology is often held up as hypercompetitive and fast paced and 
resembles ongoing environmental change.  Dynamism in other environments may resemble 
environmental shifts, such as industries that are strongly dependent upon technological or 
regulatory regimes which are subject to dramatic change as new technologies or governments 
sweep into use or power.  Still other environments are characterized by persistent disturbances, 
like the North American automotive industry.  Since, as I argue above, the dynamic capabilities 
firms build in response to each configuration of environmental dynamism differ, a strong 
understanding of these configurations of environmental dynamism can help firms build the 
dynamic capabilities that are most appropriate for their environments.  Further, my study 
highlights to managers that they may be required to address very different configurations of 
environmental dynamism concurrently.  It is not simply a matter of building faster or more 
efficient dynamic capabilities, but rather dynamic capabilities of different types.   
Second, my research highlights the layered architecture associated with dynamic 
capabilities.  At the core of this discussion on architecture is the insight that even dynamic 
capabilities that appear very similar, can provide very different abilities to change and adapt.  For 
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instance, prior to the 1970s, an automotive firm’s dynamic capability in manufacturing flexibility 
rested in the firm’s ability to adjust the production volume—altering sources of production and 
adjusting how the capacity of plants and facility was utilized.  Over time, however, firms layered 
on additional dynamic capabilities that helped the firm exhibit new forms of manufacturing 
flexibility that included the ability to flexibly adjust its production mix and to work in new and 
creative ways with partners to lower costs.  For managers this means that dynamic capabilities 
that appear similar, come in many different shades.  Managers must understand what 
disturbances the firm is prepared to respond to, and be aware of those the firm will have greater 
difficulty with.  A contemporary example is the recent difficulties that the Japanese automotive 
firms Toyota and Honda have had in adapting to tsunamis in Japan and flooding in Thailand.  
While these firms are lauded for their manufacturing flexibility that incorporated just-in-time 
systems and highly flexible manufacturing facilities, they have been forced to shut down plants 
as a result of parts shortages from their tightly integrated suppliers that have been hit by these 
natural disasters.   
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This study is not without its limitations.  First, my study is inductive theory-building 
research, and thus my findings are not generalizable in the statistical sense.  Instead my findings 
generalize to theory (Yin, 2009).  I situated my study within a single industry—automotive—and 
in a specific geographical region—North America.  Since prior research has stressed that 
capabilities are often context specific (Laamanen and Wallin, 2009; Ethiraj et al, 2005), my 
study may not generalize beyond the automotive industry.  However, the automotive industry 
shares similarities with other manufacturing industries and industries possessing homogeneous 
oligopolies in moderately dynamic and regulated environments.  Thus, my insights are most 
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likely to be applicable in manufacturing industries and industries such as telecommunications, 
energy production, forestry, and mining, which are oligopolistic in structure and which have 
strong regulations and have had many disturbances over their long histories.  Within the 
automotive context my study is further focused on a particular category of dynamic capabilities 
in manufacturing flexibility.  Thus the theories I propose may be further limited to dynamic 
capabilities that closely resemble manufacturing flexibility.  Further research should study a 
broader range of industries and dynamic capabilities. 
Further, my case study has a historical focus and differs from contemporary case studies 
in its reliance on archival and historical documentation.  The nature of this archival dataset 
constrained my interpretation and analysis because I was reliant on what experts had chosen to 
write about and did not have the opportunity to ask pointed questions as one would with 
interview or focus group data collection methods.  This constraint is a reflection of the 
longitudinal nature of my study, which makes interviews and focus groups unreliable owing to 
retrospective biases (Golden, 1992).  While I took steps to address and mitigate the difficulties of 
this historical focus, such as employing high-quality data sources and corroborating qualitative 
opinions and perspectives with quantitative data (Jick, 1979), this limitation remains an inherent 
challenge of conducting inductive research examining long historical periods.     
Third, the strength of my dataset, and thus my analysis, is that it is longitudinal.  This has 
permitted me to analyze patterns over a full 45 years of data.  While this is a strength of my 
study, it carried with it implicit difficulties with respect to the depth of analysis for a given year.  
Future research may explore specific events in more detail, such as the actions that firms took 
prior to, during, and following major oil crises and regulatory events, so as to gain greater depth 
of insight into how dynamic capabilities originate and develop.   
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One specific limitation of my archival data was that they did not provide information 
about managers’ cognitive processes and how managers perceived their environments before 
developing dynamic capabilities.  Danneels (2011) stresses the importance of cognition with 
respect to how dynamic capabilities are deployed, arguing that to be effective, managers need a 
strong understanding of their firm’s resources and capabilities.  Gavetti (2005) in turn, highlights 
the importance of cognition in building an accurate interpretation of the challenges the firm is 
facing.  Recent research on dynamic managerial capabilities argues for the reintroduction of the 
manager as decision maker into studies of dynamic capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Sirmon 
and Hitt, 2009).  Incorporating information about cognition processes could also shed light onto 
how persistent disturbances are perceived.  An analysis of my data suggests that different firms 
identified different disturbances as being most salient.  For instance, from a study of annual 
reports it was clear that for Chrysler, the Vietnam War imposed significantly on their business, 
while managers at Ford and GM made no mention of any difficulties associated with that war.  
Future research could explore how managers within firms perceived the persistent disturbances 
in their environments, and attempt to better understand the decision-making processes through 
which they build dynamic capabilities to respond.  Extending this study by interviewing 
managers about how they perceive disturbances and how they respond would provide a stronger 
cognitive understanding of managerial action that could be very valuable.   
In addition, my study distinguishes among environments possessing different 
configurations of environmental dynamism.  I distinguish environmental shifts from ongoing 
environmental change and persistent disturbances.  However, firms face complex environments 
that invariably include some combination of different configurations of environmental 
dynamism.  Thus firms likely face two or more of these configurations simultaneously.  Future 
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research could consider how firms build dynamic capabilities that permit them to respond and 
adapt to environments characterized by multiple configurations of environmental dynamism at 
the same time.  How do firms build and maintain these different dynamic capabilities?  Research 
could also examine the interactions between different configurations of environmental dynamism 
and between dynamic capabilities developed to address each configuration.   
My research has demonstrated that delving deeper into a particular dynamic capability, 
such as manufacturing flexibility, can offer critical insights regarding the inner workings of a 
dynamic capability.  In particular, my study offered an understanding of dynamic capability 
architecture.  I argue that future research should delve deeper into specific dynamic capabilities 
such as alliance management, dynamic managerial capabilities, and new product development 
processes.  This approach has the potential to empirically ground future understanding of 
dynamic capability architecture.   
Finally, my research highlights how automotive firms dramatically improved the 
technical fitness of their dynamic capabilities in manufacturing flexibility over the course of my 
study period, from early incompetence in adapting product mix and partnering to strong, well-
tested, and technically fit dynamic capabilities.  However, despite these improvements the firms 
floundered.  The firms’ financial performance deteriorated to such a point that in 2009 both 
Chrysler and GM declared bankruptcy, with Ford narrowly avoiding a similar fate.  Future 
research should explore this disconnect between the technical fitness of a given dynamic 
capability and the performance of the firm as a whole.  Some research has begun to address this 
important question.  Shamsie, Martin, and Miller (2009) found that dynamic capabilities do not 
necessarily lead to performance improvement.  Still other research has argued that dynamic 
capabilities operate across levels of analysis (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Drnevich and 
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Kriauciunas, 2011).  Research by Coff (2010) shows how rent appropriation should be 
considered from very early stages of capability development, arguing that both should coevolve.  
In short, future research should pursue what firms require, beyond a technically fit dynamic 
capability, in order to achieve superior (or even average) returns.   
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
In a recent article on dynamic capabilities, Helfat and Winter (2011) pondered the 
paradox of the (n)ever-changing world (Birnholtz, Cohen, and Hoch, 2007) asking “[i]f 
everything is changing all the time, what then is the basis of the impression that some things do 
not change at all?”  Indeed, managers are often left with the impression that the world is 
changing too fast or too dramatically, but at the same time they are confronted with variations on 
familiar disturbances. Addressing this paradox requires thinking that advances our understanding 
of environmental dynamism and the capabilities that firms build in response.  
In my research, the (n)ever-changing world is well illustrated by a configuration of 
environmental dynamism that I call persistent disturbances, defined as repeated temporary events 
confronting firms.  The persistent disturbances I studied in the North American automotive 
industry were economic cycles, government regulations, labour disruptions, competitive 
pressures, and energy challenges.  Each of these persistent disturbances depicted arenas of 
ongoing concern for automotive firms, but also ones which the firms had had decades of 
experience addressing.   
My research studied the dynamic capabilities related to manufacturing flexibility that 
firms built in response to these persistent disturbances—both what they were and how firms built 
them.  I found that firms built dynamic capabilities in these environments, progressing from 
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technically unfit dynamic capabilities towards increasingly technical fit dynamic capabilities 
through a nested process of layering.  As persistent disturbances remained in place, firms added 
and elaborated both dynamic capabilities and the capabilities they comprised to improve the 
effectiveness of their responses to the persistent disturbances.  The resulting dynamic capabilities 
resembled the process by which they were built, possessing a multi-layered capability 
architecture.   
In short, my research emphasizes the importance of better understanding dynamic 
capabilities through three avenues.  First, my research stresses the importance of moving beyond 
dimensions of environmental dynamism towards a better understanding of configurations of 
environmental dynamism and the role these play in the development of dynamic capabilities.  I 
take steps in this regard by discussing the influence that different configurations of 
environmental dynamism have with respect to the nature, origination, development, and 
deployment of dynamic capabilities.  Second, I encourage scholars to identify and study the 
capability architecture of different types of dynamic capabilities across different contexts.  Even 
subtle variations in capability architecture reveal differences in how and how well a firm can 
respond to disturbances.  Finally, my research highlights how dynamic capabilities can develop 
in parallel as environmental dynamism unfolds.  Through a process of layering on top of existing 
dynamic capabilities, firms can, over time, improve the technical fitness of their dynamic 
capabilities for a particular persistent disturbance. 
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Appendices 
Table A1 Definitions of Key Terms 
Term Definition 
Dynamic Capabilities A firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to 
address changing environments 
Disturbance Adversity, either internally generated or externally imposed, that disrupts the normal 
functioning of the firm 
Persistent Disturbance Repeated temporary events confronting firms 
Persistent Manufacturing Implication The manufacturing related implications of repeated temporary  events confronting firms 
Manufacturing Flexibility A firm’s ability to adapt to environmental changes by varying products, product mix and 
production volumes.   
Capability Architecture How different capabilities fit together or relate to one another 
Evolutionary Fitness (of Dynamic Capabilities) Evolutionary fitness refers to how well a dynamic capability enables a firm to survive and 
even grow in changing environment 
Technical Fitness (of Dynamic Capabilities) Technical fitness pertains to how effective a dynamic capability is at performing its 
intended function 
Environmental Dynamism Change in a firm’s external environment 
Configuration (of Environmental Dynamism) Recognizable patterns of environmental dynamism 
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Table A2 Dynamic Capabilities Literature Review – Empirical Review 
Author Dynamic Capability Dynamic Capability 
Development 
Environmental 
Dynamism 
Characteristics 
Method Research Context 
Adner and 
Helfat, 2003 
Dynamic Managerial 
Capabilities 
Managerial human capital, 
managerial social capital 
and managerial cognition; 
these factors can influence 
how strategic decisions are 
made; in strategic 
reorientation in response to 
changing conditions in 
environment 
NA Fluctuating Oil Prices; 
Changing 
environments 
ANOVA U.S. Petroleum 
Industry from 1977 
through 1997 
 
Agarwal and 
Helfat, 2009 
Strategic Renewal 
IBMs transformations from 
electromechanical 
accounting equipment to an 
electronic computing 
company and then to a 
business computing services 
company; also incremental 
strategic renewal  
NA Dramatic shifts in its 
external environment; 
specifically new 
technology or changing 
competition 
Case IBM from 1940 
Anand, Oriani, 
and Vassolo, 
2010 
Firm Entry 
“Ability to create and 
manage new alliances in 
order to enter emerging 
technological fields in the 
presence of discontinuous 
technological change.”  
P1214 
NA Discontinuous 
Technological Change 
Heckman probit 
model 
U.S. and European 
Phramaceutical 
firms from 1980s 
through 2000. 
Capron and 
Mitchell, 2009 
Capability Sourcing 
Ability to select appropriate 
modes of capability sourcing 
- internal development or 
NA Rapid industry 
changes, including 
deregulation, price 
competition, 
Survey and survival 
survey 
International 
telecommunication
s industry (2000 to 
2005) 
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external sourcing – so as to 
renew capabilities 
moderator role 
technological 
convergence and entry 
of foreign competitors 
Coen and 
Maritan, 2011 
Resource Allocation Process 
The capacity to manage 
investments in operational 
capabilities.  
Operationalized as the 
ability to recognize 
opportunities (search) to 
invest in new operational 
capabilities 
NA  Simulation NA 
Danneels, 2008 Exploration and Learning  
Ability to explore new 
markets (marketing) and 
ability to explore new 
technologies (R&D) 
 
Ability to build new 
competences. 
5 organizational 
antecedents (4 of which 
gained empirical 
support):  slack 
resources, 
environmental scanning, 
willingness to 
cannibalize and 
constructive conflict.  
Tolerance for failure not  
Environmental change 
making previously 
acquired competences 
obsolete or create 
opportunities for new 
competences 
Regression Public 
manufacturing 
Danneels, 2010 Renewal of Resources and 
Competences 
How Smith Corona 
attempted to modify its 
resources (leverage, create, 
access and release) 
Resource cognition plays 
an important role 
because managers 
understand the 
resources they have, and 
their fungibility. 
Environmental shift 
from mechanical 
typewriters to 
electronics.  
Environmental change 
that threatens long-run 
viability of the firm. 
Market and 
technological change 
Case Smith Corona – 
typewriters 1980-
2001 
Doving and 
Gooderham, 
2008 
Altering service portfolio 
offering of a firm (related 
diversification) 
NA Changing 
environments 
Regression Small 
accountancies in 
Norway 
Drnevich and 
Kriauciunas, 
2011 
IT ordinary and dynamic 
capabilities 
NA Degree of 
environmental 
dynamism 
Regression Chilean firms – IT 
based capabilities 
Galunic and Architectural Innovation Social and economic Changing markets; Case Multi-business firm 
 155 
 
Eisenhardt, 
2001 
Corporate level processes 
by which multi-business 
firms reconfigure or realign 
their resources.  
logics 
Simple rules that guide 
charter redeployment 
Executives are key 
evolving product 
markets 
Ethiraj, Kale, 
Krishnan, and 
Singh, 2005 
Role of client specific and 
project management 
capabilities 
Capabilities develop 
through repeated 
interactions and through 
deliberate and persistent 
investments. 
NA Interviews and 
Regressions 
Software services 
Industry; single firm 
multiple projects 
Gilbert, 2006 General – The ability to 
move from one competency 
configuration to another 
Argue that structural 
differentiation permits 
simultaneous holding of 
two competency 
configurations 
Discontinuous 
environmental change 
Case Newspaper 
organization 
Helfat, 1997 Creating new products and 
processes 
Decisions to engage in coal 
gasification /liquefaction 
R&D 
DC accumulation based 
on past complementary 
assets (refining assets) 
and know-how (refining 
R&D; other synthetic 
fuels); or strong 
capabilities in new space 
(ie coal assets) 
Oil price increases – 
1973 and 1979 
Regression U.S. Petroleum 
industry during 
1970s and early 
1980s 
Kale and Singh, 
2007 
Alliance learning process 
Articulation, codification, 
sharing and internalization 
of alliance management 
know-how.  A higher order 
DC, helps firms learn, 
accumulate, and leverage 
alliance know-how so as to 
modify or improve its 
operational alliance 
management skills. 
Learning and knowledge 
accumulation processes 
are how firms build and 
sustain a dynamic 
capability that permits 
the firm to modify its 
alliance capabilities 
NA Survey;  Large firms  
King and Tucci, 
2002 
Market entry 
A general DC surrounding 
the role of experience on 
market entry patterns  
Prior experience 
important for dynamic 
change 
 
Technological change; 
development of new 
markets; explicitly 
recognizes different 
types of environmental 
Regression from 
archival 
Disk drive industry 
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dynamism 
Laamanen and 
Wallin, 2009 
Cognitive microfoundations 
of capability development  
Role of cognition at 
operational capability, 
capability portfolio, and 
enterprise level in 
dynamic capability 
development 
NA Case Network software 
security firms 
Lampel and 
Shamsie, 2003 
Industry transitions 
Identified mobilizing 
(bringing together bundles 
of resources) and 
transforming (putting 
together a finished product) 
capabilities  
Environment transitions 
can emphasize and 
direct attention to 
changing and innovating 
one or more sets of 
capabilities at the 
expense of others.  
Industry transition 
from studio to hub and 
spoke organizations (a 
PE model) 
Regression Hollywood film 
industry 
Lee, 
Venkatraman, 
Tanriverdi, and 
Lyer, 2010 
Managing complementarity 
relationships among firm’s 
product markets to match 
industry changes.  Two 
approaches – reconfigure 
resource base of product 
portfolio or reposition 
product portfolio  
NA Hypercompetition Regression Software industry 
Malik and 
Kotabe, 2009 
Three dynamic capabilities 
including manufacturing 
flexibility, organizational 
learning and reverse 
engineering 
Underpinning DC – 
learning (repetition and 
experimentation), 
reconfiguration (identify 
opportunities and 
changing resources - 
external) and 
coordination (how 
managers coordinate 
and integrate internally) 
processes 
Shift from emerging 
economy through 
market liberalization 
Survey and 
regression 
Indian and 
Pakistani firms 
Marcus and 
Anderson, 2006 
General DC 
Ability to renew, augment 
and adapt competencies 
over time  
NA NA Survey/ regression US Retail food 
Martin, 2011 Dynamic managerial Antecedents of dynamic Dynamic environment; Multiple-case study Multibusiness 
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capabilities  
 
managerial capabilities 
include recombinative 
structures, 
recombinative processes 
and social equivalence 
uncertain and rapidly 
changing 
organizations in 
software industry 
Moliterno and 
Wiersema, 
2007 
Resource divestment 
capability 
How divestment can 
generate competitive 
advantage 
NA NA Regression Major League 
Baseball 
Morgan, 
Vorhies, and 
Mason, 2009 
Acquiring and deploying 
resources in such a way as 
to reflect changing 
environment 
NA NA Mail Survey; SEM Broad sampling of 
US firms 
Narayanan, 
Colwell, and 
Douglas, 2009 
Fast drug development and 
chemical biology R&D 
platforms 
Development of DC a 
combination of path 
dependent behaviours 
and firm idiosyncratic 
behaviours; early 
dynamic capability 
fragility 
Fast paced 
environment 
Case based Single US 
Pharmaceutical  
Pablo, Reay, 
Dewald, and 
Casebeer, 2007 
Learning through 
experimenting; 
Bringing together existing 
resources in new ways 
Phases of developing DC: 
Identify latent DC, 
enabling the DC and 
managing ongoing 
tensions 
Continuous reduction 
in financial resources 
(squeeze); Continual 
need for improvement; 
Interviews Public healthcare in 
Calgary 
Pierce, 2009 Ability of firms to survive in 
face of strategic change by 
core firms in their industry.  
Forecasting capabilities; 
Related experience in 
niche market;  
Core firms create 
shakeouts that 
challenge niche 
markets.  
Regression Automotive leases 
Rindova and 
Kotha, 2001 
Continuous Morphing 
Ability to change 
organizational form 
(structures, organizational 
arrangements), function 
(product strategy) 
dynamically.  Can be used to 
support rapid changes in 
Dynamic capabilities are 
open-ended; emergent 
and evolving over time; 
process of layering 
resources to convert 
strengths to assets 
 
 
Hypercompetitive; high 
velocity; regimes of 
rapid change;  
 
It is about maintaining 
dynamic fit with this 
changing environment. 
Cases Search Engines 
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strategy required in dynamic 
environments  
Rosenbloom, 
2000 
Achieving new forms of 
competitive advantage.  
Actualize latent dynamic 
capabilities; painful crisis 
during adaptation 
Radical technological 
change in business 
equipment 
Case Business 
Equipment (NCR) 
Rothaermal 
and Hess, 2007 
Seeking the locus of 
dynamic capabilities – 
individuals, firm or network 
Finds that antecedents 
for dynamic capabilities 
at the individual, firm 
and network levels of 
analysis.   
Exogenous paradigm 
shifts 
Regression Biotechnology 
Salvato, 2009 Dynamic managerial 
capabilities 
 
Encoding successful 
experiments into higher 
level capabilities; 
ordinary and mindful 
acts can play a strong 
role in DC development; 
initial temporary under 
performance 
Ever changing 
competitive 
environment 
Sequential analysis Alessi Italian 
designer 
Schilke and 
Goerzen, 2010 
Alliance management 
capability 
Degree to which 
organizations possess 
relevant management 
routines that enable them 
to effectively manage their 
portfolio of strategic 
alliances 
 
NA NA SEM R&D Alliances 
Shamsie, 
Martin, and 
Miller, 2009 
Investment decisions – 
Choosing between 
improving strengths or 
developing weaknesses 
Resource allocation 
between exploiting and 
exploring 
Constant and 
unpredictable change 
Regression Hollywood film 
industry 
Sirmon and 
Hitt, 2009 
Dynamic Managerial 
Capabilities/Asset 
Orchestration  
Focusing on manager’s 
resource-related decisions 
such as resource investment 
NA NA Two-stage least 
squares regression 
Banks 
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and deployment (asset 
orchestration) 
 
Song, Droge, 
Hanvanich, and 
Calantone, 
2005 
Resource configuration, 
complementarity and 
integration.   
NA Moderated by low or 
high technological 
turbulence 
SEM  Joint Ventures 
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Table A3 Persistent Disturbance Codes and Persistent Manufacturing Implications 
Persistent 
Disturbance 
Codes 
Description Representative Passage Persistent 
Manufacturing 
Implications 
Economic 
Cycles 
Economic cycles refer 
to the booms and busts 
of recessionary cycles 
as well as other 
economic factors such 
as high inflation.   
Deepening recession, double-digit inflation and public uncertainty over the availability and price 
of gasoline took their toll of vehicle sales and industry profits in most major markets last year. 
[Ford 1974 Annual Report] 
 
The year 1982 was another year of mixed economic results. While both inflation and interest rates 
declined significantly, the long sought upturn in economic activity did not occur. As a result. 
Industry deliveries of passenger cars and trucks declined for the third straight year. [GM 1982 
Annual Report] 
 
We had a good first half in 1995, second half automotive profits were reduced by lower U.S. 
production volume caused by a soft car market [Ford 1995 Annual Report] 
Fluctuating 
Consumer Demand 
 
Profit Margin 
Pressure 
Labour 
Disruptions 
Labour disruptions 
included strikes and 
labour negotiations 
The strike by the UAW, extended from September 7 to November 11 caused the Company to lose 
more than 600,000 cars and trucks from scheduled production in North America.  This lost 
production was particularly damaging because it came at the start of a new model year, when 
customer demand is high. [Ford 1967 Annual Report] 
 
The new three-year agreement concluded last December between the Company and the United 
Automobile Workers is by far the most costly in our history. It has increased the downward 
pressure on profits, the upward pressure on prices, the gap between 
U. S. and foreign labor costs and the difficulty of competing with foreign cars imported into the 
U.S  [Ford 1970 Annual Report] 
 
A more important factor was the UAW strike in the fall, which shut down most GM facilities in the 
United States for a minimum of ten weeks, and some for a longer period. … We estimate that the 
strike caused production losses of more than 1.5 million cars and trucks. [GM 1970 Annual Report] 
 
Strike-related production losses in the United States and Canada during the first and fourth 
quarters of the year reduced our earnings by approximately 1.2 billion. [GM 1996 Annual Report] 
Profit Margin 
Pressure 
Energy 
Challenges 
Energy challenges 
included energy crises 
as well as fluctuating 
fuel prices 
Late in the year, the Mid-East war and the Arab oil embargo transformed what had been a 
worsening petroleum shortage into an immediate energy crisis. The energy crisis, in turn, 
transformed what had been a steady trend toward small cars into a sudden rush. [Ford 1973 
Annual Report] 
 
… rising fuel prices caused demand for SUVs to drop sooner and faster than we had anticipated. 
[Ford 2005 Annual Report] 
 
Fluctuating 
Consumer Model 
Preferences 
 
Fluctuating 
Consumer Demand  
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For the automobile industry, 1974 was the year the patterns of the marketplace went awry. In the 
gasoline-short early months, demand for small cars soared to unprecedented levels while sales of 
fullsize cars dropped sharply. For a time, used Vegas were bringing higher prices than used 
Impalas. No one knew when the oil embargo and gasoline allocations would end; no one knew 
where the new trends would lead. America's love affair with the automobile was said to be over. 
[GM 1974 Annual Report] 
 
The impact of 1979's fuel shortages and high prices is likely to last longer than it did after the 
1973-74 crisis. By ignoring gas guzzlers and turning to smaller, fuel efficient cars, consumers seem 
to be reasserting themselves as our No.1 taskmaster. [WARDS 1980] 
 
“Ford’s main U.S. problem, abetted by the economy and the energy situation, was Ford’s small-car 
lineup.  It was no longer new and exciting.  Its new-for-’79 downsized LTD was being passed up by 
some buyers who became more interested in small cars as gasoline prices rose to $1.25 a gallon 
and were expected to go nowhere but up in 1980 and beyond” (WARD, 1980:211) 
Competitive 
Pressures 
Competitive pressures 
included those from 
domestic competitors 
as well as international 
entrants from Japan, 
Europe and Asia.  
With the reduction of trade barriers, the rapid growth of the Japanese automotive industry and 
the merging of many European manufacturers to form larger and more efficient firms, worldwide 
competition in our industry is becoming steadily more vigorous. The ability to sell at competitive 
prices and still earn, a satisfactory return depends more than ever on efficiency gains made 
possible through technological advances, as well as on continued innovation in product design. 
[Ford 1970 Annual Report] 
 
One of the reasons for the strength of Japanese cars sales in the U.S. market is the price 
advantage resulting primarily from the substantial disparity between Japanese and U.S. wage 
rates.  In 1977 Japanese labor costs were about $7 an hour below US costs.  [Ford 1977 Annual 
Report] 
 
The current labor cost differential in excess of $8 per hour, comparing GM wages and benefits 
with those of Japanese auto workers and with the average for all U.S. manufacturing workers, 
represents a disadvantage to General Motors of approximately $8 billion in a typical year.  No 
company can compete for long, and no jobs are safe for long, with that kind of disadvantage. [GM 
1981 Annual Report] 
 
The competitive playing field is larger and more open than it's ever been before.  That means Ford 
is going to have to compete increasingly with the best companies in the world, wherever they are 
located and wherever they operate. [Ford 1994 Annual Report] 
 
Competition in the automotive industry is intensifying, with more market segments and more new 
products than ever before [Ford 2003 Annual Report] 
 
The second was the consistent pressure that rising costs and intensified competition exerted on 
profits throughout the year. [GM 1971 Annual Report] 
Fluctuating 
Consumer Demand  
 
Profit Margin 
Pressure 
 162 
 
 
While domestic-make car sales slumped 10% to 8.3 million in 1979 from 9.3 million in 1978, cars 
from Europe and Japan soared 16% over 1978 to a record 2.3 million from 2.0 million units. 
[WARDS 1980] 
Government 
Regulations 
Government 
regulations covered a 
range of regulatory 
issues including fuel 
economy, safety and 
emissions. 
In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the test of the marketplace.  In 
the future, we shall be severely tested by the need to respond at the same time to the 
requirements of the market and the requirements imposed by the Federal governments' safety 
and air pollution regulations. [Ford 1966 Annual Report] 
 
Fuel economy legislation passed during the last session of Congress requires progressive 
improvement in the average fuel economy of the cars sold by each manufacturer. By the 1985 
model year our cars will have to average 27.5 miles per gallon- a requirement that based on 
existing technology, can be met only if the majority of the cars we sell are Pinto-size or smaller . 
Today however cars in that class account for less than one-fourth of our sales.  [Ford 1975 Annual 
Report] 
 
Our efforts to comply with Federal regulations covering vehicle safety, damageability, emissions 
and fuel economy continue to require large and growing expenditures. [ Ford 1976 Annual Report] 
 
Meeting additional [regulatory] requirements will call for further redesign of much of the 
Company's product line by 1985. From 1978 through 1985, the Company will launch 22 major new 
North American product development programs, compared with six in the prior eight years.  For 
example from 1980 to 1984 Ford will introduce an average of one new engine a year compared 
with one every 2.4 years between 1968 and 1980, and one new transmission a year, compared 
with one every four years for the prior 15 years.  [Ford 1978 Annual Report] 
 
Government regulation of the auto industry had become a permanent fixture.  The cost of 
compliance with federal regulation by some industry estimates was over $100 billion a year.  
[WARDS 1980] 
 
“The Federal Government’s programs of conservation of energy, increased highway safety, and 
protection of health are fully consistent with the goals of Chrysler Corporation.  However, in the 
past year alone, the Federal Government has put into final or proposed form four major standards 
covering motor vehicles which go beyond reasonable limits, substantially increase our capital 
needs, and raise the cost to the consumer.” (Chrysler Annual Report, 1977) 
Profit Margin 
Pressure 
 
Fluctuating 
Consumer Model 
Preferences 
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Table A4 Ford Production Volume Flexibility 
Year Ford - Production Volume Flexibility 
1964 • New sources for Mustang added due to demand at Dearborn Michigan, 
San Jose California, and Metuchen New Jersey 
1967 • Heavy overtime used to make up for losses due to strikes 
1968 • Common for vehicles to be built in a small number of plants – ie Falcon 
just in St. Thomas Ontario 
1970 • High production cars launched at a number of plants – so Pinto at San 
Jose, St. Thomas, and Metuchen plants 
1971 • Realignments and inventory adjustments cause production fluctuations – 
as much as 16,000 units from week to week. 
• Weak demand for some cars can mean facilities falter – Cougar facility in 
Dearborn faltered due to weak sports car market 
• Use of overtime to match demand for Mark IV 
1977 • Changed over two small car plants early due to diminished demand 
• Full-size cars didn’t change over models until August 
1978 • Louisville and Atlanta plants closed a week early to adjust inventories 
1980 • Closed two assembly plants and two component factories 
• Reduced active hourly workforce by 25%; cut salaried by 20,000 
• Ability to ramp up production of Ford’s Escort is hampered by limited 
engine capacity; plans in place to double capacity at Dearborn engine 
plant and start production at Lima Ohio as well as a new plant in Mexico 
1981 • Two new sources for subcompacts – San Jose and St. Thomas 
1982 • In exchange for wage freezing, Ford agreed to a moratorium on plant 
closings; this reduces ability to adjust demand 
1982 • Escort built at four plants – Edison, Wayne, San Jose and St. Thomas 
• Reduced production volumes – UAW agrees to alternating shift routine – 
10 days on and then 10 days off.  Saved jobs and kept skilled workers 
available for when sales picked up 
• Cuts in plant scheduling 
• Lincoln Mercury – a second shift added and 1100 workers recalled at St. 
Louis to increase output 
1983 • 18% of cars built on overtime between July and December 
• Production increases of Marquis and Grand Marquis at St. Louis and 
Chicago 
• Second shift added for Mark and Lincoln and an increase in line speed for 
Wixom MI  
1985 • Tooling up to build 500,000 Taurus and Sable (sister cars) 
1986 • Delayed plans to drop Grand Marquis due to strong market demand 
1987 • UAW agreement stipulates no UAW employee could be laid off due to 
domestically made component or car being replaced by an imported 
vehicle.  And a moratorium on plant closings granted to UAW 
1989 • Able to manage inventory adjustments by reducing daily overtime – not 
until January 1990 did they need to close plants.  This is because Ford had 
kept capacity low, revamping existing facilities instead of building new 
ones 
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1990 • Ford closes plants for 85 plant weeks  and plans cuts to salaried staff 
1992 • Increasing capacity of medium/heavy truck facilities 
1993 • Plans to sell 800,000 of Mondeo world car yearly 
1994 • Increased capacity at  St. Louis plant by 135,000 units (to 445,000 units) 
• Halved production of Aerostar van 
• Michigan truck plant going to three crew  for an increase of 32,000 units 
1997 • Shuttering Lorain plant for up to two years 
2002 • Large downsizing activity – 35,000 jobs and five NA plants (Edison, 
Ontario Truck Oakville, St. Louis, Cleveland casting and Michigan-based 
Vulcan forge) – Shrinking capacity by 1 million units by mid decade 
• Discontinued low margin plates – Cougar, Villager, Continental, and 
Escort 
2004 • Ford to cut a shift at Oakville 
• Closures of Ontario Truck, Edison, and Rouge plants 
• Wayne experiencing multiple down weeks to trim inventory 
2005 • Major reshuffling calling for 14 plants closing (including St. Louis, Atlanta, 
Wiixom, Twin Cities, Norfolk, and Batavia transmission) and reduction of 
hourly workforce by 25,000 to 30,000 jobs by 2012 
2007 • 38,000 UAW members accepted buyout packages 
 
Table A5 GM Production Volume Flexibility 
Year GM - Production Volume Flexibility 
1971 • Plants working 6 days a week  
1973 • Closed down full-size model assembly plants for a week prior to 
Christmas break 
1974 • Cutback of full size production in anticipation of more small car demand.   
• Closed assembly plants at various points throughout the year to manage 
inventory 
1980 • Ceased production of full-size models at South Gate and St. Louis 
• South Gate idled from March 1980 to March 1981 
• Reduced line speeds at many Olds factories towards end of model years 
1982 • Closed indefinitely South Gate, Fremont and Lakewood plants 
1982 • Consolidating two rear-drive assembly plants into one to produce front-
drive cars for ’86 – layoff of 3600 workers 
• Second shift added to Livonia engine plant 
1983 • Second shifts added at Janesville and Lordstown for Cavaliers;  
• Second shift added at Oklahoma for Celebrity 
• Use of significant overtime at Lansing 
• Layoffs, line speed reductions and idle weeks for inventory control at 
Willow Run 
1984 • Fiero and 2000 Sunbird run extended into November - Fiero car always in 
short supply  
• 6000 production extended to North Tarrytown 
• Daily and Saturday overtime common for Cadillac 
1985 • Second shift added at Fremont for Nova’s 
• Daily and Saturday overtime common  
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1986 • A wave of plant closings – mostly inefficient and redundant older ones 
• Portion of Fremont (NUMMI) turned over to Toyota for production of 
Corolla 
1987 • Three cutbacks in production  
• Reduced demand at Fiero dropped output to one shift at Pontiac 
• Norwood closed permanently 
• GM eliminated second shift indefinitely at Buick City 
1989 • Framingham added to indefinitely idled list 
• Lakewood closing in mid 1990 
• Sales slow down led to sporadic one and two week plant shutdowns  
1990 • New plant – Saturn at Sprint Hill 
1991 • Major losses leading to closing 21 plants, idling 74,000 employees over 4 
years 
1992 • Saturn moving to three shift production in June of 1993 
1994 • Grand Prix adds second shift, recalling 750 laid off workers 
• Capacity hikes at several plants for pickups, vans and SUVs 
• Saturn cut production 25% in March through May due to slow sales and 
rail car shortages 
• Delayed planned closure of St. Catharine’s engine plant 
2000 • Built first U.S. Greenfield plant since 1986 
2001 • Sporadically idled Orion (as opposed to reduce line speed – this saved 
850 workers) 
• Closed Ste. Therese 
2004 • Closed Saginaw Iron plant 
• Closed Baltimore assembly plant 
• Expanded Flint South engine plant by 500,000 square feet 
• Idling of Linden plant – could not be closed due to union contract 
2005 • Restructuring plan to close 9 facilities, change operations at four plants 
and cut 30,000 jobs in 3 years 
• Close a line at Oshawa, idle No 1 line at Spring Hill and cut third shift at 
Moraine and Oshawa 
• In total, expected output reduction from 6.2 million to 4.3 million by 2008 
 
Table A6 Chrysler Production Volume Flexibility 
Year Chrysler - Production Volume Flexibility 
1971 • Minimum plant shutdowns for inventory adjustments 
1972 • Relatively constant production pattern – few peaks and valleys in schedules 
• Valiant used same basic body for 6 years – very rare in the industry  
1973 • Layoffs and production cutbacks to manage big car inventories that 
skyrocketed due to energy shortages 
 
1974 • Plant downtime used in early and latter parts of calendar year (energy crisis 
and recession respectively) 
1975 • Intermittent assembly plant shutdowns and layoffs to keep pace with slow 
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sales 
1978 • Chrysler’s most modern plants operating at capacity early in 1979 
1980 • Closed 8 plants and cut workforce by 31% 
1981 • Lynch Road assembly mothballed 
1983 • Employees working 10 hour shifts seven days a week to facilitate stamping 
needs (led to wildcat strike) 
• Dodge production rose 46.5% straining capacity 
• Most U.S. facilities double shifted  
• Expected to add five shifts between 1983 and 1984 at each of St. Louis plant 
1, St. Louis Plant 2, Sterling Heights, Warren and Windsor 
1984 • Opened 6th US assembly plant in Sterling Heights to assemble two products – 
Chrysler LeBaron and Dodge Lancer 
• Added additional source for vans at St. Louis (in addition to Windsor) 
• Corporate goals to increase production capacity by 25%  
1987 • Plant acquisitions from AMC 
• Closing of a number of plants 
• Belvedere added a second shift to new full-size front drive cars 
1989 • Slow sales led to sporadic one and two week plant shutdowns 
• Closing assembly plants at Detroit Jefferson Ave and St. Louis No. 1 
• Cancellation of second shift at Jefferson Avenue 
1990 • Slow sales led to sporadic one and two week plant shutdowns 
• Third shift added at Windsor for small vans 
1993 • Increasing outputs of minivans with a three-shift operation at Windsor 
• Sterling Heights can produce 190,000 units on 1 shift; 290,000 on two shifts 
with overtime and 330,000 on a three crew system 
• Increasing capacity of vehicle assembly and powertrain over 3 years – up 
6000 jobs and 500,000 units 
1994 • Second shift added at Sterling Heights following start up of new JA cars 
1995 • Unshuttering St. Louis South plant to increase production of Dodge Ram 
1996 • New Brazil plant to assemble Dakota pickups 
2000 • PT cruiser production hiked at Mexico plant 
• Week of shut down to control inventory prior to start up of new small vans 
2001 • Downsizing – 19,300 workers by 2001; another 4200 by 2002 and then 
another 2500 by 2003 
• Closing Mound Rd at Warren and Toluca Transmission plant; Campo Largo 
operation in Brazil and Pillette road in Windsor 
2002 • Closed Pillette plant 
• Mercedes reducing output in Germany of short term contract employees 
• Planned 12,000 workers to retire 
2004 • 35,000 employees reduced 
• Third shift added at Warren for new midsize 
 
2006 • Belvidere plant added third shift and overtime shifts 
• Production cut of 135,000 for second half of the year 
2007 • Calls for 11,000 hourly job cuts and a capacity decrease of 400,000;  achieved 
through shift reductions at three truck plants and a minivan plant 
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Table A7 Ford Production Mix Flexibility 
Year Ford – Production Mix Flexibility 
1964 • Having plants dedicated to a single car is unusual – but Mercury was out of St. 
Louis 
1971 • Developed “back to back” launch between model years – close on Friday and 
open on Monday/Tuesday with new model.  Changeover week output closer to 
50% rather than 10% during changeovers 
1972 • Increased use of “running changes” which means improving a model in 
between model years 
1973 • Major model switch to production favouring small cars in 60 to 40 ratio 
including:   Pinto production rate increase at Metuchen; redesigning Dearborn 
to produce Mustang II; Pinto production rate increase at San Jose; Mustang II 
added to San Jose; second shift added at San Jose; Chicago conversion to 
intermediate Torino; Wayne conversion to Maverick output.  In total, adding 1 
million small car units within 12 months.  Called “fastest and most expensive 
production model-mix shift in history” 
1974 • Employing imports from European operations 
1975 • More running changes than ever before 
1977 • Satisfying full-size and intermediate demand – changed over two small car 
plants early while full-size cars didn’t change over models until August 
1979 • Mustang and Thunderbird built from the Fairmont platform.  Body frame 
platform for LTD II and old Thunderbird eliminated.  A reduction in platforms 
1983 • Big cars and small cars built on the same platform in St. Thomas (Grand 
Marquis with Ford Escort and Lynx) 
• Dual front and rear drive production permitted swings based on market 
demand 
1989 • Retooling Edison from Escort to Ranger compact pick up trucks mid-year 
1991 • Converting St. Louis from Aerostar to Explorer SUV 
1994 • Ford announcing desire to reduce platforms from 24 to 16 
1996 • UAW agreement where Ford must replace hourly workers that retire, die or 
quit on a one to one basis (with some caveats) 
• Trims platforms from 24 to 16, and engines from 30 to 14 
• Ford absorbing workers from Flat Rock into UAW agreement providing 
flexibility to shift Ford workers and Ford products into and out of the plant 
1997 • Low investment vehicle (aimed at China, India, Brazil, other emerging places) 
would be very flexible – same platform for a pickup, car, van, four-wheel drive  
1998 • Philippines plant capable of three body styles – Ranger pickup, Laser Liata and 
Econovan 
2002 • Flexible manufacturing taking hold in Europe (later in North America) involving 
investments in supplier parks close to assembly plants.  Chicago an example, 
and other plants including Kansas City, Norfolk, and Dearborn (Rouge)  
• Rouge redone to accommodate three distinct platforms instead of two 
2004 • Ford Focus is third vehicle built on global C-segment C1 architecture  
• Overabundance of body on frame capacity for truck and SUV; not as much 
capacity cross/utility vehiclesChicago plant involves multi-supplier park and 
flexible assembly line capable of building eight models from two platforms 
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• Dearborn plant capable of building nine models from three platforms 
 
2007 • Preparation for cross utility vehicles (Ford Edge and Lincoln MKX) combined 
Oakville Ontario and Ontario Truck into a single flexible campus 
• Plan in place called Global Product Development System (GDPS) in order to 
bring vehicles out of Mazda quicker 
 
Table A8 GM Production Mix Flexibility 
Year GM Production Mix Flexibility 
1968 • Central General Motors Assembly Division took over responsibility of 6 of 11 
assembly plants for Chevrolet and Fisher Body Division.  This move was made 
to achieve greater flexibility in processing chassis and body operations 
1971 • Shifted plants around – put Nova in Van Nyus and Norwood plants; Moved 
Camaro from Van Nuys to Norwood  
1973 • Laid off workers while resourcing from big to small cars was carried out 
1977 • Sourcing changes – LeMans added at Baltimore and dropped at Lakewood; 
Sunbird added at Lordstown; Phoenix added at Willow Run and North 
Tarrytown; and Ventura dropped at Van Nuys 
1978 • Looking to centralize engine manufacturing more; Chevrolet shared its V-8 with 
other divisions for first time; Chevrolet typically went alone 
• Linden ended production of C-body cars several months earlier than other 
plants to convert to front-drive E body 
1979 • Multi-divisional sourcing of supplies –such as engines from Chevrolet to Buick, 
Oldsmobile and Pontiac 
• Oldsmobile providing diesels for other divisions – Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick and 
Cadillac 
• Pontiac’s fuel efficient engines sold to others within GM family 
• Olds exchanged some production capacity dedicated to H-body Starfire cars for 
additional X-car allocation 
1980 • Pontiac producing 4-cylinders for other divisions – phasing out V-8s to make 
more four cylinders 
• Oldsmobile produced diesel and gasoline V-8’s for all divisions – more diesels 
given gasoline crunch 
• Cadillac using Buick’s V-6 until it could produce its own 
1981 • Corvette production moved to Bowling Green from St. Louis 
• Importing 4 cylinder engines from GM do Brazil 
1982 • In exchange for pay concessions, GM agreed not to close four component 
plants 
• Converting Pontiac plant to other use 
1983 • ‘88s and 98’s started at Cadillac’s Detroit plant – first time Cadillac shared its 
home plant 
• GM-20 (N-cars) being build by Oldsmobile for Olds, Pontiac and Buick on a 
single line 
• Buick City is born by converting 60 year old unrelated component 
manufacturing and assembly plants into a 500 acre state of the art facility  
1984 • Buick City to build 314,000 cars annually – uses maximum JIT parts delivery – 
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just one day of components on hand 
1985 • LeSabre and Olds 88 designed on new platform 
• Hamtramck plant included robot painters 
1986 • N-car trio – So three cars based on N-Body 
• E/K trio – three cars based on this (Buick, Olds and Cadillac) 
• Some difficulties from synergies with vehicles looking very similar 
1987 • Mix of 4 door sedans and 5 door hatchbacks for NUMMI’s Nova 
• Specialized plant in Lansing for luxury 2 seater Reatta 
• Cadillac employing “simultaneous engineering” for quick design changes to 
things like grill panels and tail-lights 
1988 • Cadillac only fully integrated and self-contained GM North American car 
division – they considered moving all output to a single plant in Hamtramck 
1989 • Some switching around – Lordstown van output move to Flint and then Flint 
moves to Janesville and then Janesville to Lordstown 
• Lumina trio – coupe, sedan and minivan on same platform 
• Chevrolet, Pontiac and Olds splitting APV output from North Tarrytown 
1991 • Consolidation of engine and transmissions operations into the GM Powertrain 
Division 
1997 • Additional concerns that distinctive brand equity difficult when building 
Chevrolets, Opels and Saturns from the same architecture 
• Shifted work from UAW plants in Pontiac to Oshawa where CAW agreed to 
different work rule changes 
1998 • GMT800 program was future of GM’s SUV and pickups.  Eventually would form 
basis of 40 models.  Used a hydroformed frame with three box-shaped 
modules that could be mixed and matched to produce maximum model 
variation with minimum parts.  Four front models, four mid sections and two 
rear sections created 14 models.  Result was reduced build time, less 
changeover downtime and improved differentiation 
• Bulldozing inefficient plants to build state of the art facilities with modular 
assembly that operated 24 hours a day (Yellowstone) 
1999 • Project Yellowstone called for two new assembly plants (Lansing and 
Lordstown) with suppliers bringing up to 15 built-up modules including interior 
cockpits and doors.  (Heavily challenged by UAW) 
2003 • Equinox based on same Theta platform as Saturn 
• Saab building first SUV based on GM’s GMT360 midsize truck platform 
• Cobalt marked North American arrival of GM’s global Delta platform (also used 
by Opel’s Astra) 
2005 • New flexible manufacturing at Oshawa 
2006 • Increased use of shared global platforms 
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Table A9 Chrysler Production Mix Flexibility 
Year Chrysler  Production Mix Flexibility 
1973 • Reliant on Colt for its subcompact vehicle – lack of domestic subcompact left 
Dodge and Chrysler in the lurch 
1978 • Lynch Road plant only ’79 model year plant to build a single body style 
exclusively 
1979 • Shutdown Hamtramck assembly plant which was 6 stories high 
• Eliminated the production sales bank system 
1981 • Continued use of sister K-cars – Reliant and Aries 
1983 • Windsor gutted and replaced with minivan – 123 robots helped with assembly 
• Chrysler Laser built on same line as Reliant and LeBaron at St. Louis 
1986 • Chrysler and Plymouth separated – as part of the trend to distinguish cars from 
one another despite shared platforms 
• Building upscale subcompact alongside H-cars at Sterling Heights 
1987 • Switching production from Belvedere to former AMC plant in Kenosha lost 6 
months of production of subcompact L cars 
• Another transfer from St. Louis to Kenosha – m-cars Gran Fury, Fifth Avenue 
and Dodge Diplomat 
1988 • Modern UAW agreement brought influx of robots (from 70 to 220) 
1992 • New Yorker and LHS sharing a body and output 
• Ram and Dakota trucks sharing a line at Warren 
1996 • CAW negotiation yielded job security improvements.  All jobs lost to 
outsourcing would be replaced one to one 
• Chrysler simplified minivan to have a fourth sliding door after 90% of orders 
had that option 
1997 • China concept vehicle – idea of a really inexpensive and easy to manufacture 
vehicle for China 
• Adapting continuous improvement system from Toyota 
• Talk of integrating passenger car platforms to reduce investment and focus on 
light truck/SUV capacity – but stopped short of abandoning cars due to cyclical 
nature of the industry 
2002 • Built new Pacifica platform for station wagon, but will be the basis for next 
generation of minivans 
• Sharing underpinnings of Neon with Mitsubishi- produced at Belvedere 
• Joint platform with Mitsubishi for C-segment cars with possible expansion to D-
segment 
2005 • Announcement by CEO that by end of 2008 more than 60% of his groups 
assembly plants would be feature advanced flexible manufacturing technology 
capable of building multiple models off varied platforms on the same assembly 
line 
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Table A10 Ford Partnering Flexibility  
Year Ford – Partnering Flexibility 
1983 • Constructing assembly and stamping plants in Mexico to build 130,000 cars 
annually for U.S. 
1984 • New engine from Mazda for the Escort and Tempo  
• Merkur vehicles received from Germany 
1985 • Ford division getting version of Mazda 626 from Mazda’s first US assembly 
plant in Flat Rock 
1986 • Front drive version of Mustang being produced at U.S. Flat Rock assembly plant 
• Festiva coming from Kia – a mini-compact 
• Lynx being imported from Mazda based on the 323 frame 
• Opened first Mexican assembly plant 
1987 • Probe being produced at Mazda’s Flat Rock based on 626; included engineers 
from both companies but no JV 
• JV with Volkswagen to build and market cars in Brazil and Argentina 
• Finalizing plans to build a minivan in North America  with Nissan 
• Tracer from Mexico plant replaced Lynx 
• Additional model in Merkur line from Germany 
1989 • Escort coming from Wayne MI and Hermosillo Mexico 
• Merkur from Germany dropped 
1991 • Ford partnering with Nissan to build small vans (Mercury Villager and Nissan 
Quest) at Avon Lake plant.  Ford’s role assembler; Nissan design and 
engineering 
1992 • Ford purchased 50% of Mazda Flat Rock facility 
• New world car: built in Kansas, engines from Mexico and Belgium, transmission 
from Batvia, U.S. built transmission 
1994 • Ford of Europe to supply Mazda with rebadged version of Fiesta 
1995 • Galaxy mini-van launched jointly with Volkswagen in Portugal 
• Raised stake in Mazda to 35% 
1997 • Combined Mazda cycle plan for first time – so a larger optimization of facilities 
and skills over next 10 years 
• Trotman expresses continued support for global vehicles  
1998 • Last year for Nissan mini-van JV  
• Could not get sliding door in time for launch of mini-van from Ford’s Visteon 
parts, so went with GM’s parts department 
• Mazda 626 designed in Ford’s Small Vehicle Center in Cologne – so may share 
same platform as next world car 
1999 • Sold rights to produce vehicles at their AutoEuropa plants – a Volkswagen JV in 
Portugal 
2000 • JV with Alfa Romeo to build aluminum engine components in Windsor; had a 
Nemak partnership with Alfa Romeo since 1979 
2005 • JV with Peugeot for two new power plants 
• JV with Changan and Mazda in China engine plant  
2008 • New B-segment car based on Mazda2 underpinnings 
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Table A11 GM Partnering Flexibility  
Year GM – Partnering Flexibility 
1972 • Purchased interest in Isuzu – Importing light truck 
1973 • Reliance on Opel for subcompact 
1975 • Buick shifted from Opels to a T-car from Japan 
1979 • New diesel engine coming from Isuzu 
1983 • JV announced with Toyota to produce small cars at an idle GM plant in 
Fremont 
• Deals with Isuzu and Suzuki Motors to import up to 300,000 compacts starting 
in 1985 
1984 • Nova built with Toyota at Fremont as part of NUMMI pilot 
• Cars from Isuzu and Suzuki started to come in 
1985 • Plans for Pontiac branded South Korean subcompact imported from Daewoo 
Heavy Industries 
1986 • GM getting bodies for Allante from Italy’s Pininfarina S.p.A 
1987 • Sprint and Spectrum captive imports helped a lot 
• NUMMI built Nova not measuring up to Chevette or Ford Escort 
1988 • Establishing Geo franchise including Suzuki and Isuzu vehicles as well as Prizm 
(Nova replacement at NUMMI) and Geo Storm (NUMMI) 
1989 • JV with Saab Scania to jointly produce cars for sale in West Europe 
• Formed JVs with governments in East Germany and Hungary to begin 
production in 1990s 
• Canada based GM Suzuki plant at CAMI to produce Tracker replacing Japanese 
imports with Canadian imports 
• Daewoo’s LeMans vehicle strong – it was based on the West German Opel 
Kadett 
1997 • Long 2 month strike in order to take greater advantage of global outsourcing 
• Possible exchange of car production with Daewoo 
2000 • GM investing 20% in Fiat – resulting in a JV for purchasing and powertrain 
operations in Europe and South America 
2001 • Planning on naming suppliers “lead interior integrators” to manage 
development of passenger compartment of every NA vehicle.  GM would 
assume the overseeing and benchmarking roles 
• Signed non-binding agreement to acquire large chunk of Daewoo 
2002 • Cut share of Isuzu from 49% to 12% 
• GM exporting Meriva to Canada from Brazil – first global car GM launched in 
Brazil before Europe 
2003 • Equinox featuring Chinese built engine 
2005 • Fiat deal exited – but 50/50 JV for engines remains 
• GM dumps 20% in Fuji (Interesting note – Toyota jumped in with an 8.7% stake 
in order to tap capacity of Subaru plant in Indiana and build Toyotas 
2006 • Unloaded 20.4% stake in Suzuki and its stake in Isuzu 
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Table A12 Chrysler Partnering Flexibility 
Year Chrysler – Partnering Flexibility 
1970 • JV with Mitsubishi for production of vehicles for Japanese and other world 
markets 
1971 • Purchased 15% equity in Mitsubishi 
1972 • Shifted Cricket from Great Britain to Japan to be built by Mitsubishi 
1974 • Sourcing small engines and manual transaxles from Volkswagen for 
domestically built subcompact car 
1977 • Increased number of cars coming from Mitsubishi - 4 
1980 • Was going outside Chrysler for parts 
1981 • Jointly producing subcompact with Peugeot SA and getting 450,000 diesel  
engines (but then Peugeot pulled out in 1982) 
• Increased breadth of vehicles from Mitsubishi 
1984 • JV with Mitsubishi to build cars at new plant in Illinois under name Diamond 
Star Motors 
1986 • AMC to begin production of Chrysler’s full-size rear-drive cars in Kenosha in 
1987 
• Mitsubishi venture underway at Bloomington Illinois 
1987 • Mitsubishi engine powers New Yorker vehicles 
1988 • Cancelled share of output of Summit from Mitsubishi’s Diamond Star plant 
• Up to 55,000 four door K-cars imported from Mexico (despite UAW objections) 
1989 • JV with Renault to produce Junior jeep SUV in Spain 
• Continued use of Mitsubishi imported vehicles – and from Diamond Star 
1990 • Dropping plans with partners – out of the ’92 Hyundai Sonata deal with Korea’s 
Hyundai’s new plant in Quebec 
• Out of JV with Renault over jeep 
• Halved equity with Mitsubishi 
1993 • Eagle Talon, Dodge Avenger and Chrysler Seabring built at Diamond Star plant 
1994 • Multi-year deal reached to purchase from Italy’s VM Motori SpA 200,000 2.5 L 
diesel engines for Voyager and Cherokee models in EUrope 
1995 • Moving all engines in house by end of century 
• Negotiated end of MMC’s manufacture of Dodge Stealths 
1996 • Partnership between BMW and Chrysler to produce engines in Latin America 
for sale outside of North America 
1997 • JV with GM to build 4-wheel drive transfer cases, manual transmissions and 
other driveline products 
2000 • A deal between Daimler Chrysler, Mitsubishi and Kia to build high quality low 
cost cars for all world markets – like Neon 
2001 • JV with Mitsubishi to build engines in Germany for use in Smart and Mitsubishi 
cars 
2002 • Underpinnings of Neon shared with Mitsubishi 
• Partnership with Hyundai and Mitsubishi to build 4 cylinder engines 
• Sold off an assembly plant to Magna International;  Production of Voyager 
moved to Magna Steyr joining Jeep Grand Cherokee and M-Class 
2004 • Engine manufacturing with Mitsubishi and Hyundai increase size 
• Dropped relationship with Mitsubishi to 25% 
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• Sold stake in Hyundai 
2005 • Deal with Volkswagen to build minivans at Chrysler’s St. Louis plant 
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A13 Reflexivity Statement 
An important practice in qualitative research is to practice reflexivity so as to understand 
the origins of a researcher’s own perspective and in the process enhance the objectivity of a 
scholars research outputs.  A reflexivity statement captures a researcher’s perspective and 
recounts some of the scholar’s experience in conducting the research.  
First I will comment on my relationship to the automotive industry.  I have never been an 
employee of any organization within the automotive industry.  This means that I read detailed 
firm and industry analysis from the perspective of an industry outsider.  Any biases regarding the 
automotive industry that I held were those of a casual observer of popular news outlets.  To 
sensitize me to the industry, I read two to three books detailing the very early years of the 
automotive industry including a book on Henry Ford and an economic survey of the automotive 
industry prior to 1945.  Both of these books provided me with a historically grounded 
understanding of the automotive industry. 
This research was conducted as part of my pursuing a doctorate degree in management.  
In earlier versions of my thesis proposal, this research appeared as an effort to connect how firms 
respond to disturbances to a multi-level theoretical framework called Panarchy which builds on 
complex adaptive systems and resilience.  While this theoretical framework was not explicitly 
referenced, I believe that some of these ideas permeated my work (confirmed by Robert 
Lannigan, a complex systems expert and thesis reviewer, who noted the strong undertones of 
complex systems theory that were present in this thesis).  Further, I have an enduring interest in 
connecting ideas of sustainability and strategy together which may have further influenced my 
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focus and data analysis such as by sensitizing me to perceive ideas critical to my research such as 
persistent disturbances. 
There was no direct funding for this research, however I was supported throughout my 
PhD by funds originating from Western University, my thesis advisor, an OGS scholarship and a 
personal SSHRC grant.  None of these funding sources exhibit direct influence on the content or 
direction of my research.  
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